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 ABSTRACT 
 
Broadly speaking the dissertation is concerned with the repetition compulsion (RC) and the 
question of why we repeat; the motivation and form of agency behind repetition. A review of 
existing literature indicates that there is little consensus concerning these points and that 
interpretations of the concept vary widely, resulting in a loss of construct validity and utility.  
In the aim of remedying this state of affairs, I return to Freud’s Beyond the pleasure 
principle; his most comprehensive attempt to answer the question of why we repeat undeniably 
painful and damaging experience. In the paper Freud delineates an observed phenomenon, that 
of RC, and follows this descriptive account with a theoretical explanation based on the proposel 
for the first time of a dual instinct theory. My feeling is that the paper stands at a theoretical 
crossroads; a point where Freud was strongly nudged in a new theoretical direction suggested 
by mounting clinical evidence – that of prioritising object relating – but chose to turn back in 
support of drive theory instead.  
I argue that with the eventual movement towards prioritising the object, observed in 
object relations theory, the question of the relationship between RC and its negation of the 
pleasure principle was forgotten; discarded along with Freud's dual instinct theory. Freud's 
basic statement on the mechanics of RC can be read as, 'we repeat instead of remember and in 
these instances what we do not remember is due to repression'. I would say this differently after 
taking Fairbairn's thought into account as 'we internalize instead of remember and we repeat 
because of what we have internalized'.  
For Fairbairn the primary target of repression is neither memories nor impulses, but 
rather internal(ized) objects and parts of the ego bonded to them, that is object relationships. 
Following these developments and concerning my own research question, a predominantly 
Fairbairnian object relations account provides key theoretical entities/processes, that are 
consolidated in the form of an initial explanatory hypothesis, which is put forward for 
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investigation across multiple cases. The hypothesis, which according to the methodology 
employed, is necessarily a tentative one (open to reformulation), states broadly that 
‘dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object 
relationship’.  
Using published case studies as data, I identify the dynamic (as opposed to etiological) 
causes of RC activity according to whether they qualify as necessary conditions. Analytic 
Induction is employed as a method of identifying relevant causal conditions, defined in 
dispositional terms, and my broader aim has been to develop a systematic research approach 
that employs a conception of causality in terms of tendency or disposition 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background to the Topic and Rational for Conducting the Study  
Freud introduces the concept of the repetition compulsion (RC) in an attempt to account for 
behaviour which is repetitive, unconscious, and intrinsically painful and damaging. His 
preliminary observation, relating to the reason for such behaviour, is the suggestion that we 
repeat instead of remember; that we relive experiences, because we have repressed them. My 
theoretical interest in RC, and the central aim of this research, has to do with a further 
exploration of just this question; the cause behind repetition.  
One answer to the question of why we repeat, that seems to come up in conversation 
among therapists, is the assumption of an inherent aim towards some form of restitution. I.e. 
that repetition aims at ‘healing’ or mastering. I have always found myself sceptical of this 
proposal, I think because of where the emphasis is lain – on the possibility of a hopeful 
outcome. Drawing on my own personal experience, and on my work as a psychotherapist, my 
feeling has been that repetition, of the kind under consideration, is generally a far more doomed 
enterprise. In short, that it is often repetition. I also feel that there is a qualitative character to 
it, which speaks to the immediate and automated, running contrary to a teleological aim 
towards something like restitution. Of course, this is the element captured by the term 
compulsion, and my feeling is that whatever drives this character, does so in a manner that 
mostly leads to disappointment, pain, destruction. If hope, healing or reason have a place, it is 
often as misguided or transitory epiphenomena.               
When I read through existing literature on RC, I found that there was little consensus 
concerning the cause of RC, and in fact widespread disagreement about most aspects of the 
phenomenon. Kubie (1939) for instance, writes that innumerable authors have signalled the 
untenable nature of the construct “by giving to the concept such widely diverse interpretations 
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as to render it almost meaningless” (p.390). He wrote this statement in 1939, and after a review 
of the literature it becomes clear that eighty years later the situation is more dire. Multiple, 
often contradictory, conceptions of it abound, many of which nevertheless seem valid in part. 
There are also strong arguments concerning construct utility and validity. Taken as a whole, 
there is an absence of precision and integration. I feel that RC is an extremely important 
descriptive insight, and yet as a construct it lacks specificity. There is no existing systematic 
attempt to organise and make sense of the various contributions, and if the construct is to have 
utility then some kind of synthesis of the diverse conceptions needs to occur. This then became 
a secondary goal of the current work; to establish a framework that can accommodate, both the 
complexity observed in RC activity – that is, can account for the multiplicity of elements which 
seem present in its functioning – and some of the central theoretical conceptualizations and 
insights about it. The conceptual framework that I have proposed is an object relations one, 
based primarily on the work of Fairbairn.        
To return to the central aim of this research, the question of causality, I would like to 
include brief indications of some of the key accounts existing in the literature, since my sense 
is that the object relations account I propose, will by the close of this work, be able to 
accommodate many of them. In these works, causality may be said to centre on the following 
issues: biased assessments of the environment (Morehead, 2002), expression of aggression 
(Inderbitzin & Levy; 1998), role change in terms of identification with the aggressor (Zulueta, 
1993; Shabad, 1993), reparative aims (Lipin,1963; Cohen, 1980), a restitutive tendency 
(Bibring, 1943), object seeking behaviour (Kubie,1941; Russel, 2006; Orlandini, 2004), 
analgesia attainment (Orlandini 2004), attempts at arousal modulation (van der Kolk, 1989), 
affect as a prime motivator (Russel, 2006), pre-symbolic experience (Wilson & Malatesta), 
compromise formation (Kubie, 1941).  
On the experiential level RC activity is characterised by a lack of conscious awareness 
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or conscious deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its functioning are described, as 
being either unconscious, dissociated or ego dystonic. Broadly speaking, this dissertation is an 
attempt to take seriously, the paradox of an alien or foreign, ‘compulsive’ agency, that acts 
outside of awareness. My proposal is that an object relations framework is best suited to 
account for the unconscious nature of RC experience, specifically one which grants active 
agency to aspects of an internal object relationship. Internal objects are here distinguished from 
mental representations on the grounds of evincing dynamism or agency, a capacity derived 
from their lineage; their nature as split off subdivisions of the ego which retain the attributes of 
that structure.  
 
 
Outline of the Process     
The core procedure of the research is a verification and test of a hypothesis. The object relations 
conceptualization of RC, provides the ingredients for this hypothesis, outlining proposed 
dynamic psychological causes of RC activity. The hypothesis is then applied, in turn, to an 
analysis of three published psychoanalytic case studies, and in line with the research method is 
open to modification, based on the findings of each successive case analysis.  
 
 
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter one begins with a discussion of Freud’s formulation of the repetition compulsion, 
which culminates in a working definition of the repetition compulsion. The core component of 
the chapter outlines a predominantly Fairbairnian object relations conceptualization of RC, and 
is followed by a presentation of the central defence mechanisms which are proposed to bring 
about RC experience, within this framework. The chapter culminates in the generation of the 
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hypothesis mentioned above.    
 
Chapter two is fundamentally a presentation of the research method, Analytic Induction (AI). 
The chapter begins by outlining the research logic and procedure, continuing with some core 
critiques of the method and my rebuttals of these. Other key areas which are covered, centre 
on the philosophical underpinnings of the research approach, steps involved in the research 
process, issues relating to data, limitations of the method, generalizability, consideration of 
alternative research methods and quality control.  
 
Chapter three is a presentation and analysis of the first case, Freud’s (1909) Notes on a Case of 
Obsessional Neurosis. The first portion is concerned with an identification and description of 
RC activity in the life of the patient, in accordance with the working definition generated from 
chapter one. This is followed by an analysis of the dynamic psychological conditions which 
are identified as bringing about that activity. The chapter culminates with a consideration of 
the hypothesis, again, generated from chapter one, which is confirmed or altered in line with 
the findings.   
 
Chapter four is a presentation and analysis of the second case, Karpman’s (1951) A 
Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Murder, and proceeds in the same fashion as the previous 
chapter. One point to emphasise is that it employs the altered hypothesis, following case one.  
 
Chapter four is a presentation and analysis of the third case, Stoller’s (1973) Splitting: A Case 
of Female Masculinity, and proceeds in the same fashion as the previous two chapters. As with 
case two, the altered hypothesis from the previous case analysis is employed.  
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Chapter five is essentially a discussion chapter of the research findings.  
 
Chapter six is the concluding chapter.      
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AN OBJECT RELATIONS ACCOUNT OF THE REPETITION 
COMPULSION 
 
 
This chapter aims to produce a working definition of the repetition compulsion (RC), based on 
Freud’s presentation of the construct, as well as an object relations hypothesis about the causes 
underlying repetition.   
Most of what Freud has to say about the repetition compulsion (RC), is detailed in two 
papers, which have the construct as their central focus. The first, is Remembering, Repeating 
and Working-through, and the second, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. I will deal with each in 
turn.    
 
 
The First Work  
In Freud's (1914) first comprehensive consideration of RC, Remembering…, he includes the 
following as examples of that which may be repeated, as RC activity, from childhood: forgotten 
attitudes and modes of relating, disappointments, feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, 
and experiences of shame (p.150). He further widens the scope to include all that is no longer 
repressed and has become part of the manifest personality – inhibitions, unserviceable attitudes, 
pathological character-traits, and neurotic symptoms (p.151). 
If we consider these examples, it is difficult to see how they can come to form any 
meaningful and specific category of pathology. They are instances of general human 
psychological functioning; a broad and diverse range of phenomena that cannot justifiably or 
productively be grouped together as the significant psychological content of a compulsive need 
to repeat. I will return to this point below, when considering further examples of RC activity in 
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other of Freud's works. For now, I would like to explore one area which is given prominence 
in Remembering...; the relation of RC to transference. As Freud states, “what interests us most 
of all is naturally the relation of the compulsion to repeat to the transference and to resistance” 
(p.151).   
In the paper Freud seems for the most part to be viewing RC as an equivalent of 
transference, stating that “...the transference is itself only a piece of repetition, and...the 
repetition is a transference of the forgotten past...” (p.151). Although the paper evidences a 
clear overlap or fluidity between the two constructs, Freud simultaneously often 'treats' the 
terms as though different. The grounds for distinction are however never made explicit. Adding 
to confusion there are passages in the paper where it is unclear which construct he refers to. 
What he seems to be suggesting though is that transference may replace RC in the analytic 
setting through a process of transformation; that repetition as RC is different from repetition as 
transference. It should be noted that the distinction is not one of place, between the analytic 
setting and the outside world, as Freud considered that transference occurs in both (1910, 
1925), as may RC (1914, 1920). Concerning the notion of 'replacement' as 'transformation', 
Freud says the following: 
  
“The main instrument, however, for curbing the patient's compulsion to repeat and for 
 turning it into a motive for remembering lies in handling the transference. We render 
the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the right to assert itself in a 
definite field. We admit it into the transference as a playground in which it is allowed 
to expand in almost complete freedom...” (p.154). 
 
 
 
8 
 
He adds that 
 
“the transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and real life 
through which the transition from the one to the other is made” (p.154).     
 
In other words, the analyst encourages the growth and establishment of the transference, and 
in doing so shepherds RC activity. This 'shepherding' activity involves a process of containment 
and also implies alteration; RC activity is made harmless because of inhabiting an intermediate 
region. I would note that this intermediate region, which is the transference, is defined by a 
high degree of 'non-action'. As Freud puts it, the analyst attempts to “...keep in the psychical 
sphere all the impulses which the patient would like to direct into the motor sphere...” (p.153). 
I would suggest that the primary grounds for distinguishing transference and RC here concerns 
action and non-action, or the recreation of events in reality as opposed to merely in the mind 
as an intrapsychic event. What remains at question is whether a differentiation along these 
grounds, between the psychological and behavioural, is sufficient to fundamentally distinguish 
between RC and transference. My feeling is that it is not, since the behaviour in question can 
simply be seen as a response to the transference experience, an additional outcome, but not 
something that exists in its own right independently of the transference. It would in fact be odd 
to expect that people would not in some way respond (even if just by blinking for instance) to 
what they are 'seeing' and feeling and so transference must surely include such an outcome as 
expected, and therefore as a characteristic feature. What I take from a reading of 
Remembering… is that Freud was unable to adequately distinguish between RC and 
transference. This tallies with a proposal that is made in the latter parts of this chapter, where 
transference is understood as a component of RC activity.   
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The Second Work   
Turning now to Beyond the Pleasure Principle, I begin with my overarching thought about the 
paper, which is that it stands at a theoretical crossroads – a point where Freud (1920) was 
strongly nudged to step off a precipice, so to speak, in a new theoretical direction suggested by 
mounting clinical evidence – but chose to turn back in support of drive theory instead. Areas 
of evidence include trauma and the aetiological role played by external experience, as well as 
the repetition of experience as observed in RC, which directly challenges the notion that 
impulse is directed towards pleasure (a tendency directed by the pleasure principle, a 
supposedly foundational overriding principle). What results is a desperate, perhaps even heroic 
attempt to save elements of his previous work by weaving a theoretical tangle of speculation.  
I feel that we will profit from splitting the paper into three sections. The first (Freud's 
sections I,II) introduce the notion of the pleasure principle and offer illustrations of behaviour 
which may exist at odds with it or 'beyond it', but after consideration are shown not to, largely 
due to the presence of secondary ‘pleasurable’ gains. In the second (section III in the paper) 
Freud delineates an observed phenomenon, RC. To do this he draws as he says on 
“...observations...based upon the transference and upon the life-histories of men and women...” 
(p.22). For the most part the section is a reiteration of the subject matter dealt with in 
Remembering... A noteworthy exception being his explicit statement that where RC is 
concerned, we observe the repetition of “...experiences which include no possibility of 
pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction” (p.20). It is important 
to note that he is here concerned with the repetition of experiences. The obvious question being 
why do we repeat them, when doing so would seem inherently undesirable. The third section 
(comprising IV, V, VI, VII) is opened with the statement that “what follows is speculation, often 
far-fetched...” (p.24). This is the more theoretical side of the paper and offers an account for 
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the phenomenon observed as RC in section two. It attempts a final answer to the question of 
why we repeat in the fashion described. It deals with the subject of instincts and the proposal 
for the first time of a dual instinct theory consisting of the life and death instincts. 
 
Section One  
Section one begins with an outline of the pleasure principle. Freud writes that, 
 
“...the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure 
principle. We believe, that is to say, that the course of those events is invariably set in 
motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final 
outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension – that is with an avoidance of 
unpleasure or a production of pleasure” (p.7).   
 
He clarifies that “...unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and 
pleasure to a diminution” (p.8). Therefore, if RC over-rides or negates the pleasure principle, 
which Freud claims it does, it would lead to an increase in excitation or tension. As a general 
observation I would suggest that this accords with clinical experience where we often find that 
what troubles certain individuals, bringing them to therapy, is the emotional pain and stress of 
repetitive experience; RC here creates tension and does not reduce it. 
 
Section Two  
It is in the 2nd section, that Freud for the first time makes explicit the painful and damaging 
nature of the behaviour he is trying to identify, singling out instances of behaviour which seem 
not to function in accordance with the pleasure principle. As Wilson and Malatesta (1989) note, 
by this stage in his writing RC “...is intended to account for more primitive phenomena, such 
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as masochism and separation distress (272). Freud argues that when we exclude unpleasurable 
behaviour where secondary gain or delayed gratification is evident, we observe occurrences 
that are unconscious and repetitive. He emphasises the point that RC “...recalls from the past 
experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have 
brought satisfaction...” (p.20). Making the unpleasurable aspect of RC explicit allows us to 
exclude examples which fail to meet that criteria and we can then fit all remaining instances 
under the rubric of repetitions of unwanted situations and painful emotions.   
Freud here offers anecdotal illustrations of RC as part of a descriptive presentation of 
the phenomenon. He writes that individuals under the compulsion to repeat often “...produce 
a plan or a promise of some grand present – which turns out as a rule to be no less unreal” 
(p.21). He continues with the suggestion that we have all encountered people “...whose human 
relationships have the same outcome: such as the benefactor who is abandoned in anger after 
a time by each of his protégés, however much they may otherwise differ from one another, and 
who thus seems doomed to taste all the bitterness of ingratitude; or the man whose friendships 
all end in betrayal by his friend; or the man who time after time in the course of his life raises 
someone else into a position of great private or public authority and replaces him by a new 
one; or, again, the lover each of whose love affairs with women passes through the same phases 
and reaches the same conclusion” (p.22). Incidentally, I would not be surprised if Freud is 
speaking of himself as benefactor. For the sake of illustration, I will assume that he is, and ask 
what he felt when he encountered for instance Jung and Adler – protégés both, the former 
whom he speaks of 'adopting as an eldest son, and of anointing as successor and crown prince' 
(McGuire, 1974:218). Was there the 'promise of some grand present'?   
 
Section Three  
What links section 2 and 3 is the observation that RC seems to possess instinct-like qualities. 
12 
 
As Freud puts it “the manifestations of a compulsion to repeat...exhibit to a high degree an 
instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the 
appearance of some 'daemonic' force at work ” (p.35). A similarity that is glossed over here 
might be that they both exhibit an inflexible persistence; the capacity to 'override' other mental 
processes in a compulsive or 'daemonic' fashion. Freud does not elaborate further on this point, 
and instead asks in what further, more precise manner is “...the predicate of being instinctual 
related to the compulsion to repeat?” (p.36). He reaches the following conclusion: “...an 
instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things...” (p.36).  
Freud puts forward various arguments in support of the notion of an 'organic 
compulsion to repeat', along with the contention that this quality defines instinct. I will not 
enter into an expansive consideration of the merits of these, although will note briefly that they 
have for the most part been discredited (Brenner, 2008). I also will not here follow Freud into 
his metaphysical musings about a proposed death instinct. What I would like to suggest, is that 
Freud’s description of RC as instinctual in quality has merit, and is a point I will return to 
shortly. Where I want to end with Beyond… however, is with a final statement about the 
pleasure principle. Freud eventually amends his initial statement about tension reduction as 
follows.   
 
“Pleasure and unpleasure...cannot be referred to an increase or decrease of a quantity 
(which we describe as 'tension due to stimulus')...It appears that they depend, not on 
this quantitative factor, but on some characteristic of it which we can only describe as 
a qualitative one” (p.160).  
 
What the pleasure principle aims at, therefore concerns an  alteration in the “...qualitative 
characteristic of the stimulus...” (p.161). Freud notes that the nature of this qualitative 
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characteristic remains largely unknown. RC therefore is amended, by implication, to not 
concern a quantitative alteration in tension but rather a qualitative change, but of what sort, we 
do not fully know. Freud suggests that it may be “...the rhythm, the temporal sequence of 
changes, rises and falls in the quantity of stimulus” (p.160). I will return to this point below, 
following a line of thought which leads me to believe that re-characterizing the pleasure 
principle along qualitative lines points to a conception of RC which grants a central role to the 
object rather than the drive. This is in conformity with the development and establishment of 
object relations theory, specifically as put forward by Fairbairn.                  
In closing, I would like to suggest that it is the phenomenological observations of RC 
which are most valuable in Freud's presentation of the entity. These may be retained without 
accepting Freud's explanatory and theoretical explanations, based on 'speculation, often far-
fetched'. This point applies to the illustrations of RC offered in section two, and also to his 
characterization of RC as instinctual in quality. One way of approaching the relationship of RC 
to instinct, is as a descriptive analogy concerning the magnitude of forces observed. In this 
sense, RC mirrors qualitative features of instinct. As the term compulsion suggests, it is as 
though people in the throes of RC, are impelled by primal forces which exist on the level of 
instinct. As Freud (1920) states of such individuals, “the impression they give is of being 
pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some 'daemonic' power...” (p.21). In short, 
something powerful and alien acts to propel behaviour which brings to mind the 
uncompromising nature of instinct. As Freud does, we may then wonder about this instinct-like 
quality. In what does it originate? The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to answer just 
this question.  
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A Working Definition of RC 
 
The above provides us with a working definition of RC. I would suggest that Freud's concept 
of RC is introduced as an attempt to account for behaviour which is repetitive, unconscious, 
and fundamentally painful and damaging. He writes that the individual does “not remember 
anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a 
memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” 
(1914:150). It is not however until Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where he singles out 
instances of behaviour which seem not to function in accordance with the pleasure principle, 
that he highlights and makes explicit the painful and damaging nature of the behaviour under 
consideration. He then emphasises the point that RC “...recalls from the past experiences which 
include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought 
satisfaction...” (p.20).   
 
The Repetition Compulsion Defined1  
 it is unconscious; characterized on an experiential level by a lack of conscious 
awareness or conscious rational deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its 
functioning are described, as being either broadly unconscious, or specifically, 
repressed, dissociated or ego dystonic. 
 it is a repetition of a past unpleasurable experience 
 it is unpleasurable because it is painful and damaging  
 RC should be thought of as the unconscious repetition of a ‘lived interpersonal 
situation’.     
 
1 The definition is reproduced as appendix a  
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In relation to the last point, RC concerns the repetition of an experience, rather than of 
cognition, and therefore does not include the kind of repetition viewed in obsessional neurosis. 
Cognitive repetition is furthermore excluded under the above RC definition, since it proceeds 
alongside an awareness of the fact of repetition. I.e. the patient suffering from obsessional 
thinking is keenly aware of the repetitive nature of his/her thought.  
 
 
RC and Object Relations  
Although RC is mentioned in object relations writings – due to the briefness of focus, and 
because it is often misrepresented – there is nothing approaching a specifically object relations 
conceptualization of the construct. Fairbairn (1955a) for instance in reaching the conclusion 
that RC should be dismissed as a concept, misrepresents Freud's statement on it by defining it 
as the persistence of traumatic scenes in mental life, otherwise known as intrusive 
symptomatology in contemporary trauma theory. Freud however clearly dismisses such 
intrusive symptomatology – considered as it is manifested in dreams – as an instance of RC, 
claiming instead that it is an attempt to “master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the 
anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis” (1920:32). Whether Freud's 
conclusion is correct need not concern us here, but rather at issue is Fairbairn's omission of the 
repetition of experience manifested in behaviour, in favour of an exclusive focus on recurring 
mental imagery.  
Klein offers various accounts of RC, always in passing, and without an attempt to either 
integrate them or to question their compatibility with each other. She equates RC to repetitive 
fantasy driven play, a form of 'acting out' (1926:135-137), again a conceptualization which 
Freud after consideration explicitly rejects (1920). She also sees it as a manifestation of 
superego functioning; a compromise expression of both desire and the need for punishment 
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(1927:179-180). Although such an account may have validity, echoing elements of Kubie's 
(1941) fuller statement on RC, it is 'mainstream' psychoanalytical rather than specifically object 
relational, and so will not assist us in a presentation of an object relations account. She also 
equates RC to obsessional behaviour (1940:350), which potentially misrepresents the 
construct. As Bibring (1943) notes the term compulsion is not meant in the sense of compulsive 
neurosis, but rather has a similar meaning to automatic, instinctual or impulsive repetition. One 
mention of RC by Klein (1932:170) could be said to be principally object relational, but being 
a single paragraph, it falls far short of a comprehensive statement. RC is here described as an 
ongoing compulsion to transform an unreal internal danger situation to a real external one2. 
Externalization is preferred since it decreases anxiety; the threat becomes less immediate (not 
already inside one), and greater opportunity is afforded for dealing with it (fight or flight 
responses).  
I should note that I have chosen to focus on object relations authors who highlight the 
vicissitudes of lived experience; the actual and specific qualities of a given object or object 
relationship, where processes of internalization are concerned. This is in line with the emphasis 
on the repetition of experience put forward in Freud's phenomenological description of RC, 
described above, and ultimately in line with the basic meaning of the term repetition 
compulsion which I feel must imply, at minimum, a degree of the repetition of a past lived 
experience. As such I will not include accounts which, like portions of Klein's work, conceive 
of internal objects as inherent phenomena or as originating from the drives (Mitchell, 1981). 
Nor will accounts which speak of the generalized nature of internalization be the focus3. Since 
the notion of RC suggests a direct aetiological link to painful and damaging experience, I 
 
2 It could be argued that aspects of this account are included in my understanding of projective identification, 
which is seen as an important mechanism in the production of RC activity.         
3 Examples are, Klein's observation that all of the external world encountered is continually absorbed and 
internalized by the ego (1935:286), Kernberg's (1984) notion of internalization as a broad fundamental 
maturational process, and Behrends & Blatt's (1985) conception of internalization as a primary condition of 
psychological growth. 
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assume that the processes by which 'good' objects are internalized do not specifically concern 
us. The focus will therefore be upon the vicissitudes of 'bad' experiences/'bad' objects. I am 
proposing that the internalization of 'bad' objects be seen as the basic building block of RC, or 
as the ground upon which RC is generated. 
   Following these stipulations, I draw firstly on the work of Fairbairn, and will continue 
to employ his theoretical paradigm as the core of my statement. Other authors considered are 
those that adapt and develop his framework in the areas that have most relevance to RC. In this 
sense the object relations take on RC which I present can be said to be fundamentally 
Fairbainian. My position concerning an object relations understanding of RC can be stated 
quite simply initially. RC involves the repetition of experience, the central aspect of which is 
the object relationship. In other words, the externalization of internal object relationships 
equates to, or manifests as, RC activity.  
 
 
From Freud to Fairbairn  
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud defines the pleasure principle as a tendency towards 
tension reduction, and RC as contradicting, antedating or overriding this tendency. He later 
(1914) amends this definition, proposing that the pleasure principle would be better conceived 
of as concerning a qualitative rather than quantitative alteration in tension4. He notes further 
that the nature of this qualitative factor remains largely unknown, but suggests that it may 
concern “...the rhythm, the temporal sequence of changes, rises and falls in the quantity of 
stimulus” (p.160). RC therefore is amended, by implication, to not concern a quantitative 
alteration in tension but rather a qualitative change, but of what sort, we do not fully know.  
 Freud's initial definition of the pleasure principle states that all stimulation causes 
 
4  See previous discussion.   
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tension experienced as unpleasure and necessitates reduction in line with pleasure principle 
functioning. The moment the move is made to a qualitative account, consideration not just of 
the amounts of stimuli but also of the kinds of stimuli becomes a factor, and therefore the 
qualities of specific interactions and by extension qualities of objects. This emphasis on the 
object is a fundamental tenant of Fairbairn's work which is discussed below. It can also be seen 
in contemporary infant observational studies where for instance Stern (2002) stresses the role 
of ongoing conditions and context in determining the direction of affect (pleasure or 
unpleasure) during stimuli reception. With the movement towards prioritising the object, the 
question of the relationship of RC – its negation of the pleasure principle – is forgotten. I 
believe it was so to speak thrown out with the bathwater, which took the form of Freud's dual 
instinct theory; a conceptualisation that has often been poorly received (Caropreso & Simanke, 
2008). This review can partly be seen as an attempt to reinsert the question of RC's relationship 
to the pleasure principle while taking into account developments in the conceptualization of 
the latter.   
Fairbairn's (1952) re-formulation of the libido theory begins with the proposal that 
libido be seen as predominantly object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking. The assertion 
champions the need for object relating, that is relationships with real others in the external 
world, as a primary motivator of behaviour. The pleasure principle is re-classed as a subsidiary 
principle regulating behaviour involving impoverished modes of object relating. What then 
becomes of Freud's statement that RC overrides the pleasure principle? To my mind the issue 
centres on the nature of libido and we therefore follow Fairbairn's reformulation to arrive at 
the statement that RC is best delineated as that which overrides the basic libidinal tendency, 
now described as object-seeking. It's the libidinal attitude defined as pleasure seeking which is 
the issue, and I argued above that Freud seemed aware in part of the limitations of such a stance, 
himself proposing a formulation that would result in greater prominence for the object. 
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Attempts to define RC seem to hinge in part on the ability to designate a form of pathology 
which contradicts or negates a fundamental motivational tendency towards 'the good' (however 
that may be defined). Freud therefore attempts to clarify what fundamental orientation is 
overridden in the instance of RC, and thereby, through the logic of 'negative space' so to speak, 
better understand that which does the overriding. Fairbairn offers a different understanding of 
'the good' and by extension I believe of RC.          
 If libido is re-cast as object-seeking, then the question becomes one of how to conceive 
the negation of this tendency, in the form of RC. My suggestion is that it is perfectly explained 
within the general framework of internalization offered by Fairbairn. For Fairbairn 
internalization is always seen as a compensation for, and alternative to object relating. It is a 
mode of protecting existing object relationships, but one that is also seen as fundamentally 
pathological in nature. He equates internalization, seen for instance in his presentation of 
schizoid phenomena, with an inevitable negation, to varying degrees, of present and future 
object-seeking behaviour and object relating behaviour. It is worth noting that authors not 
working within an object relations frame have highlighted the characteristic of RC activity to 
foreclose on relating (Russell, 2006; Herman, 1992; van der Kolk, 1989). The absence of 
relating and the fact of repetition suggest that 'relating', under RC functioning, may be largely 
an intrapsychic affair which prompts the question of the nature of the intrapsychic affair in 
question, with one observation (Fairbairn's) being that it concerns internal objects. For 
Fairbairn psychopathology (of which RC is an instance) broadly concerns “...the relationships 
of the ego to its internalized objects” (p.60).  
  
 
RC: Reformulation of the Basic Mechanics  
Freud's (1914) basic statement on the mechanics of RC can be read as, 'we repeat instead of 
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remember and in these instances what we do not remember is due to repression'. I would say 
this differently after taking Fairbairn's thought into account as 'we internalize instead of 
remember and we repeat because of what we have internalized'. For Fairbairn the primary target 
of repression is neither memories nor impulses, but rather internal(ized) objects and parts of 
the ego bonded to them. He offers two accounts of the formation in early childhood of 
endopsychic structure, the second a proposed reformulation of the first, but in both the relevant 
factor for our consideration is that objects are internalized to maintain a certain 'view' of the 
external object which allows for continued relating. The mechanisms of splitting, 
internalization and repression amount to a form of forgetting where the frustrating, unsatisfying 
or depriving aspects of the external object are split-off from the 'good' aspects. The 'bad' aspects 
are internalized5 in the form of the 'bad' internal object consisting of both a frustrating or 
rejecting aspect and an exciting, tempting or alluring aspect. The tensions defining the 
relationship ultimately remain unresolved by the process of internalization, being simply 
transferred to the internal as a relationship between the ego and its now internal objects. 
Repression is the method employed to cope with the internal situation and aggression directed 
at internal objects by the central ego is the primary method (of repression). As internal objects 
undergo repression, ego fragments bonded to them get 'pulled down' along with them, and the 
object-cathexis between ego fragments and internal objects is thereby maintained, all be it in 
repressed form. Of importance, is the observation that internal objects define the mode of the 
relationship and by extension the nature of the ego fragment attached to them. For instance, the 
rejecting aspect or object, otherwise known as the antilibidinal object, evokes aggression in its 
accompanying ego fragment, the antilibidinal ego; the quality of aggression is characteristic 
of, and defines the nature of the repressed ego fragment. The same can be said of the libidinal 
 
5 In the revised formulation of structure formation splitting occurs after internalization of the preambivalent object, 
but the final outcome is similar with the focus centring on the vicissitudes of the bad object.  
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ego, characterized by overwhelming need for its object, the libidinal object. Mitchell (1981) 
writes that,  
 
“for Fairbairn, the content of internal objects derives completely from real, external 
objects, fragmented and recombined, to be sure, but always deriving from the child's 
experiences of his actual parents... [These are] the personal features of the parents: the 
particular kind of promise and hope which the mother seemed to offer, the specific form 
of rejection displayed by the father, the parent's idiosyncratic ideals, values, etc” (p.83).  
 
In Fairbairn's (1955b) own words, internal objects are  
  
“internal structural representatives of emotionally significant aspects of persons upon 
 whom the subject depended...[Furthermore they] may be defined as an endopsychic 
 structure other than an ego structure, with which an ego-structure has a relationship 
 comparable to a relationship with a person in external reality” (p.148). 
 
To return to the question of the basic mechanics of RC, and the proposal that internalization is 
at the heart of the process, we have now established the sense in which it can be stated that 
internalization replaces memory and have an idea of the nature and form of that which is 
internalized. Although most of Fairbairn's commentary on the establishment of internal objects 
is restricted to early childhood, he recognises that internalization is resorted to again in later 
situations characterized by frustration, dependence and ambivalence. The same processes of 
internalization, splitting and repression result in newly encountered exciting or rejecting 
objects being partly superimposed upon, and partly fused with, the existing libidinal or 
antilibidinal object respectively. Internal objects thus exist as 'complex composite structures'. 
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We can therefore conclude that experiences may contribute to endopsychic structure formation 
throughout the lifespan. If RC is said to result from the process of structuralization, which is 
the claim being made here, then the possibility is left open that experiences throughout the 
lifespan may contribute to its generation.        
 
 
On the Nature of Ego Fragments  
It will be useful to consider the nature of ego fragments in greater detail, as I assume that the 
complexity of behaviour observed in RC activity primarily originates with them, rather than 
from internal objects6. Fairbairn says relatively little concerning the character of the bonded 
ego fragments, restricting himself to their defining features of libido and aggression, or in more 
precise terms the “two respectively represent 'a libidinal factor' and 'an antilibidinal factor 
(1955b:145). If internal objects are characterized as idiosyncratic in the sense that they mirror 
the affective features of a specific external object, then are ego fragments equally 
individualized? In other words, does the libidinal ego simply yearn for its bonded object in 
some uniform sense of the term or does it yearn in a specific way that reflects the nature of its 
object and the relationship between the two? Although Fairbairn is largely silent on this point, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the obvious 'clue' is in the term ego. As he outlines, the 
libidinal ego differs from the central ego in a few illustrative ways; it is more infantile, less 
organized, less adapted to reality, and more devoted to internal objects (p.106). Other than this, 
 
6 Fairbairn concedes that the logical conclusion of his theory entails that internal objects would also evince a 
degree of dynamism and therefore be capable of motivating behaviour. He warns however that in practice it 
would be extremely difficult to specify when activity originates from internal objects rather than from ego 
fragments. I therefore follow his warning that it would be wise to avoid “any appearance of demonology (the 
idea that the psyche is populated with homunculi)... [and so] err, if anything, on the side of overweighting the 
activity of the ego structures rather than otherwise” (p.132). More recently Ogden (1983) has argued 
persuasively for the proposition that “internal objects be thought of as dynamically unconscious 
suborganizations of the ego capable of generating meaning and experience, i.e. capable of thought, feeling 
and perception” (p.86). Although I feel that there is much to be said for this proposal I will nevertheless as 
Fairbairn suggests err on the side of caution at present, and focus on the generative properties of ego fragments.     
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we can assume for the most part that it is an ego in the full sense of the term, and capable of 
fairly varied modes of response. The same applies to the antilibidinal ego.  In both instances 
the range of response would presumably be restricted by the encompassing and defining 
libidinal or antilibidinal factor. Considering ongoing internalization throughout the lifespan, 
Fairbairn again says little about the nature of ego fragments. Do they alter in relation to the 
changes undergone by the internal objects, as presumably the newly introduced objects alter 
the nature of the relationship? Do new fragments of the central ego get added to them? The 
latter option would be consistent with Fairbairn's outline of repression involving not only 'bad' 
objects but also fragments of the ego bonded to them.   
 
 
On the Moment of Repetition/Externalisation   
Thus far I have stated that RC activity occurs as a consequence of internalization and that the 
process involves a moment of 'externalization' of internal object relationships, which is seen as 
repetitive behaviour. I will turn now to the question of what in Fairbairn's account explains or 
supports the proposed instance of 'externalization'? He writes that, “the whole course of 
libidinal development depends upon the extent to which objects are incorporated and the nature 
of the techniques which are employed to deal with incorporated objects” (p.54). One 
fundamental solution he proposes, a method for dealing with incorporated objects, involves 
expelling them via the mechanism of projection in conjunction with the four transitional 
techniques (phobic, obsessional, hysterical and paranoid). The procedure would account for a 
form of RC activity based on perceptual distortion. Fairbairn speaks of the process as an 'active 
externalization of internalized bad objects'. He offers further commentary on the notion of 
externalization in speaking of the 'release of bad objects' which were previously unconscious, 
a proposed outcome of traumatic experience. He writes that, “an unconscious situation 
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involving internalized bad objects is liable to be activated by any situation in outer reality 
conforming to a pattern which renders it emotionally significant in the light of the unconscious 
situation” (p.76). The term activation concerns the re-emergence of unconscious bad objects, 
an accompanying state of terror, and a resultant distortion of reality. “External situations then 
acquire...the significance of repressed situations involving relationships with bad objects. This 
phenomenon is accordingly not a phenomenon of projection, but one of 'transference'” (p.76). 
For Fairbairn, cued activation of internal objects effects the way we see external reality, and so 
if a form of RC is implicated it would again involve perceptual distortion.  
We find then that certain mechanisms are involved in the externalization of internal 
object relations. Fairbairn implicates projection and transference. I will discuss these further, 
and will also include two further mechanisms – projective identification and object choice.    
 
 
A Note on the Issue of Intersubjectivity 
Following Hinshelwood’s (2012) terminology and distinction between an intrapsychic and co-
construction approach, I should note that I will present an account which is in line with the 
former7 and by extension in line with a realist ontology and epistemology. Of the intrapsychic 
approach, Hinshelwood states, “the analytic system is two subjective intrapsychic worlds of 
experience, not just the patient’s; two minds interact as two subsystems, although both are open 
systems, open to each other” (p.2). Ontologically, minds are conceived of as separate objects 
that exist in reality, and are therefore, at least in theory, open to observation. This is in 
distinction to the co-constructionist approach which holds that objectivity is not possible 
 
7 Aron (1990) uses the term one-person psychology, to refer to a monadic theory of mind, with classical 
psychoanalytic theory as emblematic, and two-person psychology to refer to a more relational approach. I 
understand Hinshelwood’s (2012) designation of an intrapsychic approach as occupying a middle ground 
between the two, and by extension between classical psychoanalytic theory and a relational model.  
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because minds are understood to consist of shared, and therefore ever shifting contents; are 
fundamentally intersubjective. This is not to suggest that the intrapsychic approach does not 
allow for intersubjectivity, because as Hinshelwood adds, the primitive processes of the ego – 
for instance introjection, identification, projection and projective identification – by their very 
nature have an interpersonal dimension. We can conceive of them as the bridge between two 
separate minds.   
 
 
Transference  
I begin with transference, the first of four mechanisms which are identified as bringing about 
externalization. Sandler et al (1969) provide an outline of Freud’s thought on transference 
which will stand as a starting point. They state that “…Freud saw transference as being 
predominantly a transfer of feelings about important objects from the past, to the person of the 
analyst in the present, and that they are experienced as real in the present…They may include 
the transfer of images from the past as well as feelings, so that they influence the perception or 
apperception of the analyst…” (p.634). It should be noted for clarification that Freud (1925) 
saw transference as a universal phenomenon and therefore as in no way confined to the analytic 
setting.   
Fairbairn’s (1952) statement on transference serves as a useful in-road into outlining an 
object relational understanding of the mechanism. In summary, transference concerns the 
activation of an unconscious situation involving internalized objects and a resulting distortion 
of external reality, the latter acquiring the ‘significance’ of the former (p.76). Like Fairbairn, 
Kernberg (1984) holds that internalized object relations are activated in the transference. In 
accordance with his own metatheoretical developments and refinement of terminology such 
transference manifestations consist of three components, reflecting the nature of internal object 
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relationships; an object image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related 
affective component8. What is externalized in the transference is one half of the internal object 
relationship. Kernberg states that in treatment the therapist may come to represent both the self 
and object image. Both halves of the internal object relationship may therefore be externalized. 
In summary, what is externalized is the object or self-representation in a particular role or guise 
determined by the valence of the defining affective state. The other half of the object 
relationship, is simultaneously activated as the predominant ego state; in other words, the 
affective valence whether it be of a positive or negative nature, is ego syntonic at the time of 
activation. 
I would argue here however, that where transference is concerned, the emphasis has 
always been on the object component. This is true for both Freud and Fairbairn, above, where 
it is the experience of past objects that distort what is encountered in the present. Greenson’s 
(1965) oft referenced definition again speaks of “…a displacement of reactions originating in 
regard to significant persons of early childhood” (p.156). I would also suggest that in practice 
it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between instances of projection and transference 
if this distinction is not made.  
In simpler terms, Kernberg's account of internalized split-off ego segments implies a 
self that is in a sense frozen in time. One that is confined to a specific moment, defined by a 
relationship with another individual, and an affective response to that engagement. The split-
off ego segment if not dissociated would be capable of generating the range of psychological 
and behavioural functioning which was present before splitting occurred. Activation here 
 
8 When compared to Fairbairn, Kernberg’s terminology places a greater emphasis on the apprehension of existing 
internal object relationships, the terms ‘image’ and ‘representation’ denoting a perceiver or observer and 
underscoring the point of response to what is apprehended; the management and by implication defence against 
that which is experienced. In distinction, Fairbairn’s terms, ego fragments and internal objects, emphasise a 
capacity for agency. I will keep this distinction in mind for the remainder of the thesis, preferring Fairbairn’s 
terms when the focus is on agency and, Kernberg’s ones when self-perception and defence are foremost at 
issue.    
                
27 
 
implies a continuation of dissociated experience, but in a different time and in different 
surroundings. The external world or whatever is found there is then felt to be responsible for 
the psychological state one inhabits. It is as though something is being repeated since the 
subjective experience is the same.  
 
 
Projection and Projective Identification 
Projective identification (PI) has been described as a central mechanism in the externalization 
or activation of object relations (Sandler, 1990; Kernberg, 1987; Ogden, 1979). For our 
purposes it is also opportune to note Feldman’s (1994) observation that there is a quality to the 
type of reenactment seen in projective identification, which seems “not to be merely defensive, 
wish-fulfilling, or communicative, but driven in the deadly way that Freud drew attention to in 
his study of the repetition compulsion” (p.439).        
The construct of PI has a complex history, and in order to circumvent the historical 
discussion, specifically as this relates to competing views over the intersubjective nature of the 
process, I begin with Sandler’s (1993) observation that the notion of PI has been extended to 
an interpersonal frame of reference since Klein’s initial formulation, and am in agreement with 
his statement that, in the analytic setting “…its relation to aspects of the analyst’s 
countertransference is now firmly established” (p.1105). What Sandler is referring to is a 
‘second step’, beyond projection and beyond the intrapersonal; an instance of 
“…externalization [that] takes the form of actualization, a process in which the object is 
pushed…into playing a particular role for the patient” (p.1105). Various authors have 
described the nature of the impact upon the object, what Sandler terms actualization. Bion 
(1961) highlights a feeling – the analyst’s or projectee’s experience – of being manipulated 
into playing a part; “a sense of being a particular kind of person in a particular emotional 
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situation” (p.149). Joseph (1989) speaks of “being pushed and pulled to feel and to react” 
(p.176) and of the patient’s intention of causing her to ‘act out’ in accordance with what is 
projected. What most accounts of PI recognise, is the seeming (that is, experientially felt) 
inducement of (again, experientially felt) alien affect, cognition and behaviour in the object – 
a motivated countertransference inducement accompanied by possible enactment.  
To consolidate the above, and to lay the ground for our discussion, we can state that 
there are three distinct stages or aspects to PI; an intrapersonal event involving projection (or a 
mechanism akin to projection), a psychological effect on the object, and an interpersonal 
‘happening’ which brings about that effect. I will address each aspect in turn, and begin with 
the question of what motivates PI. The Kleinian derived response (that is, a Kleinian derived 
interpersonal conceptualization of PI) to the question of what precipitates/motivates PI, posits 
the existence of underlying phantasy. Feldman (1997) for instance describes “the phantasy [in 
PI] of forceful entry into the object by parts of the self in order to possess or control the 
object…” (p.227). likewise, Ogden (1979) identifies the presence in PI of “the fantasy of 
projecting a part of oneself into another person and of that part taking over the person from 
within” (p.358). The supposition of phantasy is appealing because if we infer the presence of 
phantasies of entering and invading the object, putting parts ‘into’ the object, and of omnipotent 
control of the object, then what remains to account for the manifestation of PI phenomenology, 
is simply the actualization of such ‘pre-existing’ phantasies. It is furthermore noteworthy that 
it is partly in the nature of phantasy, because wishful, to push for actualization. This is a point 
Sandler makes (1987), writing that phantasy, “has behind it a pressure towards gratification 
or fulfilment. The patient [therefore] attempts…to make them real, to experience them…as part 
of reality” (p.42). Others, such as Joseph (1989) and Feldman (1997), emphasising the 
defensive nature of PI, maintain that actualization is often a response to the interpersonal 
situation; an attempt to avoid a new relationship that may feel threatening or intolerable, by 
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substituting for the known archaic phantasy. These theoretical statements identify a motivation 
or incentive for the moment of actualization, predicated on the place of phantasy. However, A 
strong critique can be brought to bear on the ontological status of underlying phantasy in PI in 
the first place, which leaves these accounts of actualization somewhat rootless9.                              
I would like next to briefly consider the relationship between projection and PI, 
specifically in relation to the following question. Does PI amount to a mechanism which 
includes, perhaps begins with projection, but involves further mechanics beyond it, or are the 
two better understood as distinct phenomena with PI being somewhat of a misnomer and not 
involving projection? Hinshelwood (1991) notes that “the truth is that historically both terms 
have been used in overlapping ways to cover phenomena that are not fully distinguished” 
(p.180). Ogden (1979) and Kernberg (1987) are two well-known attempts to distinguish the 
constructs, both making the separation a central feature of their respective thesis’s. To my 
mind, neither are convincing. Both rely on what amounts to a ‘-projection’ amendment; neither 
being able to avoid the inclusion of projection, they attempt to partially disavow it by an 
additional modification; a case of ‘having your cake and eating it’. Kernberg for instance agrees 
that the projection of ‘intolerable intrapsychic experiences onto the object’ (p.796) is a central 
 
9 Meissner’s (1980) critique of the Kleinian conception of PI, suggests that the type of phantasy experience under 
consideration is fundamentally psychotic in nature, and therefore has little place in the economy of non-
psychotic psychology, where reality testing remains relatively intact. This judgement is echoed by Gotstein 
(1983), who laments the outcome of overlooking the normal or neurotic aspects of PI, when it is conceptualized 
as a decidedly psychotic mechanism. To consolidate Meisner’s fuller statement, he argues that the processes 
of phantasy implicated, “…imply, at least partially, loss of ego boundaries, loss of self-cohesion, 
dedifferentiation of self- and object representations, and loss of self-object differentiation” (p.65). Pathology 
of this kind is simply not clinically evident in many cases when we would nevertheless wish to speak of PI. 
On a related matter, Hinshelwood (1991) makes the important point that we are dealing with pre-linguistic 
phantasy, of a profoundly unconscious nature. I would note that if underlying phantasy is employed to explain 
the interpersonal manifestation of PI in the manner described above, then there must be a fair degree of 
correspondence between the pre-linguistic ‘meaning’ and the linguistic versions we use to represent them. 
Absenting this, I would suggest that the inference of phantasy in PI should be restricted to an intrapsychic 
conceptualization of the construct. It would seem therefore that where PI is at issue, phantasy is best suited to 
the explication of psychotic cases of the kind presented by Rosenfeld (1983) where the outcome of something 
akin to enactment by the analyst, is not explored in the material.   
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element of PI, but then adds that PI in distinction to projection is characterized by the 
maintenance of ‘empathy’ with what is projected. A difficulty here is that Kernberg does not 
elaborate on what exactly is meant by empathy in this context, except in so far as it is opposite 
to what is observed in projection, where a distancing from the object is characteristic. One of 
the few moments of elaboration occur in the second case study of the article, which Kernberg 
claims is a typical example of PI, illustrating amongst other things, the patient’s “…potential 
capacity for empathizing with what had been projected onto me because, at other points, it so 
clearly corresponded to her self-representation” (p.809). Before considering this illustration, 
it will be useful to note that Kernberg makes repression a distinguishing feature of projection, 
in distinction to splitting which is identified as the primary defence in PI. Are we then to 
understand that in projection the individual, post repression, is never conscious of the 
intrapsychic contents projected onto the object, whereas in PI the individual, post splitting, will 
at times be aware of such intrapsychic experience? And, what should we make of the following 
where Kernberg notes, seemingly under pressure of clinical experience, that “projective 
identification may permit a patient to localize aggression outside the self...[and furthermore 
that]…projective identification…is not necessarily based on a lack of differentiation between 
self and object representations (although it may occur under such conditions)… (p797). This 
is far too shaky ground upon which to erect a statement attesting to the absence of projection 
in PI. Ogden’s (1979) argument is similar, although instead of a poorly defined empathy, he 
relies on the notion of reinternalization by the projector as a prerequisite for the maintenance 
of identification. While differentiating projection from PI – on the grounds of psychological 
distance in the former and connection or closeness in the latter, he like Kernberg is forced to 
qualify that “of course, the contrasting processes are rarely found in pure form; instead one 
regularly finds a mixture of the two, with greater or lesser preponderance of feelings of oneness 
or of feelings of estrangement” (P.359). In my view, both accounts are a throwback to Kleinian 
31 
 
notions of ego blurring or self-object dedifferentiation which, as argued above may be seen as 
a decidedly psychotic experience. I would suggest and will argue below that self-object 
confusion in PI is in fact an experience which belongs more to the object, in many cases the 
analyst, and that these experiences have historically been defensively disavowed and displaced 
during theory development onto patients, leading to the view that it is the patient who 
experiences such. In conclusion, I take the view that PI includes, perhaps begins with 
projection, but involves further mechanics beyond it. Under this reading, PI is somewhat of a 
misnomer, but in respect of the term identification - accepting in so far as this is said to be a 
property/experience of the object.    
Klein’s original formulation of PI speaks of aspects of the self being put into the object 
(here, the internal object and in phantasy). The wording of this formulation seems sometimes 
to have resulted in short-hand imagery of a projector placing or forcing bits of the self into the 
external object, with a further, although I think mostly resisted, tendency towards the 
concretization of the metaphor. It is surely in response to this, that Grotstein (1991) makes a 
point of stating that “one really cannot project into another person” (p.189). To avoid 
ambiguity, it will be useful to specify the precise nature and site of the alteration under question 
in the mechanism of projection. Sandler (1987), Grotstein (1999) and Meissner (2009) clarify 
that it is the internal object – in related terminology the fantasy, image, representation, or 
construction – which undergoes alteration. This is an intrapsychic event, which Sandler 
usefully describes in terms of displacement; “aspects of the self-representation are shifted to 
(and made part of) an object-representation” (p.36).    
I am in agreement with Knapp (1989) that “the importance of projective identification 
as a defence mechanism rests on the assumption that it differs from pure projection in that it 
not only expels outward aspects of the self but does so while inducing the object of the 
projection to feel or experience the projection” (p.54). The interpersonal inducement of the 
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object is the step beyond projection, beyond the intrapsychic, which grants the construct its 
distinct character and utility (Meissner, 2009). If there is agreement in one area of the literature, 
it is surely on the centrality of control in PI (Klein, 1946; Bion, 1962; Segal, 1954, 1973, 1983; 
Ogden, 1979; Rosenfeld, 1983; Sandler, 1987; Kernberg, 1987; Knapp, 1989; Josephs, 1989; 
Feldman, 1994; Grotstein, 1999; Goretti, 2007; Meissner, 2009). In my view, the act of 
pressurizing or controlling the object can be intuitively and simply understood as an attempt to 
certify an instance of projection. As Ogden (1979) notes, projective identification does not 
occur outside of an interaction, whereas projection may. It seems reasonable to assume that in 
the presence of the object, projection will be less affective because faced with the real 
possibility of contradictory evidence. The projector controls the object, in an attempt to ‘force 
the issue’. In this regard, Meissner (2009) speaks of “an internal need or pressure in the 
projector to find support for the projection in the real order…” (p.122). Feldman (1997), 
although offering an account of the motivation behind projection, nevertheless provides us with 
a statement which can equally apply to the act of controlling the object. If the terms are 
exchanged, we can say that control of the object, or the pressure exerted upon the object 
“…represents an attempt by the patient to reduce the discrepancy between an archaic object 
relationship and an alternative object relationship that might be confronting the patient and 
threatening him” (p.228).     
As regards the type of control envisaged, the literature speaks of unconscious 
inducements or forms of pressure, manipulation and influence. Sandler (1993) suggests that 
they may be both verbal and non-verbal, with Kernberg (1987) in agreement, and elaborating 
that where the former is employed, words may be used “…not as communication but as a 
means of action, a direct expressing of unconscious material…” (p.801). Goretti (2007) 
picking up on Kernberg’s point, notes that verbalization is here seen as a way of ‘doing things 
with words’; “in the relational situations it presupposes and institutes, this ‘doing’ is suited to 
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‘arousing’ in one or more objects the most complex emotional constellations…” (p.400). 
Goretti notes further that tone, timbre, vocal warmth and rhythm may all play a part. Under 
non-verbal communication she includes physiognomic, postural and tactile influence. Outside 
of the therapeutic encounter and, absenting the therapeutic frame’s constraints on motoric 
action in favour of verbalization, I think it is reasonable to suggest that behaviour will play a 
larger role as a mode of pressure and influence. In other words, it will function likewise as a 
‘direct expressing of unconscious material’, to a greater degree than is commonly permitted in 
psychotherapy.    
A final area that requires clarification is the nature of the alteration exacted upon, or 
experienced by the object. If nothing is ‘put into’ the object, then what type of thing is it that 
is induced, which can reasonably be thought of as sufficient in form to bring about enactment 
of the kind under consideration? Knapp (1989) and Meissner (2009) independently arrive at 
the same answer, although employing different terminology, she speaking of the inducement 
of “existing identity fragments” and he of the reactivation or reinforcement of “pre-existing 
introjective configurations”. Their position can be summed up in the following way; that 
disavowed aspects of the self are activated within the object, in accordance with the form of a 
given projection and as a result of the supplementary pressure exerted by the projector. The 
key insight in this account is that what is activated in the object belongs in large part to the 
object10. A statement by Ogden (1979) would support this account. He notes that in PI “the 
 
10 Both authors do in fact however include both a “contacting” and a “transferring” (in the sense of something 
being ‘put into’ the object) aspect to the workings of PI, but the former is seen as the more central mechanism 
and the latter augmented by certain caveats. Meissner for instance notes that where an introjective response is 
stimulated in the object, it is “a relatively independent self-generative process…and not some magical taking-
in of the projection” (p.100). He speaks here of an ongoing ‘self-creative modification’ of the sense of self 
and, believes that where PI is concerned such self-generation is of secondary importance, and may not be 
present at all. Knapp makes a different point, surmising that where internalization does occur in response to 
persistent projections, it succeeds under specific conditions of vulnerability where the object’s sense of identity 
is compromised or not well delineated. The vulnerability may be characterological, for instance disorders of 
character; a result of inherent power imbalance as in the case of young children; or situational, where the 
context is one of extreme environmental stress, for example prison. The emphasis is however placed on the 
notion of ‘contacting’ and activating pre-existing aspects within the object.  
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recipient’s feelings may be close to those of the projector, but those feelings are not 
transplanted feelings. The recipient is the author of his own feelings albeit feelings elicited 
under a very specific kind of pressure from the projector” (p.360). Goretti (2007) understands 
Klein’s position as amounting to the statement that in PI different projections will effect 
different objects differently, or not at all since the object has a certain ‘right of refusal’.      
 
 
Object Choice  
In addition to transference, projection and PI, externalization where RC activity is implicated 
may centre on object choice or ‘object directed’ repetition. According to the logic of RC which 
assumes a compulsive aim towards repetition, I am proposing that repetition involving the three 
above mechanisms would often occur where there is an absence of a suitable object in the 
external world allowing for ‘object directed’ repetition. In other words, if the right object cannot 
be found it is ‘created’. Conversely, if it is found then the need to ‘create’ ceases11.     
Under this reading, the individual searches for, or at the very least ‘chooses’ to engage 
with an object for the very reason that it will damage and hurt. The obvious question is why 
would a person do this, even if unconsciously? Armstrong-Perlman (1991) asks the same 
question, musing on the “…compulsive, masochistic persistence of such relationships” 
(p.346). She turns to Fairbairn’s theoretical structure for understanding and I follow her in this. 
Specifically, an explanation can be found in his consideration of the nature of internal objects 
 
11 I do not suppose that object choice ever occurs in complete isolation from manifestations of transference, 
projection and projective identification, nor vice versa. I would suspect instead that combinations of these 
mechanisms/procedures are required to bring about RC occurrences; that certain of them are well positioned 
to deal with distinct aspects of repetition, and others required for other facets. I also suspect that experientially 
the encounter with the other during RC may often be akin to Winnicott's (1971) presentation of the transitional 
object. One is never certain whether the object is 'found' or 'created', which can be seen in the constant 
questioning of 'is it me or is it them', 'are they like that or am I imagining it' which plagues romantic 
relationships and relationships generally.  
 
35 
 
and their reason for being. As he outlines, the need to maintain a relationship because one is 
dependent upon it for one's very survival is the central reason for internalization. This same 
need remains attached to caregivers, in the form of internalized objects, within the unconscious. 
As Fairbairn writes, “the truth is that...the individual is extremely reluctant to abandon his 
original hate, no less than his original need, of his original objects...” (1955a:117). Ego 
fragments are structurally attached to their objects, and what is more attached with a ferocity 
or intensity born from the presence of a singular uncontaminated affective valence (either 
purely libidinal or aggressive). The proposition of object seeking or object choice as RC 
activity, would then amount to a cathexis of a substitute or replacement object, in the external 
world. Although an account of RC defined in terms of object choice is not found in object 
relations thought it is observed in 'mainstream' psychoanalytic writing, for instance Kubie 
(1941), Russel (2006) and Orlandini (2004), who emphasise repetition through object choice. 
Although little more than a musing, it may be, that Freud (1920), hints at object directed 
repetition when he points out that repetitive behaviour causes less “...astonishment when it 
relates to active behaviour....[and that] we are much more impressed by cases where the subject 
appears to have a passive experience, over which he has no influence, but in which he meets 
with a repetition of the same fatality (p.22).   
It is important to note that this account does not posit a teleological aim, towards some 
form of restitution for instance. Rather, what is being conceptualized is that affect, centrally 
yearning, desire and need are directly activated in relation to certain object features or 
behaviours12. If, as Fairbairn suggests, the fundamental need of the individual is to be genuinely 
 
12 A complication needs to be considered. Fairbairn (1952) defines libido as predominantly object-seeking. I stated 
that RC over-rides the basic libidinal tendency and yet am now claiming that it should at the same time be 
seen as centring on object choice. This seeming contradiction is overcome if we state the sense in which 
Fairbairn speaks of object seeking in the aim of object relating. He defines true object relating as amounting 
to a relationship where the individual is genuinely loved for who they are and where their love is genuinely 
accepted by the other (p.39). It is this account of object relating which RC negates, since it repeats the 
frustrating relationship which previously necessitated internalization.          
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loved and accepted by their objects, then what is being conceived here is that in repetition the 
need relates to a specific type of object; no other will do. Recall that for Fairbairn 
internalization concerns ‘bad’ aspects of the object. What gets ‘pulled down’ along with those 
object features is a libidinal ego, that yearns for an exciting but rejecting object.  
For me, a difficulty arises here, because it is unclear what precisely the exciting object 
consists of. Or, more to the point, it is difficult to separate out exciting from rejecting features? 
Armstrong-Perlman (1991) uses the following terms to denote the workings of the exciting 
object. It may tantalize, allure, provide selective comfort, deliver certain measures of 
satisfaction, offer hope for something more. As she summarises it awakens “…an intensity of 
yearning but it is essentially the elusive object of desire, seemingly there but just out of reach” 
(p.345). She notes furthermore that a direct relationship exists between rejection and 
excitement; the more frustrating or rejecting the object the more it is needed for survival 
(especially in its primal guise as caregiver), and therefore excites. There is clearly a degree of 
overlap or ‘cross-pollination’ between the exciting and rejecting components. To some degree 
it would be valid to say that the individual yearns for its object precisely because it is rejecting. 
As Fairbairn (1952) states, “there can be no doubt, however, that a bad (viz. unsatisfying) object 
may be desired. Indeed it is just because the infant’s bad object is desired as well as felt to be 
bad that it is internalized” (p.111). He adds, “…the unsatisfying object has, so to speak, two 
facets. On the one hand, it frustrates; and, on the other hand, it tempts and allures. Indeed it’s 
essential ‘badness’ consists precisely in the fact that it combines allurement with frustration” 
(p.111). I think however, that the tantalizing component does need to be present – that the two 
work in tandem – but that the strength of its offering, what it provides of love and care, need 
not be very great at all. Armstrong-Perlman here speaks of a ‘just enough’ quality, and we can 
reason that in instances this ‘just enough’ may be a fabrication down to transference, for 
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instance, or that it may exist only in memory, all kindness having occurred in the early stages 
of a relationship.     
A final point that I would like to consider, is to question whether desire or more broadly 
need, is experienced consciously in the instance of object choice, where object directed 
repetition is concerned? I would think that it often is, and that in such instances it may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations. The need for the other, may concern a belief 
in something longed for, needed or better. As Freud (1920) observes, individuals under the 
compulsion to repeat, often “...produce a plan or a promise of some grand present – which 
turns out as a rule to be no less unreal” (p.21). RC as it occurs in erotic object choice, with its 
powerful tendencies towards idealization, would be a clear example. I suspect though, that the 
desire or need for the object may also be less clearly delimited at times, and take the form of a 
strong preoccupation where negative or positive affect is queerly absent; a preoccupation that 
one cannot quite explain or account for. Relevant factors in determining the level of awareness 
may relate to the degree of repression, the individual’s capacity for reality testing, etc.   
I turn now to a hypothetical outline of the structures, dynamics and mechanisms which, 
based on this chapter, could be said to underlie RC activity. This outline will stand as an initial 
hypothesis which is put forward for verification and testing in accordance with the research 
method, discussed in the next chapter. Before providing the hypothesis, I would like to add a 
final note about the instinctual quality of RC, discussed above, in the section on Freud. The 
discussion ended with a question about the nature of the instinct-like quality. Why does RC 
have it? In what does it consist? We can now answer this from an object relations perspective. 
The intensity of the instinct-like character of RC, is a product of the purity of the drive 
derivative or affective component, expressed in the instance of activation of a given internal 
object relationship. In simpler terms, we can speak of the love or hate that was meant for a 
parent, being reactivated, with all the force of the original, although now directed at a substitute 
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(real or imagined). The alien or foreign character is a product of shifts in ego state, from the 
syntonic to the dystonic, in relation to the vicissitudes of split-off ego fragments, or 
apprehension/disownment of self-images.      
 
 
Initial Hypothesis13  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object 
relationship. In accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where 
internalization is seen as a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of 
dealing with ambivalence. Splitting mechanisms here keep object relationships defined 
by a positive affective valence (libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) 
apart. We therefore infer the presence of ego fragments attached to internal objects, 
with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely libidinal or 
aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to 
smother it or to pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter 
ambivalent formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations 
between love and hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego 
 
13 The hypothesis development across cases is reproduced as appendix b 
39 
 
fragment or as centred on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of 
a repressed internal object relationship (an object-image/representation, a self-
image/representation and a related affective component linking the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, 
effecting perception and behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. 
In the first, it involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the 
self onto an object (an intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of 
aspects of the self-representation onto an object-representation). A second step, 
beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of additional pressure, 
manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel or 
experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will 
depend on the reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or 
“pre-existing introjective configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire is here centred on a specific object choice, often imbued with 
compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed 
or better. A basic assumption is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of 
repetition, and that what is desired is simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and 
unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously chosen because of certain 
harmful qualities or capacities.   
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and 
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identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and 
superego participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including 
numerous aspects of the individual.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
The research attempts to identify the dynamic, as opposed to etiological, causes of repetition 
compulsion (RC) activity. The literature review consolidates an object relations account of the 
repetition compulsion, originating both in Freud's writings and continuing in theoretical 
developments up to the present. The account provides a ‘pool’ of theoretical entities/processes, 
which, in accordance with the research method, Analytic Induction, are put forward as potential 
candidates for the title of necessary condition.    
Empirical observation is prioritised as a means of generating knowledge, and to this 
end published case studies with rich verbatim transcription of psychotherapy sessions were 
deemed most suitable as data. My overall aim has been to follow a systematic research 
approach that employs a conception of causality in terms of tendency or disposition. Such an 
approach is in line with the philosophical paradigm of realism1, developments in the philosophy 
of science, specifically in the area of causal theory2, and is antireductionist, in the sense of 
respecting agency and intentionality in human behaviour. The approach is also in line with a 
notion of psychoanalysis as incorporating elements of both hermeneutic and empirical 
thinking3.   
The basic requirement of the research method is that it do two things: it must identify 
the entity/condition about ‘whose’ tendency/disposition I wish to speak – considering that I am 
beginning with an assumed effect and asking what may have a tendency/disposition to cause it 
– and it must look at the ways in which tendency/disposition is contextually expressed 
 
1 Proponents being for instance, Maxwell, 2004; Salmon 1984, 1989; Sayer, 1992; Archer et al. 1998.   
2 Bird et al. 2012; Salmon 1984, 1989; Harre & Madden, 1975; Bhaskar, 1975; Cartwright, 1989.   
3 Gomez, 2005; Hinshelwood, 2013.  
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(facilitated, negated, diminished, accentuated, adapted, etc). Analytic Induction is proposed as 
a method of meeting both criteria.  
As an introductory outline of the method, I’d like to refer to Lindesmith’s (1981) 
presentation of the discovery and elucidation of the causative role of parasites in malaria. The 
account is intended by me as more than an illustrative analogy, as a larger claim is made 
throughout this chapter, about the suitability of the scientific method to psychoanalytic enquiry. 
In other words, the method attempts to approximate, as closely as possible, scientific practices 
of investigation and explanation. In this regard, it seems opportune to note Lindsmith’s 
specification of the type of scientific enquiry under consideration; “the malaria 
example…presents us with an instance of the verification of a non-quantitative theory by a 
‘soft’ qualitative methodology” (p.89). He adds that generalization of the theory, that is a 
willingness to generalize about the causative role of the parasite in malaria, was initially based 
on a single observation; “one man seeing one parasite in one blood sample” (p.94). We 
therefore have an example of accepted scientific practice that is qualitative, and where 
generalization may be based on limited instances of observation – two features that are 
characteristic of case-study research generally, and therefore amenable to the case-study design 
I am proposing.                   
To proceed with the analogy. In the malaria example a microscope is the means of 
observation and discovery. Broadly speaking the method of analytic induction can be viewed 
as the theoretical and methodological frame which gives meaning to otherwise arbitrary 
observation; that which allows for a relationship to even potentially be defined as one of cause 
and effect. In the malaria example, it is both the means of observation and what ‘looks for’, 
can ‘conceive of’, a relationship between the parasite and malaria. Analytic Induction is further 
a method for specifying the nature of that relationship, customarily in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions.  
43 
 
 
 
Analytic Induction   
Analytic induction is a research logic proposed by Znanieki in the mid-1930s, which 
emphasises rigorous empirical study of cases. Hammersley et al (2000) classify it as a mode of 
dealing with non-experimental data, that is naturally occurring cases, while aiming at causal 
explanation of universal applicability. The aim, in other words, “is to produce a theory that 
conceptualizes a process of systematic causation that will operate whenever particular 
conditions are met” (Hammersley, 2008:85).  
Analytic induction, as the name implies, is an inductive research procedure, but one 
that crucially ‘formalizes and systemizes the method of the working hypothesis’ (Robinson, 
1951). That is, it incorporates a procedure for ongoing verification and reformulation or 
modification of hypotheses. This process may be seen as the practical method of progression 
in science generally (Kuhn, 1962), and certainly as the characteristic “process of advance in 
science by induction and verification” (Hinshelwood, 2013:57).   
Comparing analytic induction to the statistical method provides us with a key 
observation, allowing for a clearer understanding of what analytic induction tries to achieve, 
and of what it brings to the epistemic table, so to speak. The observation concerns the 
distinction between statistical inference and scientific or causal inference. Mitchell (1983) 
remarks on the well-known insight that statistical correlation tells us nothing about the nature 
of causal processes. When for instance generalizing to a parent population from a sample, “the 
inference…is simply about the concomitant variation of two characteristics…[and] the analyst 
must go beyond the sample and resort to theoretical thinking to link those characteristics 
together” (p.175). The important point is that correlation has no impact on, can tell us nothing 
about, the explanation that is provided for the relationship between the identified correlated 
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characteristics. We accept or reject the explanation on its own terms, in accordance with 
scientific or causal inference. Such “inference is the process by which the analyst draws 
conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some 
systematic explanatory schema – some set of theoretical propositions” (p.176). It is such causal 
accounts that analytic induction seeks to generate, and in accordance with a systematic 
procedure.           
Although Znanieki did not formulate procedural steps for executing analytic inductive 
enquiry, other authors have developed such. Cressey (1950, in Robinson 1951) for instance 
offers the following outline:  
 A rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is formulated 
 A hypothetical explanation of the phenomenon is formulated 
 One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis with the object of determining 
whether the hypothesis fits the facts in the case 
 If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is reformulated or the 
phenomenon to be explained re-defined, so that the case is excluded 
 Practical certainty, may be attained after a small number of cases has been examined, 
but the discovery of a single negative case disproves the explanation and requires a 
re-formulation  
 This procedure of examining cases, re-defining the phenomenon and re-formulating 
the hypothesis is continued until a universal relationship is established, each negative 
case calling for a re-definition or re-formulation   
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Unique Qualities and Capacities of the Method   
Hammersley (2008) draws our attention to a distinctive feature of analytic induction, one that 
is often omitted in competing methodologies; the explicit revision of the phenomenon to be 
explained. Here the conceptualization of the phenomenon of interest may be revised, as part of 
the research process, to exclude instances which contradict the hypothesis. Robinson notes that 
such revision ‘limits the range of applicability of the explanatory hypothesis’, what Dubs 
(1930) calls ‘limiting the universal’. As with the modification of hypotheses as part of the 
method of the working hypothesis “such limitation of universals has occurred not infrequently 
in the history of science, and is now a matter of common acceptance” (Robinson, 1951:189). 
Hammersley (2008) adds that the option of limiting the universal “is surely a crucial element 
of any process of theory development” (p.85); a statement with which it is difficult to disagree, 
given the immediate common-sense it displays. For surely, it is often only through the process 
of investigating a phenomenon that we come to know what the phenomenon is exactly. 
Hinshelwood (2013) remarks on one of the primary limitations of inductive logic; the 
point that verification based on current observation provides a poor basis for predicting future 
occurrences. It is therefore important to stress that analytic induction does not function merely 
armed with the procedure of inductive verification, but also explicitly harnesses the power 
inherent in the logic of induction to conclusively prove a generalization false, based on a single 
instance of empirical observation. The distinction is summed up by Hinshelwood; “proving 
the validity of some inductive generalization is uncertain; but proving it false can be definitive” 
(p.61).  
Analytic induction employs this capacity for ‘single-shot’ refutation by making 
generalized claims about the form of the relationship between assumed occurrences of cause 
and effect. It defines such relationships, usually in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
For the moment, for reasons that will become clear below, I will focus here exclusively on 
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those conditions specified as necessary. When we claim that ‘A’ is a necessary condition for 
‘X’ we make a generalized claim about the nature of the relationship between ‘A’ and ‘X’; a 
statement that is open to empirical refutation. If we observe an instance of ‘X’ without the 
presence of ‘A’ we must conclude that ‘A’ is not a necessary condition of ‘X’. Our 
generalization is proven false. With this procedure, analytic induction demands through the 
comparative method, the seeking out of potential negative cases; those which may definitively 
falsify the implicit hypotheses it continually employs (the claim of relationships defined in 
terms of necessary conditions). As Hinshelwood (2013) notes, it is just such a ‘necessary 
condition thesis’ (NCT) that Grunbaum (1984, 1993) employs to challenge Popper’s view of 
psychoanalysis as unscientific. The key point is that by such means theories may be tested and 
falsified, and therefore considered ‘risky’ in Popper’s sense; the element of risk being essential 
to any enterprise claiming the status of scientific enquiry.           
      
 
Critiques of the Method    
Critique 1  
Although AI was originally proposed as a method of causal analysis, Robinson (1951), while 
viewing causal explanation as tantamount to prediction, argued against such a use stating that 
the method as often employed “cannot enable us to predict. It cannot because it gives us only 
the necessary and not the sufficient conditions for the phenomenon to be explained” (p.191). 
He is saying that we cannot know the precise cause ‘A’ of a phenomenon ‘X’, that which 
always results in a specific outcome, unless we know that the phenomenon never fails to occur 
under certain conditions. We therefore need to include in our study all instances of ‘-X’ and 
verify that ‘A’ is never present. Although some (Bloor & Wood, 2006) have argued that the 
critique can be countered by the inclusion of a control group, this misses the point that where 
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prediction is concerned, what is required is that we examine all instances of ‘-X’, which can 
only practically, as Robinson observes, be achieved in terms of probability and the statistical 
method. Claims of sufficiency may however be tested by the inclusion of a control group, in 
the sense that one negative instance, here the presence of ‘A’ disqualifies it as a sufficient 
condition, but this does not get us any closer to knowing that where ‘A’ is not disqualified such 
will always be the case. It is worth noting that such testing of sufficient conditions has generally 
been omitted in previous undertakings of analytic inductive research (Robinson, 1951).         
 
Critique 2 
Turner (1953) argues that one of the reasons why analytic induction cannot produce empirical 
prediction, “is down to the very specifications of…[the] method itself…[and is partly a 
consequence of the fact that] “the alleged preconditions or essential causes of the phenomenon 
under examination cannot be fully specified apart from observation of the condition they are 
supposed to produce” (p.198-9). He uses Lindsmith’s (1947) and Cressey’s (1953) research on 
opiate addiction and embezzlement respectively, to develop his critique. To illustrate, violation 
of financial trust results from a process where the individual has first a non-sharable problem 
which he recognizes as such, identifies embezzlement as a solution to the problem, and finally 
rationalizes his behaviour to provide justification. Turner’s point is that there is nothing which 
can be identified as making the problem of itself ‘non-sharable’, other than the fact that it 
eventuates in embezzlement. The same is true of the ‘recognition of a solution’, and of the 
‘rationalization to act’; both must result in embezzlement to become as Turner says, 
discriminating conditions. He goes on to state that “in any situation in which variable A is said 
to cause variable B, A is of no value as a predictor of B unless we establish the existence of A 
apart from the observation of B” (p.199). 
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The type of explanation we are left with is then not one of a causal process of the sort 
‘A’ is a…something…condition for ‘X’, but rather a tautology of the kind, ‘A’ = ‘A’. The key 
point about tautologies is that they convey little information about the world, tell us nothing 
about the nature of ‘A’ independently from it being identical to the second ‘A’, in ‘A’ = ‘A’. 
Any ‘truths’ about ‘A’ are purely a matter of definition.   
Turner claims that analytic induction is best classified as a method for providing 
definitions; ongoing refinement of definition resulting from instances of ‘limiting the 
universal’. The method’s universal generalizations are then said to be deducible from such 
refined definitions. He elaborates that, “it is, of course, not accidental but the crux of the 
method that these generalizations should be deducible…The operation in practice is one which 
alternates back and forth between tentative cause and tentative definition, each modifying the 
other…Once the generalizations become self-evident from the definition of the phenomenon 
being explained, the task is complete” (p.202).   
What I take issue with below is not the question of prediction, but rather the 
classification of analytic induction as a method of definition production. I will argue that 
analytic induction is perfectly capable of identifying ‘A’ apart from ‘X’, and is therefore no 
guiltier of producing tautologies than is any other scientific endeavour which acts to limit 
universals or modify hypotheses.   
 
 
Rejoinders    
Response to Critique 1  
I am happy to concede the truth of Robinson’s argument, because I aim to work with a notion 
of causality viewed in terms of tendency and of phenomena having a disposition towards 
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certain effects. My aim is not one of identifying relationships of strict determinism, nor of 
prediction, and therefore isolation of sufficient conditions does not concern me.    
I think however that AI can still be useful in its ability to identify necessary conditions, 
and I will use the approach in this manner. It is clear that an explanation in terms of necessary 
conditions does not deal in strict determinism; necessary conditions may or may not bring about 
a given effect, but the claim is that they are required to bring about the effect in question, and 
that the effect cannot be present without them. This indicates that we are considering 
phenomena that may have a tendency/disposition towards certain outcomes. Referring to my 
research topic; RC cannot occur without such conditions (those identified as necessary), but 
such conditions may be present without producing RC. I therefore assume that certain 
conditions/entities are causally relevant for bringing about RC activity, but that the context will 
always determine whether they in fact do bring it about. This would be in line with a realist 
ontology of causality, which “typically understand causality as consisting not of regularities 
but of real (and in principle observable) causal mechanisms and processes, which may or may 
not produce regularities” (Maxwell, 2004:247).  
Edelson (1985) highlights a difficulty here. Drawing on the illustration of striking a 
match he points out that such things as the presence of oxygen, dryness of the match, or the 
surface against which it is struck, are all necessary conditions for the lighting of a match, and 
yet cannot individually cause such. We would not therefore want to say that these conditions, 
although necessary, caused the effect. He is stating that ultimately if we want to say anything 
about causes then we require the sufficient condition. Put in terms relevant to my position, how 
do we determine which of a multitude of necessary conditions can be viewed as possessing the 
specific disposition/tendency which makes the difference – produces the effect?  
Edelson’s observation, although relevant, is also something of a straw man. We can see 
why if we turn to Lindesmith’s (1981) account of what he refers to as the ‘principle of limited 
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inquiry, or of closed systems’, defined as “a principle, that restricts scientific explanations in 
a field to influences and processes within that field” (p.91). He illustrates:  
 
“the explanation of malaria does not include the earth’s rotation on its axis as a causal 
factor despite the fact that the disease is spread mainly at night and the early hours of 
dusk. Similarly while common sense might conclude that the atomic explosions in 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima were caused by political events in Washington, such assertion 
makes no sense in physics.  
 
It is the same with Edelson’s example: the presence of oxygen would perhaps concern a 
chemist; the surface against which the match is struck, a mechanical engineer; and the dryness 
of the match, a thermal engineer specializing in heat transfer. It is fair to say that nothing would 
concern the psychoanalyst, and if it did, only then does it become relevant as a prospective 
causal entity. This limits the possibilities substantially, making the task more manageable than 
Edelson’s illustration would lead us to believe. We can also further assume that many of the 
candidates for a title of necessary condition will be negated through the process of searching 
for/confirming/dismissing necessary conditions.  
 
In summary:   
If ‘A’ is a necessary condition for ‘X’, then the occurrence/presence of ‘X’ = ‘A’.  
- Procedurally, I observe occurrences of ‘X’ and confirm that ‘A’ is always present.  
- The previous point means that the attempt to search for negative cases, of the sort ‘X’ 
but ‘-A’, is crucial as a mode of inductive testing.   
- Again, I will not be searching for negative cases of the kind ‘-X’, in order to determine 
‘A’s candidacy as a sufficient condition.  
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It is worth reiterating that researchers such as Cressey and Lindesmith who employed 
analytic induction, although occupied with the attempt to account for sufficient conditions, 
where in practice restricted to the identification of necessary conditions (Robinson, 1951). In 
this sense stating from the outset that I will only be seeking necessary conditions, is not a 
departure from previous research employing the method.  
 
Response to Critique 2  
In responding to Turner’s classification of analytic induction as a method for producing 
definitions, I believe that his argument is founded on confusing the logical structure of the 
procedure in question, with that of the ‘level of explanation’ commonly employed. That is, 
analytic induction, as commonly practiced, does produce tautologies, however this results not 
from the method, but rather from the kind of explanations it tends to produce; explanations 
where the level of analysis is restricted to the conscious and rational.  
What is striking to note about both Lindsmith’s and Cressey’s work is that the central 
causal entities, those which lead to addiction or embezzlement, are set out in terms of rational 
and conscious decision. I would argue that the inability to determine ‘A’ apart from ‘X’ derives 
in these instances from the fact that the explanation is couched in terms of propositional 
psychology. To expand, in describing the form of propositional explanations in ordinary 
psychology, Gardner (1993) notes crucially that there is characteristically no ‘gap’ between 
explanans and explanandum. He designates the term ‘propositionally transparent’ to describe 
the proximity between explanation and description. Using the example of self-deception, he 
states that there is  
 
“no gap between recognizing that the concept of self-deception has application, and 
knowing the kind of psychological state of affairs that it consists in. Just as identifying 
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a case as one of self-deception and knowing what sort of beliefs, desires and intentions 
it consists in are but one move, so there is no logical gap between making a judgement 
of self-deception and knowing an explanation of the phenomenon. Such proximity of 
description and explanation is a general characteristic of ordinary, propositional 
psychology (p. 28-9).   
 
It is precisely explanation at the level of propositional psychology which analytic induction has 
tended to employ. In trying to account for embezzlement Cressey highlights acts of conscious 
human agency where instances of agency identified are roughly equivalent to those 
characteristic acts of agency which result in embezzlement. In other words, he identifies the 
conditions that we are commonly aware of, given definitional knowledge of the phenomenon 
to be explained. It is the absence of a gap between explanans and explanandum, the inability 
to determine ‘A’ in the absence of ‘X’ – a characteristic of propositional psychology – which 
Turner mistakenly conflates with the logic of the method itself. 
Gardner distinguishes propositional commonsense psychology from psychoanalytic 
explanation defined as pre-propositional. In summary, he includes the following under the 
heading of pre-propositional content: crude emotion of an infantile character, circumscribed by 
an inability to enter ambivalent formations; ‘chronic conflict’, delineated as direct conflictual 
relations between love and hatred; the repressed seen in terms of mechanism, and consisting of 
primitive pre-propositional components; wishes defined as conative states; phantasy, as a 
purposive motivational state4. Introducing the distinction between kinds of content results as 
Gardner says in an amendment of our view on agency. He suggests the term mental activity, 
 
4 Accepting Gardner’s observations and arguments for a categorical distinction concerning the content of the two 
spheres under consideration – the domains of psychoanalytic and common-sense psychology – does not imply 
that I therefore also accept his characterization of psychoanalysis as an extension of common-sense 
explanation, which is one of the central tenants of his work. I do not hereby comment on the correctness of the 
notion, but simply conclude that the question falls outside the scope of the current investigation. 
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replacing the traditional term mechanism, and augmenting an existing generally accepted class 
of agency, that of mental action involving rational motivational structures. “What distinguishes 
psychoanalytic from ordinary psychology is…[therefore] captured not by a contrast of 
personal with sub-personal, but by a distinction between kinds of mental agency” (p.189).                 
By employing Gardner’s distinction of kinds of mental content, and by including pre-
propositional data in the research, it is my contention that we gain the capacity to use the 
method of analytic induction in a distinct, relevant and more striking fashion than previous 
attempts. It does not mean, that by incorporating pre-propositional explanation, we necessarily 
get any closer to the possibility of prediction. For, if the aim were for instance to predict a 
behavioural outcome, then we might begin with a link in a causal chain occurring at the level 
of the pre-propositional, but would still end with the propositional, the point at which overt 
public behaviour occurs, and would here succumb to Turner’s argument, as before. What we 
do however gain by the move into the pre-propositional sphere, is a point in a causal chain 
where ‘A’ (a pre-propositional entity) can legitimately be said to be a necessary condition of 
‘X’; ‘A’ being identifiable in isolation from ‘X’. 
 
 
Analytic Induction summarised  
As a summary, the procedure is employed to search for conditions which are necessary (but 
not sufficient) to produce RC activity. Three central methodological point are the following.        
 One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis with the object of determining 
whether the hypothesis fits the facts in the case 
 If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is reformulated or the 
phenomenon to be explained re-defined, so that the case is excluded 
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 Practical certainty, may be attained after a small number of cases has been examined, 
but the discovery of a single negative case disproves the explanation and requires a 
re-formulation  
The theoretical account is used as a means of initial ‘soft’ inference, and what decides on the 
nature of RC mechanisms and processes is empirical observation alongside procedures of 
limiting universals or modifying hypotheses.  
 
 
In Defence of a Dispositional Account of Causality   
Edelson (1986) distinguishes between a causal pattern and a covering law model of 
explanation, the latter being the standard paradigm of explanation and hypothesis testing in 
contemporary science, and aiming at the generalization of law-like regularities. It is possible 
however, and in line with Edelson’s alternative account, to view causation, in terms of tendency 
and to speak of phenomena having a disposition towards certain effects (Bird et al, 2012). Such 
an account assumes that objects possess capacities “…that naturally dispose towards certain 
outcomes or manifestations” (Mumford & Anjum, 2012:101). Introducing the notion of 
disposition, puts us at odds with the aim of identifying universal regularities. This is because 
an object under a dispositional account may still be thought of as a potential causal entity 
without manifesting an assumed disposition; we are interested in the aspect of ‘characteristic 
potential’, and not simply actualized causal influence - i.e. that which may count as an instance 
of law-like regularity5. It should also be noted that dispositionalism views causality as real, 
consisting of actual processes and mechanisms, and therefore as potentially observable6.  
 
5 Note that the dispositional account is compatible with the search for necessary conditions outlined as the aim of 
the analytic induction procedure. Recall that in searching for a necessary condition ‘A’, ‘A’ must be present 
whenever ‘X’ is, but that the presence of ‘-X’ does not negate ‘A’ as a candidate for the title of necessary 
condition.     
6 This is in marked distinction to the ‘regularity’ theory of causation which argues for the non-visibility of causal 
processes and is as Maxwell (2012) argues: “…a genuine living fossil that is consistent with basic logical 
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Edelson’s causal pattern model of explanation would seem to offer the rudiments of a research 
procedure underpinned by the above ontological commitments. His starting point is to argue 
for the existence of causes, “…out there in reality” (p.92) and to include their identification as 
a primary aim of research. He claims here to follow Freud, who in “believing that unconscious 
psychological entities are causes, exerts himself to demonstrate that these entities actually exist 
in the patient’s mind; they are not just fictions or mere figures of speech” (p.92-3). He states 
further that such “research must show that a cause has the power to produce its effects by 
virtue of its structure or properties, and also just how – by virtue of what processes or 
mechanisms – its causal influence is propagated from one space-time local to another” (p.97).  
It should be noted that we are again concerned with the distinction in the form of 
explanation, identified above, between causal and statistical inference7. In other words, to 
explain a cause-effect relation, an account or narrative of how a cause produces an effect is 
required – the steps or processes or mechanisms involved. Edelson provides the following 
examples of such mechanisms in psychoanalysis; ‘mental operations’, ‘alterations in 
representations’, ‘shifts in emphasis’, ‘object substitution’, etc. Analytic Induction is here 
viewed as a procedure for framing a process or narrative account of how tendency may be 
actualized8. To justify the approach, I proceed with a realist ontology that views causal 
processes and mechanisms as potentially observable, and follow Edelson (1986) in the belief 
that causal stories are not “underdetermined by data in the same sense that empirical 
generalizations are” (p.119).  
 
 
positivist premises and has survived in virtually unchanged form since the positivist era” (p.656).  
7 Edelson (1986) having the following to say about findings restricted to correlation or regularity, “If the 
relationship thus established has not in addition been demonstrated to be a causal relationship, it is not an 
explanation of anything” (p.113). He states further that “to understand a cause-effect relation is to know what 
the causal connection…is” (p.103). 
8 The aim is not to claim for instance that ‘B’, an identified independent variable, cooccurring with ‘A’ and ‘X’, 
but not with ‘A’ and ‘-X’, is the causal condition which results in ‘X’. Rather, the kind of statement aimed at 
is of the following sort: “in an observed instance, ‘B’ effected ‘A’ in such and such a manner, eventuating by 
this and that step in ‘X’ rather than ‘-X’.   
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Etiological vs Constitutive Explanations 
Edelson (1986) distinguishes between etiological and constitutive causal explanation. The 
distinction is found in other writings, though different terms are used. Hinshelwood (2013) uses 
historical vs dynamic causality, and outside of the psychoanalytic, Analytic Induction speaks 
of open vs closed or semi-closed systems, or of genetic vs systematic (Hammersley, 2008). 
Etiological explanations postulate causal connections in which cause and effect are at the same 
level, and causes are external to and impinge upon the system whose properties are to be 
explained. An example, relevant to the research would be loss or trauma as an etiological factor 
in RC production. Constitutive explanations on the other hand, postulate causal connections in 
which cause and effect are at different levels, and causes are internal to, or constituents of, the 
system whose properties are to be explained. Relevant examples might concern desire for an 
object, or the occurrence of projection and transference in relation to an object.   
Edelson (1986) notes that psychoanalytic case studies might in general offer stronger 
evidence for the credibility of constitutive explanations. This makes a lot of sense given the 
remoteness in time of etiological factors, and the idea that one can view constitutive causal 
processes in the ‘here-and-now’ during psychoanalytic sessions. Following this line of thought, 
my interest will not be in the causative role of loss or trauma, but rather with the inter and intra-
subjective processes that bring about RC activity in the present. It may be that historical 
experiences are considered, but in such instances, they will be explored on their own terms so 
to speak, with no claim being made about a supposed etiological role. In other words, they will 
be seen as simply an additional site of RC activity, akin to any other considered.          
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Epistemological and Ontological Underpinnings  
I would argue that both the phenomenon I am investigating, and the methodology employed, 
fits comfortably within the ontological and epistemological perspective suggested by critical 
realism. Alvesson & Skoldberg (2010) highlight that the philosophical paradigm is concerned 
with attempts at identifying the underlying mechanisms which generate empirical phenomena. 
The paradigm suggests that “...most aspects of interest transpire beyond individuals' 
conception and definition of situations. Social structure entails things that lie behind individual 
consciousness and intention. In other words, causal mechanisms operate largely independently 
from the mind and action of individuals” (p.41). Outcomes are here dependent on facilitative 
action or on the absence of intervening capacities. Oliver (2012) writes that “a critical realist 
methodology must therefore have the dual focus on agency and structure...” (381). The 
construct of RC has always straddled the line between poles of structure and agency, with 
various authors placing the phenomenon at different points along a continuum. In a sense it has 
'called out' for a critical realist position, and also hinted at the necessity of one. 
Turning to the research method, Alvesson & Skoldberg (2010) point out that the type 
of causal explanation aimed at differs from that of positivism, critical realism viewing causality 
as complex, contextual, socially emergent and as existing on multiple levels. Generative 
mechanisms are defined in terms of tendency, where an outcome may vary or even fail to 
materialize. This is in keeping with an Analytic Induction methodology that aims at a 
dispositional causal account. Roberts (2014) adds a point on the suitability of qualitative 
methods broadly, saying that where identification of causal mechanisms of the kind envisaged 
by critical realism is concerned, “qualitative methods assist the researcher...by helping him or 
her construct a model of a potential mechanism...which will then be used to explain a set of 
observable patterns” (p.5).  
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Procedural Outline  
Procedurally, I observe instances of ‘X’ (the strands of RC identified) and confirm through 
observation and inference, that ‘A’ (proposed necessary condition for ‘X’) is always present. 
Freud’s case study on the Rat Man is used as the entry point, or initial case in the analytic 
induction procedure. Naturally, to confirm that ‘A’ is always present is a matter of across case 
analysis, and a second case is therefore required before the analytic induction procedure 
properly commences.  
 
Repetition  
I begin by identifying strands of RC in each case study (‘X’). I have chosen to focus on sexual 
and romantic relationships or encounters, both because the area seems unusually rich in RC 
activity, and because a narrower focus makes the research more manageable. In terms of the 
total analytic process, I read for RC phenomenology by considering content which meets the 
definitional criteria of RC outlined in the literature review section. The initial reading aims at 
content familiarisation and involves the recognition and retention of patterns occurring across 
large time periods and across multiple relationships. The definitional criteria are held loosely 
in mind during this reading and determine whether a given potential strand of RC, occurring 
across multiple relationships, merits further consideration. The procedure becomes 
systematized at the next stage, where a central sexual relationship between the patient and 
his/her object, which has been identified as potentially symptomatic of RC activity, is 
considered in-depth. All content related to the relationship is marked line by line as it is 
encountered. I mark for three primary aspects of relationship; the characteristics of the object, 
the typical effects of the relationship upon the patient, and the patient’s affective state (libidinal 
and aggressive) directed towards the object.  
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These three aspects are targeted because they highlight distinct regions of RC phenomenology:  
 The ‘characteristics of the object’ is concerned with the interpersonal dimension of RC 
activity, and with the notion that RC is best defined as the repetition of a ‘lived 
interpersonal situation’. A consideration of the object’s nature allows us to explore the 
patient’s relationship to the other; the mode by which they employ the other to bring 
about RC activity.    
 The ‘typical effects of the relationship’ centres on the question of unpleasure and 
damage; whether and to what degree these basic definitional elements of RC are present 
in the data.  
 A consideration of the ‘affective state directed towards the object’ is incorporated 
because it provides a context for questions about the presence or absence of 
unconscious processes; If X seemingly felt one way, then why did he do A, if he felt 
another, then why B.  
Next, I consider the fact of repetition. I do this by analysing additional relationships in the same 
way as above; in light of the same three regions of potential RC phenomenology. It is then 
possible to analyse points of overlap (repetition) between these regions.  
If further strands of RC are encountered, which are phenomenologically distinct from 
the first, I repeat these same steps with each additional strand.      
 
Search and Identification of Necessary Conditions  
The next phase of analysis is concerned with the identification of the hypothesised necessary 
conditions (‘A’). Broadly speaking, it amounts to a consideration of context and how relevant 
contextual features operate within that context. The outcome is a record and account of the 
processes or mechanisms that bring about RC in a given instance.  
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Having emphasised the aspect of context, it should further be noted that the occurrence 
of differing contexts, across cases, has a bearing on the degree of systemization possible. In 
short, since contexts differ from each other, it makes little sense to approach or organize this 
phase in the same manner in each case. For instance, one mode of systemization may be to 
begin by identifying the proposed contextual features of interest (proposed necessary 
conditions) in the manner of a check list. With each case we would begin with a specific 
condition and move down a list, either confirming or disconfirming, as we progress. The 
problem with this approach however is that it undermines the aim of capturing a comprehensive 
view of context. We could speak here of a ‘bottom up’ approach, and of an attempt to render 
the total context as ‘top down’. It is the latter that I implement because the aim is to see how 
features operate within a specific context and that context is required in order to make such an 
assessment. The consequence is that this phase of analysis resists ordered treatment. To 
illustrate the point, if a key area of context in one case is that of sibling relationships then it 
makes little sense to use such a heading in a case where siblings have no presence. As such, I 
proceed by focussing on whichever contexts RC operates in, within a given case; in one case 
it may be sibling relationships and in another parental ones. Once these contexts are adequately 
rendered, it is than possible to consider whether, and in what fashion, the necessary conditions 
operate.                
 
 
Data Format    
Three published case studies are used as data. These are Sigmund Freud’s (1909) ‘Notes on a 
Case of Obsessional Neurosis’, Ben Karpman’s (1951) ‘A Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of 
Murder’ and Robert J. Stoller’s (1973) ‘Splitting: A Case of Female Masculinity’.   
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Legitimization and Overview of Data Requirements   
The research is concerned with the identification of psychological causal entities/mechanisms 
complicit in the production of RC activity; the psychological features that are present 
preceding, or during a given strand of RC (the constitutive or dynamic factors). The data 
therefore needs to include micro-processes, for instance shifts in object-choice, transference 
vacillations or instances of projective identification, as such processes are assumed to be 
responsible – seen here as necessary conditions – for the generation of RC. Since by definition 
RC is identified as it occurs over large passages of time, the data must also include a record of 
the fact of repetition across a long period. Fulfilling these twin requirements (observation of 
both micro and macro-processes), is therefore what is minimally required to meet the aim of 
empirical observation.  
Considering these requirements, the ideal form of data would have been audio-recorded 
sessions of long-term psychotherapy, accompanied by clinical assessments which specify and 
track the presence of repetitive activity during a given course of treatment. The later would 
provide an inroad into dealing with data where I would expect a great deal of extraneous 
content. The psychotherapeutic approach should be broadly psychodynamic, as I assume that 
the type of phenomena I’m interested in, would be made more visible by an approach which 
itself tends to focus on similar or related entities. Unfortunately, practically speaking, recorded 
treatments proved exceedingly difficult to obtain, and their scarcity meant that the ones I did 
obtain simply did not deal with my area of interest. As such, I decided to use case studies, again 
broadly psychodynamic in orientation, with rich verbatim material instead, as the next most 
suitable option.   
In searching for relevant data, I used data-bases and repositories which hold case study 
material, for instance Pep Wed, Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy and Single Case 
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Archive. Initially, I searched for the terms, repetition compulsion and others suggestive of RC 
activity such as enactment, self-destructive behaviour, repetitive maladaptive behaviour, poor 
object choice, the death instinct, negative therapeutic reaction, traumatic behavioural re-
enactment, etc. A difficulty that I quickly encountered however had to do with the length of 
cases; they were simply too short. In this connection, Mahony (1999) speaks of the ‘waning of 
the case history as a expository genre’, noting that editorial policy places restrictions on length 
which “no longer allow the publication of long case histories such as Freud’s…[these being 
replaced]…by the more popular vignette, which unfortunately, rarely gives details of the 
analysis process…is illustrative rather than demonstrative, and does not offer the longitudinal 
account…” (p.454). Length then become the key search criteria, and I proceeded by assessing 
the longest cases I could find, with the richest verbatim content, for suitability to the topic.  
 
 
Limitations of the Method 
One limitation, as I have implemented the method, can be introduced by returning to 
Lindesmith’s malaria example. Following the discovery of the causative role of parasites in 
malaria, the claim may be that the parasite is both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
malaria, the implication being that the parasite will always cause illness. There is a twist here 
however, because as Lindesmith (1981) writes “If one insists on looking for a single cause 
condition, factor or variable, which invariably produces the effect with which one is concerned, 
the parasite does not qualify. It is true that it is always present when malaria occurs, but the 
sheer presence of the plasmodium is not sufficient to produce the disease” (p. 90-91). He then 
lists instances when the parasite is present but without disease. As two examples, humans can 
be immune, and the parasite does not affect mosquitoes. The parasite may therefore qualify as 
a necessary condition and the question of generalization would seem to relate to issues of 
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context, which is where a further research procedure could have been useful. Once the 
necessary condition is identified, instances when it does produce a given effect could have been 
compared to instances when it does not. The surrounding content is identified as that which 
facilitates or negates tendency/disposition of an identified necessary condition. The 
comparison would have produced greater content for a consideration of how tendency is 
actualized or manifested. To return to the malaria example, we explain why the parasite does 
not cause malaria in certain humans, i.e. because they have acquired immunity.   
In other words, it would have been productive to explore instances of ‘A’ (identified 
necessary condition), cooccurring both with ‘X’ (RC) and ‘-X’ (-RC), to see how ‘A’ functions 
contextually. This would have amounted to a comparative procedure, highlighting the 
processes or mechanisms which lead to ‘X’. The analytic induction procedure as implemented 
furnishes me with accounts where ‘A’ and ‘X’ cooccur. For comparative purposes, what would 
have been additionally required is data concerning the cooccurrence of ‘A’ and ‘-X’; a case 
where confirmed necessary conditions are present but no RC. The difficulty here, aside from 
time constraints, had to do with finding such a case. It may be that Turner’s ‘tautology’ critique 
has some merit in this regard, and that such cases simply do not exist. However, the absence 
may equally be down to author bias, for what author of a case study, in the field of 
psychoanalysis, would provide a focussed account of ‘healthy’ relationships. I did in fact find 
cases where the overall health of romantic relationships was stated, even though many of the 
necessary conditions nevertheless seemed present. The problem here was that the absence of 
data concerning those relationships meant that there was nothing to analyse.         
I believe that the greatest limitation of the method however, is one that Hinshelwood 
(2013) raises in relation to observation and data gathering broadly; the accusation of circularity. 
In short, circularity amounts to using a specific theory to identify relevant data, and then using 
observations based on that data, to support the same theory. The problem is what is left out; 
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data which could undermine the theory and is dismissed or overlooked precisely because it 
does not fall under the auspices of that theory. The limitation is therefore one of accounting for 
author bias, a matter which is discussed further, in the section on quality criteria  
 
 
Generalizability  
As Mitchell (1983) notes, the question of generalizability in case study research, often centres 
on the issue of typicality; the extent to which a given case may be judged as representative. 
Mitchell argues, however, that “the essential point about…making inferences from case 
material…[is] that the extrapolation is in fact based on the validity of the analysis rather than 
the representativeness of the events” (p.168). As Stiles (2014) summarises, the aim is to 
produce an internally consistent, explicit, unified and logically coherent account. Mitchell goes 
on to outline, that what case study research is in fact concerned with, is the operation of a 
general theoretical principle, as it occurs within a particular event or situation. The emphasis 
here is on the theoretical and the argument, again references the distinction, mentioned above, 
between statistical and scientific or causal inference. In Mitchell’s words, on the latter, 
“scientific or causal – or, perhaps more appropriately, logical – inference is the process by 
which the analyst draws conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more 
characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory schema – some set of theoretical 
propositions” (p.176). The analysis then, is set within, and balanced against, a matrix of 
existing knowledge and theory, and generalizability as I understand it in my research, has to do 
with contributing back into that matrix. Following Stiles (2014), I would classify my research 
as ‘theory building’ which has, as he says, the goal of “…improving a theory as its product.” 
(p.6). He speaks further of ‘living theories’, noting that they are never finished and “…are 
always subject to modification by further observations, which may strengthen or weaken 
65 
 
confidence in them or illuminate aspects that might be elaborated or extended” (p.8). As 
previously stated, Analytic Induction formalizes this process of verification and reformulation. 
The end product, following analysis of the three case studies, should equally not be thought of 
as a conclusive statement in the positivist sense, but rather as a ‘living theory’, which would 
no doubt change with further analysis of additional cases.   
 
 
Consideration of Alternative Research Methods 
My choice of research method was circumscribed by the nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation. By definition, RC is identified as it occurs over large passages of time, which 
make direct observation of the phenomenon impractical. RC does not in any event seem easily 
accessible to observation for three further reasons; it is expressed as an interpersonal event, 
occurs outside of conscious awareness and is a manifestation of traumatic content. My 
reasoning here is that it would be impractical to attempt to be present at often private 
interpersonal moments in an individual’s life, that it would be difficult to identify instances of 
RC if the individual is him/herself unaware of them and that behaviour of a traumatic kind is 
often hidden from general social view. It is thus difficult to see how one could gain access to 
the phenomenon by methods other than reporting. This point applies to audio recorded therapy 
sessions as well, since establishing RC would depend on reports from the patient about their 
historical and contemporary relationships.    
One alternative method that was given consideration, is the logical model developed by 
Hinshelwood (2013) based on the experimental approach in science. My first question or 
concern had to do with applying his model to existing case-studies or audio recorded 
treatments, and whether this would class the research as induction. By using existing data, I 
would not be making predictions which are put to the test. I would not be carrying out an 
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experiment. One potential solution that may have allowed me to approximate the ‘carrying out 
of an experiment’ with existing data, would have involved the inclusion of a comprehensive 
protocol. The protocol would need to specify the exact conditions that one aims at ‘testing’, 
and then my procedure would be about finding these conditions in the data where they have by 
chance and unknowingly been ‘put to the test’.  
A central practical determinant in deciding against the method was the presumption that 
finding the desired test sequences (the test result here concerned with shifts in the transference-
countertransference relationship) would have been extremely trying – perhaps best summed up 
as ‘finding a needle in a haystack’.    
Another concern, was more fundamental, having to do with questions about the 
reliability of the model. Hinshelwood notes that where scientific experiments are concerned, 
conditions should keep variables to a minimum, preferably two – the independent and 
dependant variable, for if there is a third then the dependent variable will not necessarily occur.  
My concern was the suspicion that interpretation (the independent variable suggested 
by Hinshelwood) can’t necessarily be viewed as the application of a single variable, since 
unknown variables no doubt exist, deriving from the subjective nature of interpretation, both 
regarding the way the client receives the interpretation and the way the therapist executes it. 
Ultimately, the encounter is simply not a controlled environment in the same way that an 
experiment is. Hinshelwood clearly notes these difficulties but argues that they can be 
surmounted through the use of exact prediction in the logical model. Perhaps prediction could 
show us that an interpretation is functioning as expected and thereby justify the theory upon 
which the interpretation is built, in the instance of a verified prediction. However, there is never 
a way to know whether a failed prediction is due to an incorrect theory or due to an extraneous 
variable in the interpretation moment. Recall for instance that Freud required both memory and 
affect for symptom alteration. Perhaps then in a given instance of interpretation the verbal 
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content (deriving from the theory under test) may be correct but an absence of affect precludes 
the predicted outcome. One solution would be to include the extraneous variables in the theory 
that is put to the test, but is it ever possible to be comprehensive enough to guarantee that you 
have accounted for them all? Is it even feasible to try?         
I also gave a passing thought to survey methods, which might have been appropriate 
for the apprehension of certain aspects of RC, but concluded that they would not be particularly 
useful in aiding my central line of inquiry which concerns an in-depth analysis of some of the 
processes which are at the heart of the construct. This requires a holistic view of the individual 
and of the context they inhabit; one that is better furnished through case-based methods, which 
as Mishler argues grant the individual “...unity and coherence though time, respecting them as 
subjects with both histories and intentions” (1996:80).  
Two alternative, qualitative methods, that I considered were Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), and Grounded Theory (GT), but I rejected both for the 
following reasons. Smith and Osborn (2003) note that IPA is fundamentally centred on how 
individuals construct meaning and make sense of their experience. My interest in RC is 
however in a different area. I wanted to explore the dynamic, unconscious, causal mechanisms 
involved rather than focus for instance on how individuals made sense of RC episodes. In short 
IPA, answers a different question from the one I am interested in. GT was attractive because of 
the emphasis on generating theory in a direct manner from data. Traditionally, this involves the 
rejection of an early literature review in order to avoid ‘contamination’. As Dunne (2011) 
outlines the argument, contamination may consist of imposing “...existing frameworks, 
hypothesis or other theoretical ideas upon the data, which would in turn undermine the focus, 
authenticity and quality of the...research” (p. 114). A consideration of the literature on RC, 
indicates however, that the construct is an exceedingly complex one, and it is therefore doubtful 
how profitable an exploration would be without recourse to existing knowledge. Instead of 
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seeing a grounding in existing theory as contamination, I follow Dunne in reasoning that it may 
provide theoretical sensitivity, clarity of thought about concepts and in fact promote awareness 
of potential unhelpful preconceptions.      
 
 
Quality Criteria 
Stiles (2014) writes that “theory-building research provides quality control on theories by 
gathering observations and comparing them with what the theory leads them to expect…The 
observations may confirm or disconfirm or strengthen or weaken the theory, leading to 
increased confidence in aspects of the theory” (p.8). This is the procedure that Analytic 
Induction formalizes, and we can state that the methodology itself, therefore explicitly 
incorporates a fundamental aspect of quality control.   
Where this research is concerned, three levels of validity are implicated; the content 
provided by the patient, the therapist and author’s presentation and involvement in that content, 
and the validity of my own analysis. I will start with the patient’s content or narrative. To begin, 
I would like to highlight a basic point about the value of self-reports, which is that self-
narratives have value because they are primary sources – an individual reflecting on themselves 
– and so an obvious question is where or how else could you obtain such data. How else do 
you gain access to subjective intentional states but through being told? Turning to the issue of 
validity, one method of assessing trustworthiness, is to establish the degree of verisimilitude 
obtained by the narrative through an appraisal of narrative coherence, the idea being that the 
more coherent the narrative the more trustworthy (Agar & Hobbs, 1982; Lind, 1993). My topic 
of interest, RC, is extremely helpful in this respect. Repetition is a fundamental feature of the 
phenomenon, ‘compulsion’ being the other key element, and identifying the fact of repetition, 
provides a way of assessing coherence where RC activity is concerned. In short, if something 
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is identified as occurring repeatedly, across multiple contexts, we are more likely to trust in the 
truth of its existence. This same basic tenant applies to the search and identification of 
necessary conditions, the other major area of focus in the analysis process, and roughly the 
‘compulsion’ aspect of RC. Here again, conditions needed to occur repeatedly before being 
classed as necessary conditions, and not just within case, but in accordance with the research 
method, across case as well.        
There was little I could do to identify or directly combat author bias in the case studies. 
One decision I did make, in this regard, was to largely ignore their theoretical contributions, in 
an attempt to privilege the patient’s verbatim content. Of the three case studies, the one I have 
most faith in is Stoller’s, as verbatim extracts were transcribed from audio recordings.  
In terms of insuring research validity broadly, I have taken a common-sense approach 
and follow Riessman's (2008) emphasis on the importance of demonstrating that “the data are 
genuine, and analytic interpretations of them are plausible, reasonable, and convincing” 
(p.191). Concerning plausibility and reasonableness, in displaying my analysis process, I have 
included a trail of evidence, that indicates each step leading to a given interpretation, so that 
the reader is provided with sufficient content to reflect on the validity of interpretations and 
conclusions, themselves.     
An issue relating to credibility, that I would like to return to, is Hinshelwood’s (2013) 
accusation of potential circularity. As outlined, the problem has to do with leaving out data, 
which could undermine a theory, because it does not seem relevant to, does not fit, the theory 
in question. Where the identification of RC activity is concerned, I attempted to guard against 
this possibility, by dividing the analysis into themes. As outlined above, I looked in turn, at the 
nature of the object, affect directed at the object and the impact of the relationship. In each 
instance, any content pertaining to the theme in question, was included in the analysis. For 
example, there were repetitions that had elements which were not painful and damaging and 
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therefore did not meet that criteria of RC. These were noted, and impacted on the analysis. 
Another example, would be affect, where a patient felt different things about an individual. 
Again, all affect was included, and the disparities in feeling employed to further discussion and 
analysis.  
Stiles (2014) raises a further issue relating to quality control that is worth considering, 
noting that it is essential that central terms have a stable or fixed meaning allowing for common 
usage and understanding. He highlights the particular relevance to the psychanalytic field; 
“meanings of such terms as transference, alliance, conflict, stimulus, automatic thoughts...shift 
continually in informal psychological discussions, so getting them to hold still within a theory 
is challenging…” (p.17). It is for this reason, to ensure transparency and consistency, that I 
have gone to lengths to define constructs such as transference, projection, projective 
identification and object choice before applying them to the analytic process.  
 
 
A Final Point  
In closing, I turn to the question of why the method has fallen out of favour, or more accurately 
why it never really caught on to begin with. There is no doubt that Analytic Induction would 
have suffered during the long-standing climate of anti-positivist critique in the social sciences, 
and that as a prospective representative of the scientific method, it has appeared outdated given 
endorsement of the hypothetico-deductive method.  
Although the criticisms related to methodological vogue, and the logic of the method, 
may have merit, I yet wonder if part of the story is not that it simply lacked intuitive appeal. 
My suspicion is that the accounts it produced were for the most part seen as uninspiring, a 
quality I believe results from the kind of explanations it produced; explanations where the level 
of analysis is restricted to the conscious and rational. My suspicion is that such accounts when 
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applied to the context of human intentionality, which has been a common area of application, 
feel limited, leaving readers with little appetite for repeat outings.  
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CASE STUDY ONE: FREUD’S ‘NOTES UPON A CASE 
OF OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS’ 
 
 
RC Identification  
 
A First RC Strand  
I will begin by identifying strands of RC in the case study, focussing on Ernst Lanzer’s (aka 
the Rat Man, and patient) romantic relations. The first strand of RC identified, involves a 
repetitive relationship established by Ernst, which is most fully exemplified in the study 
involving the patient’s cousin Gisela, who he courts and intends to marry. Examples are given 
of additional relationships which display the same features highlighted between Ernst and 
Gisela, and therefore support the claim of repetition. 
 
Object Nature  
The case study provides little information about Gisela as an individual, and Freud informs us 
that this is initially due to a refusal on Ernst’s part. As Freud states, “so long as he makes 
difficulties over giving me the lady’s name his account must remain incoherent” (p.272), and 
“the lady still remains most mysterious” (p.260). Freud classifies the refusal as resistance, and 
notes that a ‘violent struggle’ (p.260) was required to combat Ernst’s reticence. Freud had for 
instance to pointedly request him “to bring a photograph of the lady with him – i.e. to give up 
the reticence about her” (p.260). In the end, what we do learn is summarized by Zetzel, “we 
get a picture of Gisela as (i) a first cousin; (ii) possibly too old for him (her age is not 
mentioned); (iii) almost certainly sterile…; and (iv) a woman who was subject to frequent 
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serious and disabling periods of ill health…” (1966:127). If we do not have sufficient 
information on her character to go by, then we can still profit from an attempt to determine 
what she represents for Ernst. Freud notes that Ernst while he loved the lady, “had never felt 
very sensual wishes towards her” (p.182). Owing to the practical matter of an ongoing 
indecision concerning marriage, on both their parts, the relationship simply did not have a 
consummated sexual dimension. Given that there is little evidence of Ernst desiring such (he 
is quite open about sexual desire where it centres on other women), I am proposing that Gisela 
signifies a desexualized object choice. This is a point that Zetel also makes, referring to Gisela 
as resembling ‘a prepuberty little girl’ and theorizing that “the fact that this cousin who was 
herself highly ambivalent may also have been ‘abused’ by her stepfather, and was at least as 
disturbed in respect of her psychosexual life as the patient, suggests that her own personality 
loaned itself to a relationship characterized by many infantile features” (1966:127).  
 
Effect of the Relationship  
Turning next to the question of how the relationship effects Ernst, we find that the dynamics 
of the relationship seem mostly to centre on rejection – whether the fact of rejection is correctly 
described as due to perceptual distortion of the kind exhibited for instance in projection or 
concerns objective behaviours and features of the object, is a line of enquiry that will concern 
us at a later point. One can however make the surprising generalization that – outside of 
ongoing contact; the fact that the two have a relationship of some sort – the only distinct 
relational propensity Gisela is shown to evince, is the capacity for rejection. Her absence in 
order to look after her sick grandmother is experienced as rejecting (p.187), and so is her refusal 
of his offer to visit at that time (p.259). She is supposedly preoccupied with other men on 
specific occasions (p.188, 265, 303). She refuses his marriage proposal (p.194), and this is 
followed by a certain ‘coolness’ (p.237). Ernst also believes that she sets “great store by the 
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social standing of a suiter” (p.194), and that this negatively effects his chances. In a dream, he 
sees her ‘making a face’ at the prospect of being engaged to him (p.273). He describes another 
dream on the night following her rejection of the proposal. “There was a pearl on the road. I 
stooped to pick it up but every time I stooped it disappeared. Every two or three steps it 
appeared again…” (p.274). Ernst sums up Gisela’s feeling towards him thus, “it might be 
true…that she could not love easily; but she was reserving her whole self for the one man to 
whom she would some day belong. She did not love him” (p185). Although examples of 
Gisela’s behaviour centre on rejection there must of course be elements of acceptance implicit 
in the very fact that the two of them have an ongoing relationship; they are in contact, spend 
time together and she is a willing participant in this to whatever degree.    
 
Affective State  
What of Ernst’s affective states (libidinal and aggressive)? Freud notes that he “…passed 
through alternating periods, in which he either believed that he loved her intensely, or felt 
indifferent to her…” (p.194). As mentioned, he did not view Gisela as a sexual object, and 
since we are not provided with further evidence about what precisely is meant by ‘intense love’, 
it remains difficult to clarify the nature of the supposed libidinous trend. Although he would 
probably be able to provide conscious reasons for his ‘want’ if pushed – charm or intelligence 
for instance – he does not offer these of his own accord at any time in the case study. What we 
do see, is that the experiences of rejection often result in suicidal thought/compulsion or self-
punishing behaviour (p.188). There are episodes of aggression following these reactions, 
directed not at Gisela, but at a related object (displacement) that is deemed responsible; for 
instance, Gisela’s grandmother (p.187) or other men (p.188). Freud perhaps expands on the 
tendency towards displacement with the statement that impulses to do harm to Gisela “…where 
usually silent in her presence, but came to the fore when she was not there” (p.255). Ernst 
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therefore struggles to direct aggression towards the ‘correct’ target while it is present. The case 
study also mentions phantasies of punishment or torture (p.167), mild revenge scenarios 
(p.185), and ‘vindictive impulses’ (p.185) centred on Gisela. In my view, the following dream, 
mentioned above, seems to sum up the situation succinctly. In it, Ernst is engaged to Gisela, 
and after she ‘makes a face’, he ends by telling himself “you’re engaged and not at all happy. 
You’re pretending to be happy so as to persuade yourself that you are” (p.273). We know little 
about the quality of the positive libidinous attachment to Gisela. Ernst’s desire remains largely 
undefined and is perhaps best described as a formless need, in the nature of, or in the semblance 
of love, although not ‘love proper’. This does not imply that it is weak for clearly the converse 
is true; it consumes him. There is additionally clear evidence of reactive pain and aggression, 
following repeated rejection. It seems to me that there is enough here to conclude that we 
observe an instance of desexualised object choice, centred on a predominantly rejecting object. 
Since there is an implied degree of acceptance down to the fact of there being a relationship 
and because of Ernst’s overwhelming need, Armstrong-Perlman’s (1991) classification of an 
‘alluring but rejecting’ object would be more apt than to class Gisela as exclusively rejecting. 
For ease of use, and to highlight the central dynamic at play, I will however employ the term 
rejecting object, but the reader should note that the alluring aspect is implicit.      
The case study contains examples of other relationships which mirror key aspects of 
the relationship between Ernst and Gisela, and so provide evidence of repetition. As with Gisela 
the term rejecting object is employed, but the alluring aspect should be considered implicit. To 
proceed, Ernst mentions a childhood love of his, Marie Steiner. Freud writes that when the 
patient “was 14 or 15 he had a sentimental passion for her [and] insists upon her 
narrowminded conceit” (p.270). What is interesting here is not simply the fact of rejection, but 
also the notion of a sentimental passion, and the thought that such a term may imply an absence 
of sexual passion. Lest the reader conclude that the absence of sexual desire is down to age, 14 
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or 15 is no longer young – well past the latency period – especially in an individual who states 
that his “sexual life began very early” (p.160), and that from a young age he was “left with a 
burning and tormenting curiosity to see the female body” (p.160). Freud does state that “in his 
childhood his sensual impulses had been much stronger than during puberty” (p.182), but there 
is no suggestion that his sexual impulses disappeared altogether. Freud for instance comments 
that “in his earlier years he had exhibited frankly. When he was thirteen he still did so to 
[Fraulein] Lina” (p.279). There are other examples with both elements, rejection and an 
absence of sexual desire. “When he was twelve years old he had been in love with a little girl, 
the sister of a friend of his. (In answer to a question he said that his love had not been sensual; 
he had not wanted to see her naked for she was too small.) But she had not shown him as much 
affection as he had desired” (p.178). In later life he spends a day and evening with Marie, 
walking and playing cards. The following morning he has a dream, reported to Freud, in which 
he tells Marie about the elements of a previous dream as these relate to her, “the meaning of 
which [of the dream elements] was that I might neither marry her nor have sexual intercourse 
with her. But that is nonsensical, he said, I might just as well have a prohibition against ever 
washing again. She smiled and nodded to him. In the dream he took this to mean that she 
agreed with him that both things where absurd. But when he woke up it occurred to him that 
she had meant that he need not wash any more. He fell into a state of emotion and knocked his 
head against the bed-post” (p.271). Even in aggressive phantasy, designed to injure Gisela, 
Ernst stumbles, almost as if by chance, upon the rejecting object. His imagined plot is to “grow 
very rich and marry some one else, and…then take her to call on the lady in order to hurt her 
feelings” (p.185). The phantasy breaks-down “for he is obliged to own to himself that the other 
women, his wife, was completely indifferent to him” (p.185). The same reactive aggression 
occurs here too: after he acknowledges that the imagined wife is indifferent to him, “his 
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thoughts had become confused, till finally it had been clearly borne in upon him that this other 
women would have to die” (p.185).         
 
RC Identification  
Before continuing, I want to be explicit about how the suggested strand of RC meets the 
definitional criteria of RC outlined above. The relationships described, result in damaging and 
painful experience (rejection and self-harming behaviour), and I have also given examples 
which argue for the fact of repetition. Concerning the question of unconscious motivation in 
RC, a basic assumption must be that the individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition 
while it occurs, and that what is desired is simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and 
unintended. The unpleasurable experiences Ernst repeats in his relationships are not seen as 
repetitive by him, and are also consciously unwanted and unintended.  
 
 
Second RC Strand  
There is a second type of relationship which is viewed as an additional component of the above 
RC strand, meaning that the full picture of a proposed single repetitive phenomenon remains 
to be outlined. This sub-strand contains features which are diametrically opposed to those in 
the first. Here, object choice centres on women that are unusually accepting of Ernst’s sexual 
advances, he often rejects them, and aggression is overtly expressed. The women also tend to 
occupy a lower socioeconomic standing.  
Ernst describes a scene from his childhood, where he is lying on a sofa with his 
governess. “I was lying beside her, and begged her to let me creep under her skirt. She told me 
I might, so long as I said nothing to any one about it. She had very little on, and I fingered her 
genitals and the lower part of her body…” (p.160). Again, with a later governess – the Fraulein 
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Lina mentioned above – he says, “I took a great many liberties with her. When I got into her 
bed I used to uncover her and touch her, and she made no objections” (p.161). What is striking 
about both encounters, is the easy and willing receptiveness to his advances. In the following 
exert overt expression of aggression is linked to sexual activity. At the time of seeing Freud, 
Ernst one day arrives home and meets his servant girl “He cannot think why, but he suddenly 
gave her a kiss and then attacked her” (p.261). The same elements are present in his 
relationship to his sister Julie, which is portrayed as highly sexualized. “Even the servants said 
that she loved him and kissed him [the patient] like a lover, not like a brother” (p.314). 
Following a dream of copulating with Julie, he entered “her bedroom and smacked her bottom 
under the bedclothes” (p.278). Ernst adds further that “he made…repeated attacks on 
his…sister, Julie” (p.278). At the time of treatment, there is mention of his behaving 
aggressively to a dressmaker he is having sexual relations with (p.278). There is also the 
suggestion of a tendency towards rejecting her, “when I [Freud] asked him whether he was 
already getting bored with her he replied Yes, with astonishment. He confessed that he was 
afraid she would ruin him financially…” (p.316).   
 
Object Nature  
I will now consider the same three primary aspects of the relationship explored above in 
relation to the first RC strand, as they apply to the second sub-strand. Little can be stated about 
the characteristics of the object, beyond an observed receptiveness to Ernst’s sexual advances, 
and their position of lower socio-economic standing.  
 
Affective State  
In turning to Ernst’s affective state, we have seen that sexual desire is a prominent feature, and 
that aggression is overtly expressed.  
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Effect of the Relationship  
Ernst seems to find pleasure in his sexual exploits, describing them for instance as a ‘glorious 
feeling that one might do anything for…’ (p.264). Freud echoes these sentiments, mentioning 
for instance Ernst’s spirits rising “…greatly on account of his rendezvous with the dressmaker” 
(p.292). There is a complicating factor however, discussed in-depth below, as Ernst also 
equates sex with guilt, injury, suffering, illness, and death. This leads Freud to conclude that 
“it was always the same with him: his fine or happy moments were always spoilt by something 
nasty” (p.261).    
    
 
One Strand; Two Sub-relationships  
I stated above that it is possible to identify one strand of RC consisting of the two types of 
romantic relationship described; one desexualized, rejecting and characterized by the 
repression or displacement of aggression, and the other sexual, accepting and characterized by 
overt aggression. The case study provides ample support for the suggestion of an inherent link 
between the two types, and also affords insight into the nature of the proposed link. As a general 
statement the iconography of ‘two women’ and indecision between them, runs throughout the 
study, featured in dream, phantasy, compulsive thought, transference manifestations and even 
on the transgenerational level. Evidence therefore converges from multiple sources. Freud 
himself draws a parallel between an experience of Ernst’s father – the decision to choose 
Ernst’s mother because of her wealth and position, over a ‘pretty but penniless girl of humble 
birth’ (p.198) – and Ernst’s wish to not make the same choice, that is he should remain faithful 
to Gisela rather than ‘marry the lovely, rich, and well-connected girl’ (p.198) suggested by his 
mother. Freud finds evidence of the same scenario manifested in a transference phantasy. Ernst 
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there substitutes Freud’s own daughter for the wealthy acceptable girl, and suffers indecision 
between her and Gisela. The fact of ‘who’ Freud’s daughter is substituted for, seems to be 
Freud’s own construction. Ernst in fact takes the line that it would be him who “raised the 
wealth and position of [Freud’s] family to a level which agreed with the model he had in mind” 
(p.199). I think the ‘who’ that Freud’s daughter is substituted for, can more accurately be 
described as a ‘what’, and that the ‘what’ in question is the sexualized object choice described 
above. Ernst has, as Freud writes in the eventually published process notes, “many phantasies 
of being unfaithful to Gise with this daughter [of mine] and punishment for this” (p.282). As 
the treatment progresses Ernst goes on to describe phantasy scenarios which must surely have 
pushed Freud to his limits! Freud’s daughter is pictured giving fellatio to a naked deputy judge 
(p.283); Ernst has the idea, Freud writes, of “ordering me to bring my daughter into the room, 
so that he could lick her, saying ‘bring in the Miessnick’” (p.284); Ernst phantasies about 
“lying on his back on a girl [Freud’s daughter] and…copulating with her by means of the stool 
hanging from his anus” (p.287). There are more phantasy scenarios along the same line, and 
some incorporating Freud himself, his wife, his children and his mother. The scenarios clearly 
also exhibit the expression of overt aggression as the scenes contain humiliating sexual content, 
murder and death.    
The point I want to make is that Ernst repeats this formulation of ‘two women’ (two 
types of object choice) in a compulsive repetitive fashion. He eventually, as Freud says, 
displaces “his love for his cousin on to the dressmaker; and…is now making the latter compete 
with my daughter…” (p.295). There is also the suggestion, made by Freud, that the whole 
tormenting debacle about paying back the money to Lieutenant A, and the agonizing indecision 
of the train trip to Vienna (see case study), are founded on indecision over the choice between 
two young women who were ‘kindly disposed’ towards Ernst (p.210-212). As stated, the motif 
of two women also features in dream, there represented by two swords, signifying marriage 
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and copulation (p.267) and seems to be granted an emphasised position in conscious waking 
experience (p.311). After Ernst spends the night with a waitress, who speaks about her first 
love, Freud reports that Ernst regretted it because, “he always sought to make a sharp 
distinction between relations which consisted only of copulation and everything that was called 
love: and the idea that she has been so deeply loved made her in his eyes an unsuitable object 
for his sensuality” (p.263). I take the following phantasy imagery as representative of an 
attempt at integration. Ernst meets a women on the street who he suspects of being a prostitute, 
“she smiled in a peculiar way and he had the strange idea that his cousin was inside her body 
and that her genitals were placed behind the women’s in such a way that she got something 
out of it every time the women copulated.” From the perspective of integration, the phantasy 
does not however end well, as “then his cousin, inside her, blew herself out so that she burst 
her” (p.312).     
 
RC Identification  
Under this reading the whole entity – two relationships, diametrically opposed – is viewed as 
a repetition compulsion. I have spoken above of how the first type of relationship may be 
classed as an instance of RC, I turn now to the question of how this additional sub-strand may 
qualify alongside it and in relation to it.  
Ernst repeatedly experiences guilt over betraying Gisela. For instance, while kissing a 
woman he had a “distressing compulsive idea that something bad was happening to his lady” 
(p.267). We can class these responses as relatively mild although nevertheless neurotic due to 
the element of concretization/displacement – he believes something bad happens to her rather 
than the bad thing being his act. Ernst is also often overcome by more extreme guilt and dread 
where sex is concerned generally. As stated above, and discussed further below, it may be 
experienced as tantamount to murder. Turning to Ernst’s aggressive outbursts, we find that his 
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attacks are unjustified, involuntary (in fact surprising to him) and destructive. The guilt, shame 
and dread experienced in relation to this second type of object choice are most forcefully 
illustrated in the transference. While Ernst relays his detailed phantasies (sexual and 
aggressive) about Freud’s daughter he cannot stop moving about the room, and acknowledges 
that this is because he fears being beaten (p.283-4). Freud describes the scene further “his 
demeaner during all of this was that of a man in desperation and one who was trying to save 
himself from blows of terrific violence; he buried his head in his hands, rushed away, covered 
his face with his arms, etc” (p.284). An important factor here is the counter transference, or 
rather in this instance, to Freud’s credit, the expected counter transference response. Freud 
refers to him privately as a ‘dirty fellow’ (p.283), but overall, seems to have contained his 
reactions. Ernst however expected brutal retaliation and feared for his safety. His phantasies 
were undeniably provocative; as Freud says to him you are “…playing the part of a bad man 
in relation to me” (p.314). These libidinal and aggressive currents occur in sharp relief in one 
encounter where Ernst spontaneously kisses and attacks his ‘servant-girl’. He immediately 
flees the situation and Freud concludes, “it was always the same with him: his fine or happy 
moments were always spoilt…” (p.261).  
We can conclude therefore that this second strand does meet the basic definitional RC 
criteria; it is unconscious, repetitive and unpleasurable. We may however question whether 
neurotic guilt (either in mild or more extreme form), although unpleasant, can here be viewed 
as an unconsciously motivated RC outcome. Perhaps it would better qualify as a pathological 
consequence of behaviour which has its own self-contained motivation – i.e. sexual desire. 
Taking this reservation into account I would suggest that we are on firmer ground if we treat 
the two strands as one situation/event. This is supported by Ernst’s repetition of the ‘two 
women’ motif, concerning two distinct types of object-choice and indecision between them. It 
is furthermore due to the solution of two types of object choice that things become ‘messy’. If 
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it were not the case, Ernst’s sexual desire could be sanctified by the ‘stamp’ of love and 
marriage. His aggression would be justified because directed at an object that deserves rebuke 
when such is fitting. As things stand, Ernst instead continually fears harming or in fact does 
harm, an undeserving object. The first, underserving to his mind, and the second objectively 
so. The outcome is that he always comes off ‘wrong’, ‘guilty’, ‘bad’. In total then, in respect 
of RC criteria both options are ultimately unpleasurable (painful and damaging); the first 
engendering rejection and self-harming behaviour, the second culminating in guilt, shame, 
dread and the dissolution of the sexual encounter/romantic engagement. The fact of repetition 
has been established in relation to both strands and as applying to the ‘two women’ motif as a 
whole. The unconscious nature is surly established by the patently unwanted nature of the 
outcome Ernst repetitively engenders. Consciously his want alternates between the rejecting 
and accepting object, but nowhere is it his desire to be ‘eternally’ trapped between them, 
‘eternally’ denied either.          
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The Search for Necessary Conditions  
 
Externalization of Internal Object Relations   
 
Repressed Ego Fragments and Split-off Self-images   
In trying to comprehend the nature of object relations, focussing specifically on the presence 
of repressed ego fragments or in related terminology, split off self-images, I begin by 
identifying and considering moments of stark alteration of a state of mind within a given 
relational situation. Above, in the case of the desexualized rejecting object choice, I identified 
an undefined libidinal trend, a ‘need’ that can be described as formless, becoming desperate in 
the face of rejection and precipitating an immediate self-punishing tendency – a near automatic 
shift to a position of self-harm.  
These dynamics are also observable as the affective and behavioural dispositions 
populating certain compulsions experienced by Ernst. The compulsions, or as Freud calls them 
‘commands’ or ‘compulsive impulses’, are trains of thought that propose/command/encourage 
behaviour of an extreme nature – behaviour which Ernst himself would not sanction under 
normal circumstances – and seem always to follow an experience of rejection. Since internal 
vicissitudes are here recorded in detail, they provide an unobstructed view of Ernst’s broader 
intrapsychic response to rejection.  
It is possible to identify seven distinct elements: (i) the presence of an undefined 
libidinal trend (ii) a contextual experience of rejection (either, real or ‘imagined’); (iii) an 
immediate response of self-directed aggression and the aim of self-harm; (iv) an instance of 
anomaly (a ‘pause’, ‘gap’ or moment of indecision); (v) a redirection of aggression turned 
outwards confined to phantasy, often, and nevertheless, (vi) missing the target through 
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displacement; and (vii) a moment of self-reflective horror over the expressed aggression, that 
may precipitate an attempt at ‘undoing’.   
The following extract provides an illustration, and concerns Gisela, in relation to which 
the undefined libidinal trend (i) has previously been established. The context (as Freud 
confirms, p.187, 259) is one where Ernst, experiences rejection (ii) over Gisela’s absence. She 
is nursing her sick grandmother and has also refused his offer to visit.           
 
“if you received a command to take your examination this term at the first opportunity, 
you might manage to obey. But if you were commanded to [iii] cut your throat with a 
razor, what then? He had at once become aware that this simple command had already 
been given, and was hurrying to the cupboard to fetch his razor when he thought: 
[iv]‘No it’s not so simple as that. [v and vi] You must kill the old women’. [vii] Upon 
that, he had fallen to the ground, beside himself with horror” (p.187)1.       
 
Most of these elements are again found in the next encounter:   
Freud tells us that when Ernst was “… twelve years old he had been in love with a girl…he 
said his love had not been sensual [i]… But she had not shown him as much affection as he 
had desired [ii]. And thereupon the idea had come to him that she would be kind to him if some 
 
1 Freud reverses the order of iii and v, to argue that the moment of self-punishing/self-harming is borne out of 
guilt over the expression of unconscious aggression (directed ultimately against Ernst’s father). As he says, 
“the whole process then passed into consciousness…in reverse order – the punitive command coming first, 
and the mention of the guilty outburst afterwards” (p.188). Freud’s construction traces the same steps i to v, 
that I have highlighted above, although ignores ii, and adds a final theoretical amendment by swapping ii and 
iv. He does this again to explain Ernst’s behaviour while away on his summer holiday. Here Ernst punishes 
himself over thoughts of murdering Richard, a man who had interfered in his relationship with Gisela. With 
respect to the chronology of events however, as with the previous example, he would seem to punish himself 
in response to rejection, and then ‘correct’ the inward direction of aggression, in a move towards 
externalization and displacement. Freud’s theoretical amendment loses the connection in the present between 
rejection and an immediate response of self-harm, and minimises Ernst’s ongoing battle to place the aggression 
‘where it belongs’. Of course, here Ernst struggles further, often resorting to displacement.   
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misfortune were to befall him [iii]; and as an instance of such misfortune his father’s death 
[v,vi] had forced itself upon his mind. [vii] He had at once rejected the idea with energy. And 
even now could not admit the possibility that what had arisen in this way could have been a 
‘wish’…” (p.178).    
Although iv is not present in this example, we do observe it at other times. Midpoint 
through a phantasy which centres on revenge against Gisella, Ernst “… had been obliged to 
own to himself that the other woman, his wife, was completely indifferent to him; then his 
thoughts had become confused [iv], till finally it had become clearly borne in upon him that 
this other woman would have to die” (p.185).  
What we find then is a near automatic assumption of a position of self-harm, in the face 
of rejection, followed by an amendment towards displaced and/or phantisized aggression. I 
would suggest that the point of amendment betokens the presence and activation of a split off 
ego fragment, formed out of a primal experience where the external expression of aggression 
in response to neglect or rejection, was then inhibited (i.e. the ego fragment was repressed), 
making self-directed aggression the only viable expression of aggression – a now structurally 
engrained tendency2.  
Alternatively, viewing the matter as one of object relations units, that is in terms of self- 
and object images connected by an affective link3, the object relations unit which is defended 
against, and hence made unconscious, is one where the object image is ruthlessly rejecting and 
 
2 This construction (in distinction to Freud’s account discussed in the previous footnote) makes intuitive sense, 
possessing the feel of verisimilitude, and remaining true to the actual chronology of events; it does not ‘sound’ 
right that Ernst would punish himself so severely out of guilt, over aggressive thoughts directed at near 
strangers, nor that he would respond with self-harm before the fact of aggression, that is to an unconscious as 
yet unexpressed aggression (Freud’s account). It is for these reasons perhaps that Freud appends a final 
statement; “I cannot think that this attempt at an explanation will seem forced or that it involves many 
hypothetical elements” (p.188). Freud excludes a step which illustrates the degree to which, and the mode by 
which, aggression is curtailed in the present.    
3 To remind the reader, Fairbairn’s terms, ego fragments and internal objects, are preferred when the focus is on 
agency and, Kernberg’s, self- and object-images, when self-perception and defence are foremost at issue. 
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‘deserving’ of hatred – is hated. What we find instead is an object image that is rejecting of a 
self that is presumably experienced as not good enough. We can say that the rejecting object 
precipitates an experience of self (a self-image) in which punishment/annihilation is ‘seen’ to 
be justified. Although the object image may be ‘deserving’ of hatred, it is seldom the focus of 
conscious aggression. A split-off self-image that is kept from awareness, seen as foreign – in 
relation to this object-image – is the one which openly hates an alternative, but undeserving 
object; often as we will see, the accepting object.       
 
Mechanisms of Ongoing Repression and Degrees of Ego Syntonicity   
Extending this account, we can consider Freud’s comments (p.239) on a characteristic inability 
by Ernst to assume an ambivalent affective position in relation to one and the same object. 
Freud theorizes that the state of affairs is contingent on the presumption of repressed hatred, 
where the mechanism of repression is partly a conscious intense love directed at the same 
object. The libidinous trend therefore prevents the hatred from surfacing and maintains its 
ongoing existence in the unconscious. We are here entering the terrain of object relations – an 
encounter with mechanisms such as splitting and introjection – which Freud himself seems to 
foreshadow with the statement that “the necessary condition for the occurrence of such a 
strange state of affairs in a person’s erotic life appears to be that at a very early age, 
somewhere in the prehistoric period of his infancy, the two opposites should have been split 
apart and one of them, usually the hatred, have been repressed” (p.239). 
Theoretically, Freud postulates the existence of an intense love4, but as argued above 
this is not observed in the case study. What we find instead is a ‘shapeless need’ that suggests 
 
4 Freud argues that “in such circumstances the conscious love attains as a rule…an especially high degree of 
intensity, so as to be strong enough for the perpetual task of keeping its opponent under repression” (p.239). 
This is largely new territory to Freud and we do not need to take his account as correct. We can equally turn 
to Fairbairn who argues that aggression is the central mechanism of repression with the aim being the 
protection of the good object.    
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the presence of a particular form of idealization. In Fairbairn’s terminology, we can equate it 
with the central ego where need is shorn of its sexual and aggressive elements. 
Freud notes that at times the aggressive impulse enters consciousness, and the result is 
violent hostility “in the nature of senseless rage” (p.191). He argues that the outcome, is a 
situation where love and hate are ‘chronically’ bound together, both inescapably directed at the 
same individual (p.239). We should recall however that for Ernst, aggression is generally 
displaced where the rejecting object is concerned, and that therefore the closest he gets to the 
direct expression of aggression – the moment where the aggressive impulse enters 
consciousness – is within phantasy. Even here however he does not take ‘ownership’ of the 
impulse. Ernst for instance mentions a phantasy scene of the ‘rat punishment’ with Gisela as 
target. He states that “it was not he himself who was carrying out the punishment, but that it 
was being carried out as it were impersonally” (p.167). He breaks off the story to ensure Freud 
that the “thoughts were entirely foreign and repugnant to him” (p.167). As Zetzel (1966) 
summarizes, “the Rat Man…remained at all times aware of and disturbed by the ego alien 
negative transference fantasies which determined his behaviour” (p.124). Freud confirms this 
point, writing that while Ernst heaped “the grossest and filthiest abuse upon me and my 
family…in his deliberate actions he never treated me with anything but the greatest respect. 
His demeaner as he repeated these insults to me was that of a man in despair” (p.209). 
Activated pathological affective valences are therefore not entirely ego syntonic during 
expression. Freud however adds the famous line, of interpreting Ernst’s expression, while 
reporting a phantasy scenario, as “one of horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was 
unaware” (p.167). There is therefore the observation of an alien aggression and the suggestion 
of an alien pleasure, the latter being observable only as a subtle bodily occurrence.   
There is a further vicissitude following the occurrence of aggression in phantasy – an 
attempt to undo it (vii, above) through what Freud refers to as a ‘sanction’; a “defensive 
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measure which [Ernst] was obliged to adopt in order to prevent the phantasy from being 
fulfilled” (p.167). Ernst in effect attempts to solve the problem of his aggression by 
concretizing the matter – i.e. if he can carry out a self-designated program (or command) in the 
external world, it will negate the effects of the partly alien affect. The conversion of the problem 
from the internal to the external has the further benefit of aiding repression, by shifting 
awareness to external matters. Great confusion follows as Ernst and others (participants in the 
events, Freud, the reader of the case study) get caught up in the intrigue of an unsolvable, 
because displaced, concrete problem. We can see the workings of the procedure in the 
exhausting debacle centred on the misplaced need to pay back money to ‘lieutenant A’ (p.165 
– 173), which originates as a response to an aggressive phantasy targeting Gisela and his father. 
Freud’s observations support the notion of a ‘sleight of hand’ where displacement of the 
problem and resulting confusion facilitate repression. As he writes “it would not surprise me 
to hear that…the reader had ceased to be able to follow. For even the detailed account which 
the patient gave me of the external events of these days and of his reactions to them was full of 
self-contradictions and sounded hopelessly confused” (p.169). I believe that Freud falls for the 
‘trickery’ himself, exerting a great deal of effort to untangling the facts of the matter over 
multiple pages of the case study, and requiring that Ernst tell the story three times before ‘errors 
of memory and other obscurities’ were laid bare (p.169). He even goes to the lengths of 
producing a map of the area where the events took place (p.212).            
 
Dynamics of the First Relationship: The Rejecting Object   
What Ernst is trying to negate is the potential effects of expressing aggression that feels 
shockingly alien to him, as well as perhaps knowledge of Freud’s insight that at times he 
showed ‘pleasure of which he was unaware’. He is trying to repress the activation of a split off 
ego fragment or in other words awareness of a split-off self-image. We find the same attempt 
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at repression depicted throughout the case study, for instance in Ernst’s reliance on a friend 
who he used to employ in the following way: “he used to go to him when he was tormented by 
some criminal impulse, and ask him whether he despised him as a criminal. His friend used 
then to give him moral support by assuring him that he was a man of irreproachable 
conduct…” (p.159). The content of Ernst’s phantasies is at times also transformed in line with 
the attempt at repression. Summarizing, Freud tells us that in many of Ernst’s phantasies he 
“did the lady some great service…”  (p.195) adding that “in these he only recognised his 
affection, without sufficiently appreciating the origin and aim of his magnanimity, which was 
designed to repress his thirst for revenge…” (p.195).   
In summary, what we find where general object cathexis of the rejecting object is 
concerned, is a state of mind characterized by the pre-eminence of the central ego and an 
effective valence that can be described as a ‘shapeless need’; a form of idealization shorn of 
sexual and aggressive elements. Under this endopsychic state of affairs, self-directed 
aggression is the reactive norm. Instances of stark rejection may however activate a split off 
ego fragment characterized by an aggressive effective valence, where the aggression is either 
displaced (onto a substitute object) and/or manifested in ego-dystonic phantasy. Continual 
attempts to repress the activated ego fragment are observed, and there is also the suggestion 
that the experience of pleasure over aggression is characteristic of the ego fragment. Self-
reflective continuity across ego states is maintained to a degree, and although Ernst as we saw 
does his upmost to deny this ‘foreign’ part of himself, we do not see anything in the nature of 
dissociative identity disorder, where affective valences are wholly ego syntonic during 
activation and memory across ego states is disordered. The former point, discussed above, is 
illustrated again by Freud’s statement that Ernst “…kept hitting himself while he was making 
these admissions [of sexual and aggressive phantasy] which he still found so difficult” (p.284). 
Turning to the issue of memory, while discussing the notion of a “splitting of the 
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personality…between a moral self and an evil one” (p.177), Ernst for instance tells Freud that 
“although he considered himself a moral person, he could quite definitely remember having 
done things in his childhood which came from his other self” (p.177). He later continues with 
this theme, speaking about a specific deplorable act, “…whose author [Freud tells us] he did 
not recognize as himself, though he quite clearly recollected committing it” (p.184). As Ernst 
puts it, quoting Nietzche “I did this, says my memory. I cannot have done this, says my pride 
and remains inexorable” (p.184).      
 
Dynamics of the Second Relationship: The Accepting Object  
What of the second kind of relationship, the sexual and accepting object choice, where overt 
aggression is more permissible? Since the object is an accepting one, undeserving of 
aggression, we infer that displacement occurs. We may therefore wish to conclude that we view 
the activation of the previously outlined attacking ego state, although here targeting a substitute 
object. Recall that Ernst is paralysed in the face of the rejecting object; he cannot hate it, hence 
the need for a substitute. We could reason further that a lessening of repression relating to the 
cathexis of an accepting sexual object allows for sexual desire. As with the outlined ego 
fragment, Ernst ultimately experiences himself as bad, a state of mind that is captured in the 
transference/counter transference where he expects to be punished and ‘annihilated’. I.e. there 
is clear evidence of repression and of a need to protect against what is felt and expressed which 
must be indicated if the argument is made for the same ego fragment. To conclude, the two 
types of object choice may concern not two distinct spheres of ego functioning but rather a 
continuum between repression and consciousness involving the same ego fragment.  
This formulation is however problematic for two reasons. First, we need to account for 
the libidinous strand. Here the difficulty concerns the fact that Ernst sexually desires the 
accepting object but that we have no evidence of him feeling the same way about the rejecting 
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object, and on the face of it the contrary was shown to be true. We know that there is something 
alluring or tantalizing about it, that theoretically something akin to sexual desire may be 
repressed, but there is little evidence of this. The central question should be, is the ego fragment 
fundamentally desirous; is that the nature of its link to both kinds of object? The second 
objection relates to the hostile strand. It concerns the fact of there being two distinct types of 
object and this sitting uncomfortably with the theoretical assumption of enduring ties between 
ego fragments and internal objects, which is at the heart of object relations theory. Simply put, 
how do we conceptualize the displacement of aggression onto a second object? I.e. if the 
repressed relationship is between a hateful ego and a rejecting object why is the same ego 
fragment here activated by an accepting object?  
Two sites of internal conflict in fact argue against the wholesale adoption of the 
proposal that it is the same ego fragment observed in both types of relationship. What is 
supported however are vicissitudes which amount to outcomes analogous to displacement, 
where aggression is concerned. The result is an account which pictures attacks on the accepting 
object, being again in the service of protecting the rejecting object. Before commencing with 
this argument, I will discuss the libidinous strand.        
 
 
Sites of Conflict  
As previously suggested, it is possible to identify a conflict involving sex; that between sex 
and love, such that the two seem unable to occur together, centred on the same object. Ernst’s 
sexual encounter with a woman who speaks about a prior love the morning after their liaison, 
was mentioned as illustrative. Her admission leads Ernst to regret having had sexual relations 
with her, because he always, as he says, sought to make a distinction between relationships 
which consist of sex and those which include love (p.263). He seems to be stating that knowing 
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she was loved by another, makes her a suitable object of potential love, and therefore not of 
desire, the two being incompatible. We also see that the two areas are distinguished in dream 
representation by two swords, which signify according to Ernst, ‘marriage’ and ‘copulation’ 
(p.267). The discordancy of the two areas was further highlighted in my analysis of RC activity, 
where two distinct affective dispositions are seen to relate to two types of romantic object 
choice.  
To return to the question about the nature of the libidinous strand, given the severity of 
split relating and the absence of any evidence that Ernst does feel sexual desire for the rejecting 
object, I feel secure in concluding that the previously outlined ego fragment is not in essence 
desirous. To argue that it is in operation in both instances, would therefore require 
conceptualizing an ego fragment that ‘feels’ differently about different objects, and this 
undermines the very notion of an ego fragment. Instead, I would suggest that Ernst’s desire 
originates elsewhere, from more conscious segments of his ego. There are numerous instances 
throughout the case study of Ernst being preoccupied with sexual desire and finding satisfaction 
in encounters of a sexual nature. He has easy or unimpeded access to desire; it is not a capacity 
that is repressed. What we find instead of repression is a pressure or prohibition which comes 
into play alongside or after the fact of desire or sexual activity. This is indicated by a second 
site of internal conflict identified by Freud in the case study, that between sex and death.  
Ernst equates sex and death, such that sex or acts of sexuality betoken injury, suffering, 
illness, and death. He tells us for instance that from the age of six or seven, “there were certain 
people, girls, who pleased me very much, and I had a very strong wish to see them naked” he 
adds however, introducing the aspect of conflict, that “in wishing this I had an uncanny feeling, 
as though something must happen if I thought such things, and as though I must do all sorts of 
things to prevent it” (p.162). When asked to provide an example of what might happen, he 
replies that his “…father might die” (p.162). Freud remarks that “a conflict was evidently in 
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progress in the mind of this young libertine. Side by side with the obsessive wish [to see females 
naked], and intimately associated with it, was an obsessive fear: every time he had a wish of 
this kind he could not help fearing that something dreadful would happen” (p.163). In later life 
the conflict is expressed in prohibitions such as “if you indulge in intercourse, something will 
happen to Ella [his niece]” (p.226), or compulsive ideas that, “you can only save your sister 
by renouncing all sexual pleasure…” (p.272). There are also manifestations of the conflict in 
dreams (p.267), and perhaps in his transference phantasies centred on Freud and his family, 
which concern themes of graphic death and humiliating sexual acts, although never admittedly 
simultaneously (p.284-286). A fundamental point to note is that sex is avoided because of 
signifying harm to the rejecting object. Freud observes that “on the few occasions on which he 
[Ernst] had had intercourse with girls…he never felt self-reproachful” (p.263). This is 
immediately followed by mention of the sexual encounter, described above, where the 
woman’s admission of a prior love leaves Ernst regretting the liaison, and explaining that his 
compunction is due to an explicit separation of love and sex. It is here that Ernst’s rejection of 
the accepting object occurs, his hostility being generated out of a pressure to protect the 
rejecting object. Furthermore, because of the split between sex and love/need, the accepting 
object importantly is not an object that he cares enough about to fear injuring. He can be 
ruthless with it. In all of the examples presented above, where sex equates to death/harm his 
concern is for the de-sexualized object – for example, his father (p.162); Ella, who was “a 
charming little niece of whom he was very fond” (p.226); his sister Gerda who was ill (p.272); 
and Gisella (p.267). I would suggest finally that it is not sex per se that is bad but rather its 
capacity for injuring; the central issue is the conflict between inhibition and the expression of 
aggression detailed previously5. We find the same conflict manifested in compulsive protective 
 
5 Following a thread introduced by Freud’s comment (p.167) on unconscious pleasure experienced over the 
expression of aggression lends support to the notion of the primacy of aggression. As previously mentioned, 
Ernst has multiple transference phantasies of a sexual and aggressive nature involving Freud’s family and 
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and reparative acts related to Gisela. One of these for instance involves removing a stone from 
a road upon which her carriage is due to pass so as to protect her from harm. The act is followed 
by a recognition of its absurdity, impelling Ernst to replace the stone to its original position 
(p.190). Freud notes that “here again we have a hostile impulse against his cousin remaining 
alongside a protective one” (p.307). He concludes that Ernst’s obsession for protecting “can 
only have been a reaction – as an expression of remorse and penitence – to a contrary, that is 
a hostile impulse…” (p.191).  
We are now able to return to the question of how we conceptualize the displacement of 
aggression, given theoretical assumptions of enduring ties between ego fragments and internal 
objects. What the above account – the supposition that an ego fragment is not in operation 
where the accepting object is concerned and that protection of the rejecting object is salient – 
amounts to, is the conclusion that the same ego fragment is not activated in relation to both the 
rejecting and accepting object but is restricted to the former, and what is more that aggression 
results from a pressure to defend the former. Thus, we have Freud’s “…hostile 
impulse…remaining alongside a protective one” (p.307).         
In an attempt to contextualise the above conflicts, I will next consider how the areas 
may be situated within Ernst’s developmental history and within the ongoing parent/child 
relational matrix. 
 
specifically his daughter. The sexual content of Ernst’s phantasies speaks to sexual pleasure, but there is also 
pleasure related directly to the aggressive acts described. Although sexual and aggressive components are 
clearly intertwined, we also find, for instance in phantasies with coprophagic content, a clear progression 
whereby aggressive content comes more to the fore while sexual content recedes, and yet a sense of pleasure 
remaining. In one transference phantasy Ernst was “lying on his back on a girl [Freud’s daughter] and was 
copulating with her by means of the stool hanging from his anus” (p.287). Here the act is clearly of a sexual 
nature. In another, Freud tells us that “a number of children were lying on the ground, and he went up to each 
of them and did something into their mouths. One of them, [Freud’s son]…, still had brown marks round his 
mouth and was licking his lips as though it was very nice” (p.286). Another phantasy involving coprophagy 
leaves him with a feeling of ‘pride and high regard’ for the perpetrator of the act (p.286). These two phantasies 
are concerned more with the aggressive aspect of the act, there being no suggestion of a penetrative sexual 
rhythm, and yet there are indications of pleasure all the same.     
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Internalization of Parental Figures     
Freud informs us that Ernst, from a young age and continuing into adulthood, had a ‘morbid 
idea’ that his parents knew his thoughts (pp.162, 178). Ernst expands, “I explained this to 
myself by supposing that I had spoken them [the thoughts] out loud, without having heard 
myself do it” (p.162). It is not only that they have access to his internal world but that he fears 
something bad will happen if he fails to hide, supress, certain thoughts (often of a sexual 
nature). He gives the example of his father dying (p.162), and Freud tells us that he then “learnt 
with astonishment that the patient’s father…had died several years previously” (p.162). There 
is the suggestion that Ernst’s father is therefore ‘alive’ in some sense and able to hear and be 
affected by his thoughts (pp. 162, 174, 264-265, 303).  
 
Ernst’s Father  
In Ernst’s fantasies, Freud identifies a wish to do harm to his father, and takes this as evidence 
of repressed hatred. He argues that we can “only presume that the hatred must flow from some 
source, must be connected with some particular cause, which made it indestructible” (p.181). 
Freud exerts a great deal of effort (p.183,185,189, 201, 205, 237, 263) into confirming the 
presence of an oedipal cause for the unconscious hostility, surmising that the cause was 
“something in the nature of sensual desires, and in that connection [Ernst] must have felt his 
father as in some way or other an interference” (p.182). He seeks for a primary causal event, 
at one-point venturing “to put forward a construction…[and]…hypothesis” (p.205) of a 
childhood scene involving punishment over a ‘sexual misdemeanour’ connected with 
masturbation (p.205-6). No evidence of such an event is found however, although Freud does 
stumble upon a frightening experience of punishment coinciding with the fatal illness and death 
97 
 
of Ernst’s sister Katherine, which he attempts to employ in order to support the theoretical 
inference of placing Ernst’s father in the role of ‘sexual opponent or interferer’6. He goes to 
great pains to view the cause of the punishment as of a sexual nature (see his extended footnote 
p.206), but this is not confirmed, and in fact refuted by Ernst’s mother, who states that the 
punishment was a consequence of Ernst biting someone. Freud also tries to establish the 
presence of an oedipally derived conflict manifested in the present, suggesting that Ernst’s 
indecision where Gisella is concerned, is essentially due to a “struggle between the persisting 
influence of his father’s wishes and his own amatory predilections” (p.200). As previously 
argued however (…), Gisella is not experienced as a sexual object by Ernst; there is therefore 
no sexual aim for Ernst’s father to oppose or interfere with. Furthermore, there is also no real 
evidence of his father objecting to the union, other than for a single statement about Ernst 
 
6 I believe that Freud here encounters a site of traumatic loss and that he negates the traumatic nature of the 
experience, partly out of a need to support the theoretical inference of an oedipal event and partly owing to 
complexes of his own. Freud emphasises that Katherine’s death was a central issue in the events under 
consideration, but does not say how exactly it featured, beyond a suggestion that “his sister’s premature death 
[was] linked up with the young hero’s chastisement at his father’s hand” (p.206). In my view the inability to 
get clarity on what exactly happened, points to the presence of a site of trauma, and a resulting characteristic 
distortion of information and memory processing. What we know of the period is that Katherine was fatally 
ill and died, that Ernst was beaten and responded with ‘an outburst of elemental fury’, and that the violent 
confrontation left a ‘permanent impression’ on both father and son (p.205-6). The central issue of importance 
is surely Katherine’s death, and its impact on the family. As often happens, Freud provides us with a clue to 
his failings or oversights, here in the form of denial; “I am not to be blamed…for this gap in the analysis” 
(p.206). He is referring specifically to his failure to confirm the presence of a sexual act, but also broadly to 
his inability to gain clarity on the situation. I wonder further whether he is not also defending himself against 
a potential accusation concerning a counter transference response; that Freud was counter transferentially 
effected by the same distortions of memory that plague Ernst. This position is corroborated by content included 
in the process notes. Freud there, belatedly as he says, describes three painful memories Ernst had of the period 
surrounding Katherine’s death. I include these as it gives us a sense of the pain and destress the family 
experienced. The first memory was of Katherine “being carried to bed. The second was of his asking ‘where 
is Katherine?’ and going into the room and finding his father sitting in an arm-chair and crying. The third 
was of his father bending over his weeping mother” (p.164). Freud then adds “it is curious that I am not 
certain whether these memories are his or Ph.’s. [another of Freud’s patients]” (p.264). Freud next emphasises 
the fact of his ‘uncertainty and forgetfulness’, and concludes that he forgot, “owing to complexes of [his] own” 
(p.264). We cannot know what complexes Freud refers to, nor whether they contributed towards the counter 
transference in a way that went beyond simple forgetfulness. This specific line of thought therefore remains 
speculative, but I do believe that even without it there is enough to support the notion that Freud, for whatever 
reason, did not pursue an enquiry into a site of trauma.                   
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appearing foolish as a result of his continued, but thus far failed courtship, which could equally 
be read as a statement of protection and frustrated concern (p.201, 274).   
In my opinion Freud fails to support the inference of an oedipal cause for the 
unconscious hostility and I will therefore focus simply on the fact of unconscious aggression, 
considering instances or indications of hostility, anger and violence between Ernst and his 
father. We learn first that Ernst’s father could be ‘hasty and violent’, and that he had a temper 
which sometimes resulted in “severe castigations upon the children, while they were young…” 
(p.201). Returning to the childhood event mentioned above, Ernst’s father is said to have given 
him a beating, and Freud informs us that Ernst in response “had flown into a terrible rage and 
had hurled abuse at his father even while he was under his blows…His father shaken by such 
an outburst of elemental fury, had stopped beating him…The patient believed that the scene 
had made a permanent impression upon himself as well as upon his father. His father, he said, 
never beat him again; and he also attributed to this experience a part of the change which 
came over his own character. From that time forward he was a coward…out of fear of the 
violence of his own rage” (p.205-6). Two aspects of the encounter stand out for me. The first 
is that both father and son are frightened by the extreme nature of the event to the point where 
a lasting impact is claimed. The second, concerns the nature of that impact, Ernst identifying 
an ongoing predisposition, on both their parts, concerning the suppression/repression of 
aggression. Since this is the only historical experience of relatively extreme violence suffered 
by Ernst, we are left with a strong suspicion that it is partly what is repeated in the transference 
where Ernst attempts to “save himself from blows of terrific violence…” (p.284). As previously 
indicated Ernst expects to be attacked because of the open hostility directed towards Freud, and 
additionally experiences extreme guilt and shame over his behaviour. 
What is undeniably apparent in the case study, is that Ernst carries a great deal of guilt 
related to his father. Although there is guilt during childhood concerning sexual desire, in 
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relation to both parents (p.162-4), in adulthood Ernst’s guilt centres on general injury of his 
father. He seems to feel that he neglected his father at times (p.174-6) and that certain of his 
behaviours would leave his father feeling rejected and unwanted, or simply harmed in some 
unspecified way (p.303). He also worries about disappointing his father (p.300), and implores 
himself to action to avoid this (p.275)7. Ernst also seems to have been incredibly fond of his 
father. We learn that the two of them where extremely close (p.182) and that Ernst “loved him 
more than anyone else in the world” (p.180). Freud summarises that Ernst’s father was a man 
of good character, had a friendly and lively disposition for the most part, and was an involved 
and communicative father (p.201). These two observations – that of guilt over possible injury 
and seemingly justified, high regard – suggest to me that the father signifies more something 
in the nature of the ego ideal than he does a persecutory prohibiting superego. He represents an 
ideal self – an ongoing attempt at identification – which Ernst continually fears falling short 
of. Of course, it is possible that overwhelming guilt of this sort may be debilitating, inhibiting 
and experienced as persecutory, which does seem to be the case for Ernst. My point is simply 
that where the father is concerned Ernst seems to experience these things more over falling 
short of being the person that he ought to be, than he does over breaking a sexual taboo.  
To conclude, it seems to me that there is generous support for the supposition that the 
conflict between inhibition and aggression has a strong bases and continuing manifestation in 
Ernst’s relationship with his father. We can state further that for Ernst the ego ideal is 
characterised by a marked negation of aggression, and that this characteristic derives from 
protective emulation of the father. Anger harms the father both on the inter and intrapersonal 
 
7 Freud seems to view the guilt as ultimately defused or non-specific, noting that there is a mismatch between 
affect and ideational content and arguing that the self-reproaches belong “to some other content, which is 
unknown (unconscious)…” (p.176). One of the aims of the analysis, as he states, is therefore to discover “the 
unknown content to which the self-reproach is attached” (p.176). As previously noted, Freud believes it 
centres on unconscious sexual guilt. I have suggested that there is little support for this inference.  
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level, in the former case directly, and in the latter by earning his disappointment at who Ernst 
is/becomes. The ego ideal pictured in Fairbairnian terms would here equate to the 
“…aspirations and expectations supplied by the ideal object in relation to the central ego” 
(Gomez 1997:65). The relationship that Ernst has to his father would seem to lay down the 
‘form’ of the relationship Ernst has to the accepting object on a conscious level.   
 
Ernst’s Mother  
There is mention of Ernst identifying with his mother (pp. 59, 62), however it is difficult to 
establish a sense of her as an individual, and therefore to construct an idea of her form or 
meaning as an internalized object. The absence of content is down to Freud. As Mahony (2007) 
persuasively argues, Freud reduced her significance to the point where she barely features.  
 
“In Freud’s grand schema of detecting and assigning influence, she hardly exists. The 
facts speak for themselves. Whereas Ernst’s mother appears in thirty-one places in the 
case notes, she is nearly laundered out in the published case history… It is reasonable 
to infer that, given Freud’s minimization of the Oedipal mother and complete 
negligence of the pre-Oedipal mother, her name came up many times during the 
treatment; but he reduced her significance step by step…” (p.103). 
      
Even though the material is limited, there is in fact far greater evidence of Ernst’s mother, 
rather than his father, occupying the role of ‘sexual interferer’. Freud seemingly appreciating 
this possibility asks Ernst the following “Hasn’t it ever occurred to you that if your mother 
died you would be freed from all conflicts, since you would be able to marry?” (p.283). Turning 
to specific examples, Ernst’s mother is said to have come “into the picture as an obstacle to 
his sexual activity” in relation to his youngest sister, and to have thwarted the housemaid’s 
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(Lisa) attempts at seducing Ernst (p.279). She herself serves as an off-putting model of female 
sexuality, imparting a sentiment of disgust to the female sexual organs which Ernst transfers 
onto other objects in his imagination. As Freud reports, Ernst “had a very early recollection of 
her lying on the sofa; she sat up, took something yellow out from under her dress and put it on 
a chair…it was horrible…He assumed that all women had disgusting secretions…His mother 
suffered from an abdominal affection and now has a bad smell from her genitals, which makes 
him very angry. She herself says that she stinks unless she has frequent baths…and this appals 
him” (p.296).  
Turning to the issue of unconscious aggression, Freud remarks on a “hostile current of 
feeling against his mother” (p.296), and about Ernst’s “low opinion of his mother” (p.297). 
The hostility is said to be a response to “educational strictures, especially about his dirtiness” 
(p.296). The limited content relating to the mother in this area however prevents any 
meaningful inference from being made.  
Having now assessed the impact Ernst’s parents may have had on the endopsychic 
situation under consideration, it must be admitted that the outcome is not particularly fruitful. 
My feeling is that there is just sufficient content on Ernst’s mother in the area of sex and 
sexuality to suggest that she played a pivotal role in Ernst equating sex with ‘badness’. 
However, there simply is not enough contextual content for that insight to be put to any use; it 
does not lead anywhere. For instance, even if we know that the prohibition derives from the 
mother, we do not learn why sex should harm the rejecting object. We do not know ‘who’ the 
rejecting object is. We do not know who furnishes the ‘ingredients’ of the repressed 
relationship to the rejecting object.          
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Consolidation and the Derived Hypothesis Following Analysis  
The repetition of, and indecision between two distinct types of romantic relationship was 
documented as an occurrence of the repetition compulsion. The encounter with the rejecting 
object (the first type) is defined by a formless libidinous trend, where ‘love’ or more accurately 
neediness/dependency is shorn of aggressive and sexual components. Ernst’s ‘love’ is here 
described as hollow because sexual desire and aggression cannot occur alongside it, directed 
at one and the same object. The encounter with the accepting object (the second type), on the 
other hand, is characterized by an increase of aggression, and by the presence of sexual desire 
and sexual activity. We here observe an internal splitting of the ego where dependency and the 
capacity for needing or ‘loving’ the other is starkly separated from sexual desire and the 
possibility of aggression. In this connection a construct echoing Fairbairn’s central ego was 
identified as being dominant under the first type of relationship with obligatory aggression 
emerging in the second. This aggression served to protect the very object which precipitated 
the specific form of central ego dominance observed. Indecision between the two types of 
object, founded on the fact of ego and object splitting derives from the endopsychic situation; 
a situation where the dominance of the central ego or of mandatory aggressive attacks on the 
accepting object, respectively negates either sexual pleasure or love/need. The two cannot 
occur together, and object indecision is seen here as an attempt to continually claim what is 
absent.         
The presentation of split object relating was shown to be asymmetric in the sense that 
at least consciously it is the rejecting object that is designated good, and the accepting object 
bad. Continuing from this point, Ernst is shown to repress an object relations unit in which the 
object image – being ruthlessly rejecting and therefore deserving of hatred – is hated. What is 
found instead is automated self-directed attacks, seemingly taking the place of aggression 
directed at the deserving object. We can say that the rejecting object precipitates an experience 
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of self (a self-image), in which, self-punishment/annihilation is seen to be justified. This is not 
a self which is capable of retaliatory aggression, and yet such a self, kept from awareness and 
seen as foreign, is shown to survive in the form of a split-off ego fragment. Although capable 
of open hatred, we find that aggression is nevertheless restricted largely to an alternative and 
undeserving object, the accepting object8. The outcome, where the rejecting object is 
concerned, is shown to be a specific form of idealization, which rather than elevating the object, 
centres on the reduction of ‘tarnish’. For Ernst the rejecting object cannot be denigrated, but 
neither is there evidence of idealization of the elevating kind – no praises extoling the wonders 
and virtues of Gisela. Ernst keeps the ‘dirt’ off her but does not place her with the divine. In 
Fairbairn’s terms we are concerned with a relationship to the ideal object, one characterized by 
neither “an over-intensity of…anger or need” (Gomez, 1997:61).   
In considering the role of different modes of externalization, it is noteworthy that there 
was little evidence of a primary role for transference, projection and projective identification. 
We may wonder for instance at Ernst’s role in perceiving or bringing about experiences of 
repeated rejection where the rejecting object is concerned. Could it be that the operation of 
transference, projection and projective identification created or contributed to Ernst’s 
experience of continual rejection? I.e. that he simply experienced the other as rejecting, or for 
instance projected his own indifference onto rejecting objects, or precipitated enactments of 
rejection via projective identification? This may well be part of the explanation, however an 
important point in this connection is that Ernst does not designate the rejecting object as 
rejecting, that is as bad, which would be a requirement of all three mechanisms as they are 
 
8 When activation of the split off ego fragment did occur in relation to the rejecting object, secondary defensive 
procedures where employed to displace aggression onto substitute objects of a fairly inconsequential sort (not 
the accepting object, where ‘displacement’ was a result of underlying split ego structure). Further secondary 
defences were also observed, including a type of concretization involving a supplanting of the internal problem 
to the external world in an attempt to ‘undo’, reaction formation in the form of restitutive phantasy scenarios, 
and pleas to third parties that they confirm his goodness/deny his badness.     
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understood in the literature review. Although he is greatly affected by indifference and 
rejection, the experience is not one that results in the assignment of blame to the rejecting 
object. As we saw, there is instead an automatic shift towards self-directed aggression which 
protects this object, and in other cases a displacement of aggression away from this object (onto 
irrelevant substitutes; not the accepting object), again protecting it from the status of bad object. 
We may wonder if the permissible expression of aggression observed where the accepting 
object is concerned, relies on transference, but here again Ernst does not attribute any specific 
qualities to the accepting object which justify aggression. Instead we find automated aggression 
that surprises and confuses Ernst. I.e. the aggression does not seem to be predicated on any 
specific experience of the accepting object. Rather than being down to the operation of these 
three mechanisms, in Ernst’s case, pathological repetition within romantic relationships seems 
to occur largely as an outcome of the operation of object choice and object substitution. Ernst 
employed real objects through crippling and persistent object indecision and systematic object 
substitution (both actual and fantasized), to mirror the vicissitudes of internal object 
relationships. It is via such means that externalization occurred, rather than for instance through 
projection and projective identification.    
It is not necessarily surprising that transference, projection and projective identification 
were not observed as primary mechanisms, because it may be that in each case considered, a 
determining variable decides between potential modes of externalization. I would suggest that 
such a variable will be identifiable in relation to the broader symptomatic picture, and in line 
with this modify the initial hypothesis to include the following clause: ‘it is posited that a 
variable which decides between the modes of externalization will be identifiable in relation to 
the broader symptomatic picture’. Is such a variable identifiable in this instance? For Ernst, the 
use of the real object, through object choice and object involvement, provides a mode of 
repeating an object relationship without consciously acknowledging the role played by the 
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object, in that relationship. The mode of externalization can here be understood partly as a 
reinforcement of repression; a defence against the conscious apprehension of the total 
repressed object relationship. I would therefore suggest that the variable we are looking for is 
one which acts to fortify suppression of the total repressed object relationship and include this 
amendment in the revised hypothesis.   
One outcome of the analysis certainly worth commenting on is that, in Ernst’s case it 
is the adaptation to a primary site of loss and/or trauma which seems to give partial form to 
RC activity. Ernst’s aggression is for instance repeatedly directed at the ‘wrong’ object, and 
therefore does not repeat the supposed primary experience, of being harmed, and harming or 
at the least wanting to harm, the ‘loved’ although rejecting object. We can reason that the 
whole purpose for the repression of the aggressive ego fragment resides in alarm over its 
destructive capabilities where valued objects are concerned, and yet in relation to ongoing RC 
activity, Ernst only harms unvalued objects. This finding is included in the hypothesis and 
reads, ‘a central aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past 
unpleasurable experience’.  
Referring back to the initial hypothesis, it is noteworthy that a more nuanced picture 
was observed than that of an unambiguous separation between object relations defined by a 
positive affective valence (libidinal) and those by a negative affective valence (aggressive). 
What is seen instead is a division within the libidinous strand; a separation of the sexual and 
those capacities which speak to attachment of a more prolonged kind, the former occurring 
alongside aggression and the latter in isolation. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from this 
observation outside of reference to extra-metatheoretical considerations9, and I therefore 
 
9 For instance, those pertaining to a fusion of the sexual and aggressive drives which would undermine the notion 
of a separation within the libidinous strand, or Fairbairn’s distinction – between a repressed ego fragment’s 
overwhelming (likely sexual) need for the exciting object, and the more ‘considered love’ characteristic of the 
relationship between the central ego and ideal object – which would allow us to make sense of a separation 
within libidinous currents.               
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proceed under the banner of inclusivity, altering the initial hypothesis as follows. I stress the 
term ‘tendency’ in the statement, ‘splitting mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object 
relationships defined by a positive affective valence (libidinous) and those by a negative 
valence (aggressive) apart’. I then alter the statement following this, which initially supported 
the inference of an uncontaminated affective valence, as follows. ‘However, contamination of 
affective valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego 
fragments attached to internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective 
valence (either purely libidinal or aggressive)’.  
Finally, given that Ernst’s choice of the rejecting object, is not imbued with compelling 
fantasy representations I will add the following amendments to the section in the hypothesis 
concerning object choice. That in addition to desire, the object may be ‘chosen in line with an 
undefined want or need’.     
Outside of the above amendments, the RC definition and initial hypotheses remain 
unchanged as all conditions were confirmed. 
 
 
Bullet Point Presentation of Findings in Relation to the Initial Hypothesis: Hypothesis 
Development     
Below, standard text indicates the initial hypotheses. Bold text indicates changes made as a 
result of findings and carried forward. A line through the text indicates that a statement has 
been invalidated. Bold italics indicate that a change has occurred in the case under 
consideration.    
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The Repetition Compulsion Defined Following Case 1  
RC is defined by four descriptive criteria: 
 it is unconscious; characterized on an experiential level by a lack of conscious awareness or conscious 
rational deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its functioning are described, as being either 
broadly unconscious, or specifically, repressed, dissociated or ego dystonic. 
 it is a repetition of a past unpleasurable experience  
 it is unpleasurable because it is painful and damaging  
 RC should be thought of as the unconscious repetition of a ‘lived interpersonal situation’.     
In relation to the last point, RC concerns the repetition of an experience, rather than of cognition, and therefore 
does not include the kind of repetition viewed in obsessional neurosis. Cognitive repetition is furthermore 
excluded under the above RC definition, since it proceeds alongside an awareness of the fact of repetition. I.e. the 
patient suffering from obsessional thinking is keenly aware of the repetitive nature of his/her thought.  
 
Hypothesis Following Case 110  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached to 
internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely libidinal 
or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
 
10 The hypothesis development across cases is reproduced as appendix b 
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- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption is 
that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is simultaneously 
and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously chosen because 
of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization will be identifiable in 
relation to the broader symptomatic picture, and that this variable is one which will act to reinforce 
repression of an unconscious object relationship. 
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 A central aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable 
experience.   
   
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
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CASE STUDY TWO: KARPMAN’S ‘A 
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF A CASE OF 
MURDER’ 
 
 
RC Identification  
 
This chapter is an analysis of Ben Karpman’s ‘A Psychoanalytic Study of a Case of Murder’1. 
The case concerns Henry Valon, a patient Karpman saw for psychotherapeutic treatment during 
the former’s commitment to a federal hospital for the crime of murder. The duration of 
treatment lasted from June 1927 until May 1928, for a total of 126 sessions. At the start of 
treatment, Henry had been incarcerated for 3½ years and was 34 years old.        
Before proceeding with the analysis proper, it will be useful to briefly comment on the 
nature of the murder Henry Valon committed. What is striking about the case is the noticeable 
absence of a rational or easily understandable motive. Henry did not know the man he murdered 
and seems to have chosen him at random. As he says, during one of his ‘walking spells’, with 
a gun in possession, he reached a specific street and “decided to hold up [the] first man [he 
came across]” (p.145a). He adds that he ‘didn’t know why he did it’ (p.145a). He chooses a car 
conductor, shooting him three times, and killing him instantly. Henry takes money from his 
victim, but only $2.16, while failing to find the further $29.51 in the victim’s possession, along 
with other valuables such as a watch and diamond ring. After running a short distance and 
disposing of a stolen wallet and empty change box, Henry immediately gives himself up to a 
 
1 The paper is spread over two issues published in 1951. All references below marked a refer to the April 
publication, and those marked b to the July one.     
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watchman at a nearby college. He is acquitted by a jury on the grounds of insanity and 
committed to hospitalization.    
My analysis considered three regions of potential RC activity; Henry’s relationship 
with his wife (Ann), parents and sexual partners. The parental relationship (both parents) was 
examined as a supposed ‘primary experience’, aspects of which are suspected of being repeated 
in the other relationships.  
 
   
Ann and Henry’s Marriage     
I will begin with an analysis of Henry’s relationship to his wife, Ann. Karpman summarises 
their marriage with the statement that Henry was “…married when he was 21 years old, but 
his marital relations were unsatisfactory from the beginning. His wife was frigid, extremely 
puritanical, and in constant fear of pregnancy” (p.157a). He elaborates, saying that, “…as a 
result of his wife’s puritanical attitude to sex, he began to cultivate extra-marital relationships, 
and eventually formed such a relationship with a woman, Ellen, with whom his sexual relations 
were entirely satisfactory” (p.265b).  
 
Object Nature   
I proceed first with an analysis of the characteristics of the object. With respect to appearance, 
Henry simply notes that Ann somewhat resembled his sisters Rhodda and Mary. He also adds 
that she was not particularly attractive (p.255b). He describes his wife as unsophisticated 
(p.145a), cold (p.253), scared (p.145a), dumb (pp. 155a, 249b), frigid (p. 149a), in constant 
fear of pregnancy (pp. 145a, 149a, 259b), and afraid that he would ‘tell his mother everything’ 
(p.145a). He notes that she was a virgin when they met and later married (p.249b). Providing 
examples of her frigidity, the case study records that Ann “never cared for sex from the 
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beginning; complained that it was dirt” (p.149a). Henry notes that “it was a week [into their 
marriage] before they had sexual intercourse” (p.145a), and that he “slept with her very little, 
especially after first child was born” (p.253b). He states that he “got less pleasure from sexual 
relations with his wife than with anyone else. ‘she lay like a log’” (p.245b). He sums up that 
“[my] sex life with my wife was not normal. Sometimes I didn’t kiss her three or four months” 
(p.246b). Speaking of the further decline of their sexual relations and the breakup of their 
marriage, he states that “generally, after first two years, hardly more than four times a year. 
For one and a half years before breakup – no relations. At that time I was willing to think that 
my last boy was not my child” (p.249b). Associating from the dream imagery of a naked women 
with the absence of a vagina, he says, “lack of vagina – brings back to my wife…No vagina, – 
sexless woman” (p.251b).            
Henry also accuses his wife of ‘never having made a good home’ (p.254b), and further 
that she was in fact “never at home much” (p.254b). He expands on the theme of her absence, 
saying that after he found a ‘love letter’ written in her hand to an unknown man, two years 
before they eventually separate (and just under three years before the murder), “it was I that 
stayed at home, she went out” (p.259b). During this two year period before the separation, he 
believes “she was going out and running around with other men” (p.254b). He notes that she 
was pregnant, giving birth at the end of this period, and yet still “was out every night till early 
morning 1 or 2 A.M. Ten days after the last baby was born, she was out late, and continued 
so” (p.256b). He recalls that during this period it “seemed that I laid around the house watching 
wife” (p.249b). In the month prior to the break-up, his wife ‘disappeared’ and he suspects with 
a man he knew. He adds that “it was very wrong for a woman to desert four children” (p.252b).  
In summary, Henry pictures Ann as frightened and over anxious. He also views her as 
indifferent and uncaring; she did not create a nurturing and loving marriage/home. He sees her 
as sexually rejecting, of him specifically; she is supposedly sexually willing with other men. 
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As he says, he could not bear “that she was cold to [him], but would go with someone else” 
(p.253b). In the final assessment, he believes she cruelly abandoned him and their children.  
 
Affective State  
I turn now to considering Henry’s affective state (libidinal and aggressive), directed towards 
the object. Henry’s sexual desire for Ann has been discussed above, and is associated largely 
with disappointment and frustration. He mentions being ‘much aroused’ while the couple 
where dating, in the period before being married (p.246b), but this desire was never borne out 
in reality, being restricted to, or manifested only as masturbatory fantasy (p.246b). As Henry 
states “if he had had relations with her before marriage he would never have married her” 
(p.155a).  
Henry mentions getting on well enough with his wife for much of their marriage 
(p.146a), and that he ‘believes he loves his wife still’ (p.259b). These sentiments are 
unsupported in the case-study by illustrative examples, for instance specific reported occasions 
where he felt or showed warmth or love. As with other of his statements, they appear as 
throwaway context-less sentiments. Karpman concludes that “it is clear all the way through 
that he never loved her” (p.261b).   
His aggressive feelings towards her are far more numerous and convincingly illustrated. 
He says he often wished her dead and would have felt little sorrow (p.251b), that at times he 
contemplated her murder (p.253b), and that he blamed her “directly [as] the cause of [his] 
insanity and of the homicide” (p.259). As Henry states, “I had death wishes against Ann. I’d 
curse her, would wish accident should happen, die from childbirth…” (p.249b). Added to this, 
we have the numerous statements of dislike and dissatisfaction discussed above.       
To sum up, Henry seems to periodically assume a frame of mind where there is some 
affection for Ann. There is however no indication that the aggressive strand of affect, which 
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seems far stronger, is at those times inaccessible to awareness. We do not for instance observe 
ingrained tendencies towards the displacement of aggression, nor a predisposition towards 
idealization. In relation to Ann, Henry is evidently capable of expressing his aggression 
directly, and if anything, it is the libidinous strand which suffers. As we will see below, Henry 
does have an entrenched propensity for idealization where certain love objects are concerned, 
but this does not apply to Ann.  
 
Effect of the Relationship  
I turn now to a consideration of the effects of the relationship upon Henry. Henry provides 
relatively scant detail about the bulk of the marriage and the ongoing impact the relationship 
had on him during the union. Most of what he tells us has been covered above and provides 
only a ground for tentative inference. After a synopsis of this material, the analysis will centre 
on the roughly three-year period following from the ‘finding of the letter’. The period includes 
the break-down of the marriage over two years, the separation, and eleven-months of inter and 
intrasubjective disintegration suffered by Henry, culminating in murder.  
As stated above, Henry experienced his wife as rejecting, both sexually and in broader 
relational areas concerning an absence of affection and care. It is however difficult to determine 
how this affected Henry. Karpmen believes that it pushed him to ‘cultivate extra-marital 
relationships’ (p.265b), and yet Henry is shown to be prone to infidelity from the first. As 
Karpman notes elsewhere, he had regular sexual relations with an actress, Patricia, while dating 
Ann before they were married (p.157a). During this period “he would be with his sweetheart 
until 10:30pm, and then with the actress until two or three o’clock in the morning” (144a). 
Henry also “continued going with a girl after he was married” (p.145a), who I assume to be 
this same actress. He acknowledges that he always struggled to maintain interest and 
attachment where his sexual objects are concerned. In his own words, “it seems I’d conquer a 
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woman and then get tired of her fast – from two weeks to eight or nine months” (p.255b). Given 
his history, it is therefore doubtful that the infidelity was simply a response to Ann’s treatment 
of him.  
Another effect that the relationship incited in Henry, from the beginning, was jealousy. 
As mentioned, the jealousy may at times have taken on a delusional intensity, which is 
Karpman’s assessment. It is also shown capable of precipitating psychosocial collapse. Both 
these points are observed in the following episode. While still dating Ann, Henry experiences 
extreme jealousy related to the feeling that “every fellow was cutting [him] out” (p.144a). As 
Karpman reports, “at that time he began to think that life wasn’t worth living, had homicidal 
ideas, and made an attempt at suicide by turning on the gas” (p.144a). It is however difficult 
to identify where exactly the jealous affective state originates – with Henry as a transference 
disposition, or as a contemporary response to Ann’s behaviour; Henry saying at differing times 
that both are correct. At one point, he asks a question which seems to indicate genuine 
confusion over the matter. He asks in puzzlement, “why was I jealous of wife if I didn’t care 
for her?” (p.254b). He is suggesting that regardless of whether she cheated or not, the jealousy 
has no clear rational origin, or at least not a conscious one.  I would say that the presence of 
transference and delusional ideation is supported, but that for all we know Ann may have 
played a contributing part too. When questioned about the letter she for instance first responds 
with laughter, Henry saying that she “didn’t give an explanation – then later explanation that 
it was a decoy letter she wanted me to find…” (p.249b). One experience of jealousy that is 
noteworthy, centres on his suspicion that his fourth child was not his own (p.249, 252, 253b). 
It is worth highlighting that his jealousy increased overwhelmingly, with the birth of this child, 
and that after accusing Ann of adultery two days after the birth, they separate two weeks later 
(p.146a). Again, it is jealousy which seems to precipitate a fall. Interestingly, the timeline of 
events provided by Henry, implies that Ann’s ‘disappearance’ occurred either in the two weeks 
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before she gave birth, or soon after she gave birth – neither period, one would imagine, being 
conducive to sexual activity. Although I am inclined to believe that Ann was faithful, in the 
final assessment we simply cannot know. It is however doubtful that her many absences are a 
fabrication. And yet here we do not know why she stayed away. Were there in fact affairs? Or 
did she act to escape an increasingly paranoid and jealous husband? Or was she driven by other 
motives, perhaps seeking out an emotional connection with another man, or simply a place of 
peace and security?               
I now focus on the nearly three-year period leading up to the homicide. As mentioned, 
Henry finds a ‘love letter’ addressed to his wife, and although initially enraged to the point of 
contemplating murder, he seems ultimately to sink into a state of helpless despondency. As he 
states, during this time “I hardly had any relations – masturbated – spending most time at 
home, not working… Health poor. It seemed that I laid around the house watching wife” 
(p.249b). It should be kept in mind however that he was still seeing Ellen, the woman with 
whom his ‘sexual relations where entirely satisfactory’, for a further six months after finding 
the letter. This puts into question the claim of a global state of dejection, but does not detract 
from the fact that he was struggling where his marriage was concerned.  
As we know, with the separation (Ellen being out of the picture by now), Henry sends 
his wife from the house, places the children in an asylum and does not visit them (p.146a). He 
later remarks that “putting the children in an orphan asylum – hurt me more than anything 
else” (p.252b). Commenting on how the separation affected him, he says, “the day we 
separated, I believe was the turning point in my life. I was psychopathic all the time until the 
day of the homicide…I went to pieces...These eleven months – a nightmare – I had dual 
personality – my thoughts were on suicide” (p.256b). He describes feeling depressed, restless 
and struggling with insomnia. He steals three automobiles in one week, is arrested and locked 
up for thirteen days. He also recalls dissociative fugues or as he puts it ‘walking spells’; periods 
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of recurrent daily wondering which last from ten days to three weeks. In his own words, 
“sometimes would just come home, change cloths and then go on another one.” (p.256b). He 
states explicitly that during the walks, “I thought a thousand times to kill myself” (p.255b), and 
that “these walking spells where associated with suicide” (p.256). He also had the feeling that 
everyone was against him, and used the walks to hide from people, especially his father who 
he believed was persecuting him (p.263). One night, around six months before the homicide, 
he felt ‘so bad’ and suicidal that he asks his father to get him ‘locked up’. He sums up this 
period, “I had feeling of double personality, felt something wrong, thought I should be locked 
up…” (p.146a). It was also then that he tried to choke his favourite brother, Leo (p.254b). He 
describes the final period leading up to the homicide; “for twelve days previous to homicide I 
walked and walked. During 12 days, I thought a thousand times to kill myself…” (p.255b). And 
then the very last days; “was talking to mother and father, kept walking, went to sister’s house, 
slept there, woke up – more walking, worrying – next night homicide” (p.146).  
 
RC Identification  
In summary, there are experiences which can be identified as noticeably painful and damaging. 
In chronological order Henry suspects his wife of infidelity, terminates his relationship with 
Ellen, separates from his wife and gives up his children. These losses precipitate a period of 
psychosocial disintegration, culminating in murder. We will focus closely on Henry’s state of 
mind below – what he was thinking, feeling, attempting to do, etc. – when addressing the 
dynamic psychological mechanisms and processes evinced, but for the time being we can state 
the following. Henry is consumed by jealousy and an ingrained persecutory belief that people 
act with malevolent intent to damage him. What is more, he felt as though they were 
succeeding; taking what could have been his. He is increasingly isolated, his attachments 
strained to breaking point, and sinks into a state of abject psychological and physical 
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deterioration. He assumed the role of passive onlooker while still living with his wife, and then 
later becomes something analogous to a spectre, wondering the streets in a state of 
psychological torture. There are intermittent returns to those of his attachment figures which 
remain, the visits amounting either to unheard pleas for help, or attempts to further damage 
relational bonds. He is plagued by suicidal ideation, and seems to inhabit a somewhat 
dissociated state. I have here described the phenomenology of an experience which could 
potentially qualify as a repetition of loss and trauma. To say that the break-down of the 
marriage and its aftermath were unpleasurable would be an extreme understatement. The whole 
period was clearly damaging and painful and meets the relevant RC definitional criteria.   
What we have learned thus far, in relation to the RC unconscious definitional criteria, is that 
Henry seems to have gone into the marriage with some hope of it working out, and evidently 
had no conscious foreknowledge of the horror it would lead to. As he notes, he was very much 
in love with Ann when they married (p.256b), and at that time his “intensions where to be 
faithful to [her]” (p.252b). Concerning the breakdown of the marriage, he describes a feeling 
of double personality, fugues which imply a state of derealisation, and the inability to maintain 
awareness or knowledge of the links between an internal world of thought/feeling and the 
behaviour it precipitates. He knows something is wrong, but not what; he knows he needs to 
be confined or treated but not why exactly; he does not know why he is walking; he does not 
know why he murdered.  
 
     
Other Relationships: Henry’s Mother     
In order to argue for the fact of repetition, that Henry is repeating an experience of trauma or 
loss, I now examine the supposed ‘primary experience’ – that which is suspected of being 
repeated. I look at each parental relationship in turn, beginning with Henry’s mother.  Henry 
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was the fifth of twelve children (eight boys and four girls), four of which had died by the time 
of Henry’s incarceration. His parents remained married until the death of his mother, six 
months into Henry’s sentence.  
 
Object Nature  
In appearance, we are told that Henry’s mother was slight of build and dark in complexion, 
Henry emphasising that she was “the most beautiful women” (p154a). As we will see, Henry 
adored his mother with a fierce loyalty and was extremely dependent on her. He says that his 
happiest childhood memories are of his mother; that she was “always hugging and kissing me 
– I was happiest then – I was a favourite” (p.250b). He recalls that if she “kissed me where I 
hurt [the] pain would go away [but] if she scolded me, it would break my heart” (p.257b). 
Henry says that he spent most of his early childhood with her, and Karpmen categorises their 
relationship as one of ‘maternal overprotection’, stressing the presence of an ‘exaggerated 
mother attachment’ (p.264b). The loyalty Henry displays however, sits uncomfortably with 
much of his mother’s behaviour, and with her overall capacity to adequately fulfil the role of 
parent. We learn that she suffered from depression (p.146a, 263b), fits of ‘peculiar behaviour’ 
and irritability (p.263a), that she was ‘unbalanced’ (146a) and at times in a ‘poor mental 
condition’ (p.150a). She attempted suicide on numerous occasions, either with a razor or by 
means of gas (p.146a, 148a), and was once in a mental hospital (p.148a). We are told that as a 
suicide preventative measure “father would tie her to him” (p.250b), and can only wonder at 
the psychological impact of witnessing this parental scene. Henry’s mother also threatened to 
run away (p.146a) and frequently did flee the home, often following altercations with her 
husband (p.148a, 156a, 263b). Henry speaks of her further decline, saying that during his 
puberty she “began to be sick, lose her looks, etc” (p.253b). In the last fifteen or so years of 
her life she “was almost an invalid” (p.257b). Henry reports that his mother once attacked him, 
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hitting him on the head with a chamber (p.148a), and he believes sometimes contemplated 
killing him (p.147a, 148a). As he says “during her last days it seemed to me, mother was afraid 
of me. She would lie awake waiting for me to come home. Once she took a butcher knife – I 
thought she was not normal. Thought maybe she wanted to kill me…” (p.152a).  
 
Affective State  
I now consider the libidinous and aggressive trends directed towards the object. As noted, 
Henry was loyal to a fault. He says he had ‘a great affection’ for his mother (p.152a); that 
everything she said, ‘was right’ (p.257b); that he always sided with her over his father 
(p.146a,148a); that his ‘love never lessened’ in the face of the neglect he suffered at her hand; 
that he cannot recall ever having ‘antipathic emotions against her’ (p.155a), and that he ‘never 
feared her’ even when he thought she wanted to kill him (p.152a). He states that his reaction 
was always one of “hurt rather than hate and revenge” (p.155a), and that he never lost his 
temper with her (p.152a). In short, he sums up that she was ‘the greatest love’ he ever had 
(p.257b). Henry mentions only a single instance of aggression, admittedly an extreme 
expression of it, saying that “once, five months before homicide, thought of killing mother” 
(p.147a).   
 
Effect of the Relationship   
Given Henry’s devotion to his mother it is doubtful that he would betray much awareness of 
the negative impact the relationship had on him. For the most part, this line of reasoning seems 
correct. What we do learn, from self-reports, is the following. In childhood, Henry was 
extremely dependent on his mother to the degree that he eschewed playing with his siblings or 
other children in preference to her (p.149a, 150a, 264b). As he evocatively phrases it, “[I] 
followed her around like a dog” (p.257b). He concedes that a withdrawal of attention and 
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affection took place with the birth of his younger siblings, and that this affected him: “I felt 
lonesome – no one in the world to love me. Had longed to go back to mother, and developed 
feeling of jealousy towards the younger children, even hate…” (p.154a). He confirms again 
that during this period “I was sad of losing my mother’s love” (p.245). 
 
 
Other Relationships: Henry’s Father  
 
Object Nature  
There is less data concerning Henry’s father. What we learn about his character is that he had 
a ‘violent temper’, and that he and his wife often quarrelled (p.156a). In the eleven-month 
period before the homicide, Henry says his father threatened to kill him at gun point, because 
he suspected Henry of stealing from his brother (p257b).  
 
Affective State  
Henry nowhere claims that he loves his father, nor mentions anything amounting to feelings of 
affection or warmth. He recalls that as a child he hated him (p.155a), thinking him “the worst 
thing in the world” (p.146a). In childhood Henry seems to have held his father responsible for 
his mother’s suffering and ultimately perhaps for much of her behaviour as a parent. He blamed 
his father for his mother’s numerous suicide attempts (p.253b), and notes that their fights were 
often the cause of her running away (p.156a). He says that he always sided with his mother 
when his parents quarrelled (p.146a, 148a).  
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Effect of the Relationship  
Again, we learn relatively little about how Henry’s father affected him. Henry says that he 
could never talk to him (p.146a) and that in childhood he feared him (p.155a). Henry’s father, 
seems also to embody and represent something akin to a super ego function, which is discussed 
further below. The picture we get is therefore of a sometimes violent, generally distant, and 
frightening figure who, as we will see, also signifies judgement, disappointment, potential 
punishment and perhaps an opportunity at clemency.  
 
RC Identification  
Before continuing with an analysis of further relationships, I will consolidate the above in 
relation to the question of repetition. What is repeated across all these relationships? In terms 
of the repetition of an experience of victimhood what stands out most strongly in the considered 
relationships is surely the fact of abandonment, absence of care, and overwhelming jealousy. 
These are enduring experiences undergone by Henry. Other phenomenology is repeated, but 
not visibly by Henry across relationships. There is the presence of suicidal ideation, suicide 
attempts, alienation, and psychosocial disintegration. The difficulty here is that we do not know 
how Henry was affected by his mother, especially during his childhood - an absence, which I 
think, can be attributed in part to his ongoing loyalty. Did his mother’s behaviour, for instance 
cause him to feel suicidal as a child? Did it cause him to feel alienated, depressed, or 
despondent? Henry does not say. Although there is no conclusive evidence that Henry suffered 
these experiences himself, I do not think it unreasonable to say that he certainly lived through 
them. His mother, the person who he loved most in the world experienced these things in the 
home, right in front of him, day after day. I believe, to a degree, this makes them as much 
Henry’s experiences as they are his mother’s. There is also the dynamic of Henry occupying 
the role of perpetrator at times, especially where the act of abandonment is concerned. In his 
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relationship to Ann, he is the one who is initially often out. It is also him who finally forces her 
to leave, and both who jointly abandon the children. Henry has here done to his wife and 
children what was done to him. There is a repetition, but with a role shift from victim to 
perpetrator.     
One of the central differences in the relationship between Henry and his wife and Henry 
and his mother, is Henry’s affective state. He persistently adores his mother, while vocally 
hating his wife. With respect to repetition, we can say little about the father besides noting that 
Henry’s feelings about him, perhaps approximate those directed at his wife.            
 
 
Other Relationships: Numerous Sexual Partners and Forbidden Desire  
Henry’s sexual history consists of numerous brief sexual encounters, and short to mid-term 
relationships (lasting anywhere from a few weeks to ten months). There is a tendency to move 
from one relationship to the next, rather than engage with multiple partners simultaneously 
(p.145a, 157a). The case study strongly suggests a pattern of object cathexes, possessing the 
quality of an ineffable ‘searching after something’, followed by inevitable disenchantment and 
ensuing disengagement.  
 
Object Nature  
I begin with the nature of the object, which I take to consist not only of the individual with 
whom Henry is involved, but also of the sexual experience as a whole. The treatment of the 
sexual encounter as an object, is justified because part-object relating is evident; the 
individual’s ability to provide sexual satisfaction would seem to be a key feature of desire and 
object choice. It is clear, that for Henry tactile intimacy is a crucial and valued component of 
sexual engagement. He speaks of ‘taking his time’ (p.147a), ‘doing things calmly’ (p.149a) and 
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of the lengthy pleasure he gets from caressing a women’s body, especially her breasts (p.246a). 
Reading these descriptions, one gets a sense of absorption and contentment, reminiscent 
perhaps of infantile satisfaction. In his own words, “All my sex life – I liked to suck and even 
bite breasts – kiss them. I played with Ellen’s breasts more than anyone else’s – beautiful 
breasts – five or ten pounds…I often played with Ellen’s breast for an hour” (p.246b).  
There is also support for the notion that Henry craved and sometimes found emotional intimacy 
in his sexual exploits and relationships. As he says, “[I] always had to have a love object to be 
stimulated into phantasies and dreams” (p.246). He speaks of ‘enjoying the company’ of 
women, even if it did not lead to sex (p.147a), and as Karpmen writes, of shunning prostitutes 
“because it was necessary for him to have a love-object and there was no element of affection 
in relations with a prostitute” (p.265b). In Henry’s own words; “they didn’t care for you, you 
didn’t care for them – disgust. I’d prefer one kiss from one I would imagine cared for me” 
(p.153a). It is perhaps suggestive of a broader ambivalence concerning intimacy, that although 
Henry counts a kiss as the mark of caring and claims to aim at such in his sexual encounters, 
he at the same time generally “rarely kisses a women, but wants to suck her breasts and finger 
her vagina [instead]” (p147a). This ambivalence is further displayed in his comment that “he 
never could see anything beautiful about vagina…Sometimes didn’t feel like playing with 
vagina” (p251b).   
Object choice and therefore object nature is additionally circumscribed by a heightened 
awareness concerning the presence/absence of other men. Henry categorically states that he 
has a strong aversion to engaging sexually with married women, and that he never knowingly 
had sexual relations with a married woman (p.147a, 255b). His desire for Rhodda decreases 
after she is caught with another man. In his words, “not the same feeling, the feeling of having 
sex relations with her was gone because she had relations with another man” (p.150-1a). This 
diminishment of desire, perhaps more fully explains his aversion to prostitutes; it is not just 
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that they do not care for him and that no emotional connection is possible, but also that there 
are other men involved, ones who perhaps in fantasy have already taken possession of any 
potentialities for love and affection. This line of reasoning is supported by the following 
statement concerning Rhodda’s marriage. “The way she lowered herself marrying that fellow 
– like a prostitute – that is, to my mind. She could not lower herself any more by marrying this 
man than if she were a prostitute” (p.253b). When it was time for Henry to marry, he chose a 
virgin, saying that he could not marry a woman who had sexual relations out of wedlock, even 
if with himself (p.249b). The one explicit exception was Ellen, ‘even though she had previously 
lived with a man for four years’ (p.248b).     
Henry also shows a tendency in dreams (p.147a, 151a, 246b, 247b, 250b) and fantasy 
(p.149, 251b) to sexually desire younger women or girls, noting once that “I was surprised that 
I could allow myself to have sexual intercourse with a girl 10 years old, even if it happened in 
a dream” (p.247-8b). It should be noted that there is never confirmation of Henry acting on 
these fantasies. He is often emphatic about his refusal to do so (p.145a, 247b, 251b), suggesting 
a conflict between unconscious desire and conscious restraint. 
Henry’s objects of desire and sexual partners, amount to an apparent chain of recurrent 
substitutive object cathexis. As Karpmen puts it, Henry’s “sexual development was…an 
extension of the incestuous fixations formed within the family circle” (p.262b). Under this 
reading, his mother may be viewed as the primary object, his sister Rhodda as the first complete 
substitute, and Ellen as the last of the case study. As we will see, the signification of repetition 
is detailed for the most part in terms of physical appearance.  
Karpmen notes that Henry transferred “…his mother attachment…to his sister Rhodda” 
(p264b). This is borne out by Henry who states that after his mother withdrew her affection, he 
became closer to Rhodda than to her (p.150a), and that in puberty when his mother became ill, 
‘losing her looks’, “Rhodda took the place of mother in my mind” (p253b). Henry makes the 
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point of saying that his mother was strikingly similar to her daughter in appearance, both being 
slight and dark (p.154a, 253b). Rhodda he says, never grew beyond “5 feet 4 inches, 100 
pounds. [She was] very beautiful [and] retained her figure until death” (p.151a). He describes 
his attraction to Rhodda in the following manner; “when she was ten or twelve – a little peach 
– coal black hair, beautiful eyes. I then began to develop feelings for intercourse” (p.150a). 
He adds that as she grew up “breasts suddenly developed, legs…used to kiss her…used to kiss 
Rhodda as a sweetheart” (p.150a). Their father intervenes at this point, and Rhodda is 
eventually sent away to boarding school at fifteen. Henry notes that she was sent away 
“probably to protect her from an affair she was likely to get into” (p.151). He adds, “I think 
father really thought that I had relations with her, but I didn’t” (p.151).   
There are multiple explicit statements of similarity between love objects, Henry saying 
the following about women and girls who remind him of his mother. Between the ages of four 
and seven he recalls dreams where “most of the people around me were beautiful women and 
were exact images of Mother, but mother would not be in the picture. One of these strange 
women would be my wife” (p.245b.).  At the age of ten he forms a strong attachment to a girl 
called Reba because she was ‘almost an exact picture’ of his mother (p.245b). He stresses that 
his mother’s body, when she was younger, was similar to Ellen’s and Rhodda’s body (p.250-
1b). He adds that when his mother was happy her expression reminded him of Ann, and when 
unhappy of Ellen (p.257b).   
Concerning Rhodda, he highlights the following instances of resemblance. In a dream, 
he has a sexual encounter with “the exact duplicate of [his] sister Rhodda at the age of 15” 
(p.151a). Upon waking, he associates to a girl he knew and tried to have intercourse with. She 
was 5 feet 2 inches and reminds him of his sister (p.151a). Another girl/woman2, again ‘reminds 
 
2 I use ‘girl/woman’ because the age of Henry’s love objects is often unspecified, the term girl being preferred 
throughout the case study text. A further complication is that even when he is speaking about a resemblance 
to a woman, it is often a resemblance to her at a younger age. In instances where it is clear that the female in 
question is better described as a woman or girl, I use those terms.       
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him of his sister’, as does one in a dream (p.151a). He has further dreams of a sexual nature, 
where the girls again resemble Rhodda (p.247b, 249b). He encounters two girls/women who 
strongly remind him of Rhodda, and has sexual relations with one of them (p.251b). Another 
girl who he impregnates at the age of sixteen, resembles Rhodda (p.256b). There is a 
girl/woman he cannot stop thinking about because of her ‘striking resemblance’ to Rhodda 
(p.154a). Finally, he adds that “Ellen is much like [Rhodda] – mere touching her would excite 
me – my emotions towards her were so different  – her touch would tingle” (p.252b).        
There are only three instances where Henry mentions personality features, or affective 
tendencies on the part of his objects. Ellen is described as having an extremely jealous 
disposition (p.152a) and as ‘level-headed’ (p.154a), and Rhodda as passionate (p.152a). This 
absence of non-physical object characteristics provides us with little opportunity to determine 
the full nature of Henry’s objects. However, the sexual act seems in part to be the arena that 
the substitution is concerned with, or even restricted to, and as such the broader nature of the 
object is to some degree irrelevant. Where it does seem to feature is in relation to other men – 
the object must be his alone and not elsewhere engaged. Otherwise, its nature is to provide 
intimacy and attachment; a state reminiscent of the one he shared with his mother during his 
early childhood.      
 
Affective State 
The most visible and consistently expressed affective states in these relationships are sexual 
desire (p.150a, 154a, 248b, 250b, 258b, 262-3b) adoration and idealization (p.150a, 155a, 
248b, 257b), contentment (p.155a, 246b, 250b, 252b), and possibly love (p.248b, 252b, 253b, 
257b). His description of what it was like being with Ellen seems to sum these states up; “Ellen, 
the most enjoyable emotional experiences in my life, like fire – to touch her breast, etc. Was 
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like an electric shock – forgot myself…I was just madly in love with her, even to date I still 
think of her – sometimes will stop in the middle of work and think of her” (p.152a).   
There is also mention of a loss of interest and failing attachment. As discussed, his 
desire for Rhodda becomes restrained after she’s had sexual relations with another man and 
eventually marries. We also saw above that he would ‘conquer’ women and then get ‘tired’ 
quickly.   
A final affective state that is strongly expressed, especially in connection to Rhodda, is 
jealousy and envy. We see it resulting from Rhodda’s first sexual encounter and from her 
choice of spouse. Henry also has a strong, and clearly for him torturous, suspicion that his 
brother Geoffrey had sexual relations with Rhodda, taking her virginity. This belief caused him 
to ‘distrust and hate’ his brother (p.250b, 253b, 258b).            
Clearly the affective state displayed in these relationships is for the most part markedly 
different from what Henry directs towards his wife. Sexual desire, adoration, idealization, 
contentment, and love are not evident in the marriage. These affective features therefore cannot 
be said to be repeated across all the considered relationships. They can however be seen to 
occur repetitively across this ‘set’ – the sexual encounters and relationships. Two states that 
are for the most part shared across relationships are jealousy and the diminishment of object 
cathexis. I will return to these points below. I will also further address the question of the 
unconscious nature of repetition.      
 
Effect of the Relationship 
As we have seen, Henry persistently emphasises the pleasurable satisfaction he found in his 
sexual encounters. There is also evidence that his relationships provide a measure of emotional 
and behavioural stability; that they assist in the regulation of affect and protect against self-
injurious behaviour. When he lost Ann and Ellen he “took to gambling or taking other women” 
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(p.246b). He also tells us that when he met a woman called Hellen, after a most extreme period 
of gambling, involving nights on end without sleep, he eventually ‘dropped gambling 
altogether’ (p.247b). Thus far, the sexual encounters and relationships do not therefore meet 
the unpleasurable, because painful and damaging, definitional criteria of RC. The one area that 
does however suggest the presence of this dimension is the end point of the relationships. I am 
assuming, that ‘something’ causes them to end, and it is at the point of loss that we see a 
repetition of isolation, disintegration and suffering.    
 
RC Identification  
As mentioned above, Henry inevitably becomes ‘tired’ of his objects and ends relationships. 
He notes that this is a pattern for him – that there is a dampening of interest and ultimately of 
object cathexis – and accepts this without interrogating the reasons behind it. The one exception 
to this stance of indifference, is Ellen, who for Henry was “the best of anyone before or since” 
(p.155a). Henry cannot understand why he ended it with her nor can he let the question go 
(p.155a, 246b, 248, 249, 255, 258, 259,). I will discuss the conclusions Henry himself reaches 
below, while considering the psychological processes and mechanisms involved. For the time 
being I simply state that Henry suffered when he ended relationships and was unaware of why 
he ended them, markedly so in the instance where he really did not want to. In conclusion, the 
feature that is repeated across all relationships is the point of loss and the accompanying 
isolation, disintegration and suffering. The breakdown of his marriage was an extreme and 
complete occurrence of this.  
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The Search for Necessary Conditions 
 
Object Circumscription  
I turn now to a consideration of the psychological entities/processes which are identifiable in 
the procedure of object circumscription, beginning with Henry’s alarm over ‘other men’. As 
noted, Henry married a virgin, and explicitly states that except for Ellen he could not have 
married anyone who had prior sexual relations with other men, including himself (p.249b). He 
would not be able to trust their fidelity (p.255b) and seems to take the fact of virginity as proof 
of singular devotion and as ultimately signalling an absence of competition. As Karpman 
confirms, Ann “was a woman whom he could possess without any feeling of competition. She 
would be all his” (p.261b). A violation of a sense of security impacts object desire, as we saw 
with Rhodda (p.150-1a), and in relation to prostitutes (p.265b, 253b) and married women 
(p.147a, 255b). It may activate feelings of disgust, anger and rage – a mechanism by which 
desire is inhibited – directed at the object of desire and relatedly also at the men who are 
involved. We previously observed the disgust Henry feels for prostitutes, and also his 
classification of Rhodda as amounting to one, following her ‘betrayal’. Henry says the 
following about men who have ‘replaced him’ by having sexual relationships with his former 
objects of desire. One husband is described as “an effeminate man – not good looking, but 
pretty like a women” (p.148a), another as ‘drinking and beating his wife and infant’ (p.151a). 
Concerning Rhodda, he notes that she “didn’t get the best of husbands – alcoholic – cruel”, 
and adds by comparison that, alcohol simply makes him go to sleep (p.154). His suspicion of 
fraternal incest, between his brother Geoffrey and Rhodda, caused him to ‘distrust and hate’ 
his brother (p.250b, 253b, 258b). As a reaction to the love he felt withdrawn by his mother 
during childhood, he speaks of developing a feeling of “jealousy towards the younger children, 
even hate, especially towards victor” (p.154a). By contrast, the only man in the case study who 
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is described in complementary terms, is his younger brother Leo, who he ‘liked very much’ 
and saw as ‘a symbol of goodness’ (p.156). He adds tellingly, that “he was pure and only had 
relations with his wife” (p.156). I am arguing for the presence of extreme anxiety and 
hypervigilance, centred on the appearance of a rival, the suspicion or occurrence of which, 
results in denigrative attacks directed at the rival/supposed rival and at Henry’s object of desire, 
as well as for the related observation that continuity of attachment, requires reassurance of full 
or sole possession of the object.  
I would contend that the requirement of proprietorship is further manifested in Henry’s 
relationship to masturbation. I am not suggesting that masturbation amounts to a full 
replacement, for it is clear that Henry enjoys sex, but rather that there are indications that it is 
unusually successful in approaching such, in certain respects. I would argue that one of the 
reasons why this is so, is because retention of the sexual object in fantasy allows for a degree 
of control, thus insuring an absence of the rival and therefore a reduction of anxiety3.  
 
3 It is of course reasonable to assume that the nature of masturbation as an act of fantasy, and the control it therefore 
affords over an imagined object, is one of the basic components of the pleasurable satisfaction provided by the 
act, in general. This is not unique to Henry, but what is noteworthy is a periodic preference for masturbation 
over sexual intercourse, and an ability to ‘loose’ himself in masturbation to an unusual degree. Masturbation 
is a prominent element of Henry’s sexual life (p.144a, 147a, 149a, 153a, 246b, 247b, 258b), and he tells us 
that he got ‘more kick’ from masturbation, than he did from his first sexual experience at the age of thirteen 
(p.144a). This preference, given his age and lack of experience, could here reasonably be attributed to a lack 
of ability, and yet Henry restates it, as a thread running into later life. Speaking about the memory of the girl 
he lost his virginity to, he says that from around that time, “…and all through life, in the absence of intercourse 
– so long as I had this girl [in my mind] – at night I would think of her and masturbate and usually get as 
much out of it as from real intercourse…” (p.149a). Henry also notes that for him sexual phantasy is linked 
to, and reliant on, an object image of a specific desired object. It is the individual, retained/owned in fantasy, 
and not for instance an abstract fetish or proclivity, which excites him. As he states, “[I] always had to have a 
love object to be stimulated into phantasies and dreams. When I was going with Ann, and much aroused, I 
would masturbate with accompanying fantasies of having relations with her; had to have her as stimulus…The 
same is true of Ellen; I used to masturbate; while going with her, and picture her in my phantasies…” (p.246b). 
He notes elsewhere, that “sometimes he would enjoy a girl’s company and then masturbate” (p.147a), again 
highlighting the use of a specific object referent. My suggestion is that Henry retains the object in fantasy, 
with the intention of, and emphasis on, saving the experience for ‘later’; a later where he is alone and feels 
secure. This is echoed in the observation, that often after having sex with Ellen he “would go home and have 
wet dreams about her" (p.255b).  
There are fantasies which could be taken to argue against the notion of ‘direct object reliance’ in fantasy, 
Henry instead for instance using fictional stories to generate sexual excitement. As he says, while “reading 
dirty stories – would imagine myself in the role of the female of the story, her sensations. I would get an 
erection then masturbate…(p.247b). I reason however that imagining yourself into the body of another, 
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The ‘Something’ that Ends Relationships     
Focussing on the observed characteristic reduction of desire for the love object, Henry places 
a condition upon desire – that there be no sign of the rival. The desire for the idealized sexual 
object, a repetitive search for a union characterized by regressive infantile fusion, outlined 
above, breaks down at this point. As mentioned, Henry speaks of a repetitive loss of object 
interest, ultimately resulting in a loss of attachment, which is seemingly without cause or 
reason. He does not simply become tired of his objects, he also does not know why he does; 
‘something’ ends his relationships, and in most cases, he attributes this to a simple loss of 
interest. I.e. he employs a tautology; a loss of interest causes/equals a loss of interest. In this 
respect, it is worth wondering about Ellen, because although here too something 
unknown/unexplained caused the relationship to end, Henry at the same time never stopped 
desiring her. My suggestion is that the same psychological processes which caused this 
relationship to end, may operate unconsciously in other relationships where Henry simply 
cannot be ‘bothered’ to identify their presence/mechanics. My reason for inferring and 
investigating the presence of an underlying psychological mechanism – one that is observable 
with Ellen and yet possibly operative at other times as well – is due to the air of unavoidability 
characterising Henry’s encounter with a ‘something’ which causes him to end his relationship 
with Ellen. As Henry sums up, “It seems I’d conquer a woman and then get tired of her… But 
when I parted with Ellen it didn’t seem to me it was because I was tired. In her case I was 
 
involves an attempt to experience another’s subjectivity, but also a sort of ownership through possession. Such 
a fantasy would not be inconsistent with a general requirement of sole object possession. If this line of 
reasoning is correct, then a statement of Henry’s, about prostitutes being unsatisfactory because “you might 
as well masturbate” (p.153a), can be read as, ‘it is better to masturbate and feel secure, rather than to risk 
engaging sexually with someone who is encircled by rivals for their affection’. 
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really scared” (p.255b). The case study leaves one with the impression that this ‘something’, 
an unknown frightening ‘something’, will always lie in wait for Henry. 
 
 
The Father’s ‘Law’ and the Activation of a Repressed Object Relationship     
Henry grapples with the question of why he ended his relationship with Ellen. One gets the 
impression of a fixation to the question; he keeps on coming back to it, as though trying 
different pegs for fit, and finding each time that none is quite right. He periodically settles on 
religion as the cause (p.246b, 248b, 249b, 259b), but not in a conclusive or satisfactory manner. 
For instance, at one point the statement that religion was the cause, is phrased as a question 
(p.246b). Elsewhere, Henry puts the break-up down to a specific “sermon by a priest who 
preached about morality” (p.248) in relation to adultery (p.266b), but does not describe the 
sermon which apparently impacted him so forcibly with any further detail, leaving the account 
unpersuasive. There are also contradictions concerning the degree of his adherence to religious 
doctrine. He states that, “I never doubted my religion…I would consider divorce worse than 
adultery (246), and elsewhere that, “I wanted to divorce Ann and marry Ellen, but she refused” 
(p.249). He mentions guilt and a fear of punishment in the ‘next world’, over the adulterous 
nature of the relationship, but as Karpman points out, “that reason does not carry a great deal 
of weight” because many of his previous relationships where of the same nature (p.265b). 
Karpman remains unconvinced, and explicitly dismisses the religious motive, as ‘pure 
rationalization’ (p.261b), instead, introducing the notion of unconscious motives4 (p.266b).  
Henry goes on to muse about other possible reasons for the break-up, and although they are not 
of a strictly religious nature, they do seem to involve a moral quandary. They centre on anxiety 
 
4 Given that Ellen was a mother substitute, Karpman concludes that Henry suffered from revived oedipal guilt 
due to the incestuous nature of the union, and that this was the unconscious reason for ending the relationship. 
“Maybe I parted with Ellen because she reminded me of mother…” (p.248). 
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and fear over punishment. He speaks of feeling ‘guilt and worry’ (p.259) and mentions that 
maybe he was “afraid to get into trouble” (p.155a). He states that he was ‘scared’ (p255b), and 
that while seeing Ellen he suffered from headaches (p.255). He speaks of Ellen as ‘forbidden 
fruit’ (p.255b), and in this connection states that, “the feeling that prevented me from having 
relations with Ellen is the same feeling that caused me to give myself up at the time of the 
homicide – I felt something was wrong” (p.258). To summarise, Henry felt that he was 
transgressing on something forbidden, and experienced extreme anxiety and fear over doing 
so. He struggles to determine the nature of the forbidden entity or experience, resorting to the 
rationalization that it concerns adultery and religious transgression, both of which are shown 
to be inadequate as explanations. The nature of what precisely he is doing that is wrong, is left 
undefined, although Henry feels the wrongness acutely, and ends his relationship – with a 
woman he seems to have cared for greatly – as a result.             
The analysis highlights the operation of powerful moral constraints suggestive of 
punitive superego prohibitions. The case study provides us with an account of 
phenomenologically similar prohibitions in action, deriving in this instance directly from an 
external source – Henry’s father, who amongst other things laid down an explicit directive 
against fraternal incest, preventing Henry from acting on his sexual feelings towards his sister 
Rhodda (p.150a). It is also reasonable, without relying on the theoretical formulation of an 
essential and unavoidable oedipal dilemma, to infer that Henry experienced his father as getting 
in the way of his relationship to his mother. As recorded above, Henry ‘hated’ his father 
(p.155a), always took his mother’s side (p.146a, 148a), and blamed his father for his mother’s 
suffering, suicide attempts (p.253b) and flights from the home (p.156a). It is a small matter to 
conclude that Henry experienced his mother’s disintegration as a loss of love, and held his 
father partly responsible. As Karpmen summarizes, Henry’s father “…stood between him and 
the…object of his affect. First he stood between him and his mother; then, by means of warning 
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and proscription, between him and his sister whom he had substituted for his mother” (p.261). 
His father further exacts a ‘punishment’ by sending Rhodda away, Henry losing the object of 
his desire5 (p.151).  
Henry is clearly embroiled in an impossible predicament, involving on the one hand a 
desperate desire to breach the incest barrier, made more difficult by his sister’s cajoling, and 
on the other an attempt to follow the stark prescriptions set out by his father. These 
prescriptions lay the ground for the idea that Henry’s father embodies and represents for him, 
features typically characteristic of super ego functioning. There is further support for this 
notion, and for the conclusion of a global and ongoing adoption of this role by the father. As 
we have seen, along with laying down an explicit embargo against fraternal incest (p.150a), he 
also holds Henry to account for suspected theft (p257b). Henry’s father, further blames him for 
Rhodda’s early sexual development (she is caught with a married man at the age of fifteen), 
saying that he ‘started it’ (p.150). At the time of chocking his brother, it is his father who he 
asks to lock him up (p.146a, 254b). During the fugues, his mind was on suicide, but also on his 
father who he believed was persecuting him (p.263b). When Henry gives himself up for 
murder, he tells the watchmen to “arouse the sisters to request them to notify his father that he 
had committed a murder” (p.144a). We do not know what the college sisters – the request that 
they specifically be awakened – signify for Henry, but the meaning of the father – that he be 
notified – is less opaque. To my mind, there are three options. Henry seeks forgiveness for his 
 
5 It is worth noting that Henry claims that he never acted on his desire, a task made all the more difficult when we 
consider Rhodda’s part. For the duration of the case study we view Rhodda being under siege from Henry’s 
lust. There is a voracious dimension to his need, and we worry for her safety. It is only at the very end of the 
study that we are given a more comprehensive account which dramatically illustrates Henry being under siege.  
“Often at sixteen or eighteen Rhodda plainly spoke to me of desires to have relations with me. Showed 
herself nude on many occasions and asked me if I wanted it. She’s often come close to me. She’d put so 
much temptation in my way – it was hell. Our rooms were adjourning – she’d call me in. The first time 
she tried intercourse with me was after she came from convert. She called me in her room – she was 
nude – I left. After that she made regular trips to my room. I used to put Rhodda out of my room – had 
to, had erection, but had to control. I wouldn’t let her touch me – even get near me…” (p.262).    
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crime, or he requires condemnation of his wrongdoing, or he seeks to punish his father by 
providing evidence of how he failed as a father – i.e. he raised a murderer. The third option 
may be a factor, but I do not think in isolation. It is the first two which speak to the function of 
moral arbitrator which the father seems so strongly to embody; signifying judgement, 
disappointment, potential punishment and perhaps an opportunity at clemency. It is here worth 
recalling Henry’s statement that the same feeling which caused him to give himself up, caused 
him to end his relationship with Ellen (p.258). 
It is significant that in serving as Henry’s conscience, the father as function remains 
noticeably externalized. Henry does not simply feel mistreated by an ‘inner voice’ but rather 
persecuted by his father as a differentiated external entity6. We are not concerned here with the 
internalization of the ‘father’s law’ as an outcome of identification. I do not believe that Henry 
could identify with his father – a basic requirement for internalization where super ego 
formation is at issue – both because of his stark hatred, and because it would be a betrayal of 
the idealized mother. If Henry had internalized his strictures fully, then the matter would 
theoretically be solved via those means; an ego syntonic self-censorship would be the outcome, 
one that allows for a relinquishment of the incestuous object and paves the way for disguised 
object substitution as a future solution. Henry would then ‘know’ that the core embargo applies 
to the incestuous situation, and not to desire generally. Henry however keeps on aiming for the 
incestuous object, a point which Karpmen confirms with the observation that “all of his sexual 
development was simply an extension of the incestuous fixations formed within the family 
circle” (p.262b). It is for this reason, as we saw above, that Henry’s substitutes remain 
markedly undisguised; i.e. they are obviously substitutes. It is also for this reason that he must 
continually respond to the inherent threat of transgressing a taboo.    
 
6 Henry attempts to hide from him during his walks; he must tell him about the murder; he must rely on him to 
lock him up; it is the father who lays down the directives of moral behaviour, and who punishes transgression.     
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It is being argued that the ‘something’ which ends his sexual relationships, is this 
intolerable situation; it is as though Henry is told repeatedly, that the objects of his desire are 
forbidden. There is the constant threat that the rival will take them from him, and awareness 
that even while they do not, what he is doing is dangerous and somehow immoral. His response 
is either yielding to the pressure (as he seems eventually to have done with Ellen), and/or cued 
or pre-emptive aggression directed at both the rival and the object of desire who is judged 
complicit. For Henry, the rival, epitomised by the father, threatens the experience of blissful 
sexual fusion previously identified; a state characterized by feelings of sexual desire, adoration, 
idealization, and deep contentment. It has been observed that frustration is experienced when 
signifiers of potential object infidelity are encountered, often centred on those which betoken 
the presence of a rival, Henry in fact requiring a show of singular devotion, such as that of 
virginity, to feel secure. I would argue that this is not a matter of persecutory superego dictates, 
but rather of the activation of a repressed object relationship, Henry experiencing signs of the 
rival as though being faced with the father’s prescriptions.    
In addition to the hypervigilance, anxiety and reactive aggression described above, 
Henry experiences persecutory beliefs of, or approaching, a delusional intensity, about men 
and their wish/capacity to take what is his. As noted before, while still dating Ann he 
experiences extreme jealousy related to the feeling that “every fellow was cutting [him] out” 
(p.144a). He felt at such moments that everyone was against him, that people “had it in for 
[him]” (p.255b) and, used the walks partly to hide from them (p.263). Henry’s suspicion that 
his fourth child was not his own (p.249b, 252b, 253b), leads him to accuse Ann of adultery and 
they separate just over two weeks later (p.146a). It would seem therefore to be the suspicion of 
infidelity, which precipitates the fall into psychosocial disintegration. We find the same 
disintegrative trajectory occurring at the time when Ann and he were still dating. Then, while 
in the throes of delusional jealousy he began to “think that life wasn’t worth living, had 
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homicidal ideas, and made an attempt at suicide by turning on the gas” (p.144a). At one point, 
he relatedly states that a reason why he did not get involved with married women, was because 
the “man may…kill you” (p.147a). This disintegrative outcome is shown again during the 
‘finding of the love-letter’ which pushes Henry into a state of helpless despondency. It is clear, 
that the ‘appearance of the rival’ triggers deeply painful and unmanageable emotion in Henry.  
I would suggest that what occurs at such moments is the activation or externalization of an 
internal object relationship, and that it is this that we see in Henry’s repetitive 
diminishment/destruction of the idealized good object, illustrated starkly in Henry’s attempted 
choking of his younger brother Leo (p.146a). Leo was his ‘favourite and closest brother’, and 
he classes him along with his mother and Rhodda, as the ‘most important’ of the family 
(p.156a). He describes Leo as ‘pure’ and as a ‘symbol of goodness’ (p.156a). Leo is someone 
that Henry seems to have idealized for his goodness. Although he wonders if he choked Leo 
out of jealousy for his goodness (p.156a), adding that “[he] was jealous or envious of Leo, his 
good morels, very good boy” (p.259b), I think a more comprehensive explanation will include 
the experience of persecution defining the period under consideration. Following the attempted 
choking he asks his father to ‘lock him up’, noting that at the time he felt the “…whole world 
was against him” (p.254b). The key point is the persecutory belief and the unconscious and 
automated impact such a state of mind has on the apprehension of the (previously) good object. 
As Henry admits, he had little conscious awareness over his reasons for attacking Leo: “as a 
matter of fact, I recall little of the incident with Leo. There was no argument started, remember 
reaching for his neck, I remembered his hollering and he biting my thumb. I was in a kind of 
daze – when he bit on the thumb, I came to myself. When father came, I asked to be locked up. 
Six months later I was locked up for murder” (p.259b). In my view, what we observe here is 
the re-emergence of the repressed frustrating object which both eclipses apprehension of good 
external objects and cues the activation of a split-off ego fragment that when active generates 
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ego-syntonic behaviour that is a response to the encounter with the frustrating object – i.e. a 
response to past experiences of extreme deprivation. Under this state of affairs, any hint of 
frustration may signal a return of the split-off frustrating object; an experience of minor 
frustration, by such means becoming equivalent to one of extreme frustration and potentially 
generating overwhelming anxiety and possibly hatred. This conceptualization accounts for the 
amount or magnitude of aggression observed. It is furthermore easy to see how mutual 
reinforcement results where a loss of desire occurs: frustration breeds responsive aggression, 
and aggression causes object depreciation (a loss of idealization) which leads to further 
frustration and so on.  
 
 
Idealization  
I focus now on the desire for the idealized sexual object, manifested as a chain of ongoing 
object cathexis and replacement. I argue that the constraint upon the object that it be fully 
pleasing, to a degree reminiscent of infantile fusion, leaves no place for the inevitability of 
frustration, and therefore no possibility of relational continuity. This dynamic is echoed in 
Henry’s desire for girls and younger women, who will certainly age and therefore frustrate. It 
has also been noted that part object relating was a feature of Henry’s romantic relationships, 
with the sexual encounter as object. Here, tactile satisfaction reminiscent of infantile absorption 
was observed. It is easy to see how the general ‘stuff of living’ could frustrate a state with the 
twin core requirements of sole possession and blissful fusion. The following ‘actions’ by the 
love object are for instance shown to frustrate: a drifting attention or preoccupation not centred 
on Henry (p.154a, 245b); aging, which as previously noted effects desire; an illness or 
psychological mood which may impact pliancy or perhaps a willingness for sexual and 
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emotional engagement (p.153b); a flirtatious or perhaps simply interested response to another 
man, which again has been discussed above.    
In summary, for Henry desire is ‘shaped’ from two directions; by the rival’s claims 
which place prescriptive constraints upon desire, resulting in consequent denigrative attacks, 
and by idealizing tendencies which are incompatible with unavoidable frustration. An account 
incorporating the notion of idealization therefore further explains the inevitable time constraint 
on Henry’s romantic relationships, and by extension the fact of repetition. Idealization is here 
viewed as a product of splitting, which is understood as a largely unconscious process with 
roots in early childhood experience. Henry provides us with illustrations of its functioning 
during childhood and the mechanism’s presence is plainly delineated in the behavioural and 
affective dispositions directed towards both parents and towards Henry’s sexual objects.          
 
 
Splitting  
As already noted, Henry always sided with his mother when his parents quarrelled (p.146a); 
judging his father wrong (p.148a), and his mother right (p.153a). He states categorically that 
he cannot recall ‘entertaining any antipathic emotions’ towards is mother (p.155), even though 
as discussed he had good cause to. Again, as already noted, he describes her in loving idealized 
terms - a representation that is devotedly safeguarded from challenge. His father on the other 
hand is described in opposite terms. He is feared and hated as the worse thing imaginable 
(p.146a, 155a), believed to offer Henry no comfort whatsoever (p.146a), and is held responsible 
for the suffering of the household (p.156a, 253b). And yet, Henry’s father is also shown by the 
case study, to be a persistent and engaged presence in his son’s life. He may have been prone 
to losing his temper (p.153a), and while there is little doubt to my mind that he did contribute 
to the mother’s disintegration, his ‘voice’ is simultaneously one of ongoing moral guidance 
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(146a, 150a, 151a, 248b, 254b). When an argument is mentioned between father and son, it is 
the mother who holds a knife at the time, and who Henry thinks wanted to kill him (p.147). 
There are clear indications of splitting here, with the father as the wholly bad object, and the 
mother as all good. The same dynamics are observed in Henry’s romantic relationships, where 
on the one hand idealization and part object relating define the region of the all good object, 
and where on the other, Ann along with sexual objects which ‘fall from grace’, are designated 
as all bad. This is shown in the following statement, where Henry says “I wanted to divorce 
Ann and marry Ellen, but she refused…I had death wishes against Ann. I’d curse her, would 
wish accident should happen, die from childbirth” (p.249b). We therefore conclude that the 
object’s status (its goodness or badness) depends largely on underlying splitting mechanisms.  
Ann and the father (along with the ever-threatening rival) are blamed for disrupting/negating 
the union with the idealized object. In line with this point, Karpman argues that Henry’s 
“…suspicion of his wife, and much of the resulting antagonism toward her, followed upon his 
break with Ellen. He ‘took it out on’ his wife because he was deprived of the relationship which 
approached most nearly the one which he had truly desired unconsciously…” (p.260b). What 
is noteworthy is that Henry cannot acknowledge that the object of desire itself may undermine 
the longed-for union (as seems to have been the case with his mother), idealization here 
protecting against such knowledge.     
 
 
Ann, and the Protection of the Good Relationship   
Karpman seems ultimately to hold a pejorative view of Ann, dismissing her concerns as miner 
or irrelevant, and finally blaming the marital difficulties on her suggested frigidness. His 
assessment, within the framework I am employing, could be said to centre on the notion of 
pathological object choice, where the choice of a disappointing and rejecting object is the 
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primary dynamic considered. This was roughly the depiction presented above when 
considering Ann’s nature. Although there are grounds to justify this view7, there is also marked 
evidence in the case study, to support a more multifaceted picture, one where aspects of 
Henry’s behaviour are highlighted and his contribution to the marital difficulties are more fully 
explored.  
As just indicated, the displacement of aggression onto Ann, a by-product of splitting, 
places her in the role of the bad object. It can be reasoned that her status as the hated object is 
here established by transference and projection and further confirmed through projective 
identification, the need to denigrate her, in order to safeguard the good object, providing an 
unconscious motive for the use of these mechanisms. Concerning the status of the unconscious 
motive, I am not arguing for a form of propositional explanation, or means-end reasoning where 
Henry in each given instance chooses to denigrate Ann in order to protect the good external 
object. Rather, by comparison to an imagined or fantasized idealized object she will always fall 
short; be seen as less. It is due to such entrenched or structuralized comparison that Ann is 
perhaps for instance seen as fringed, frightened and over anxious8. Then too, as we saw, she 
 
7 As previously noted, there are multiple statements concerning ongoing absences and a lack of care, and in the 
‘love letter’ a strong suggestion of infidelity on her part, or at the least a portrayal of a provocative nature. The 
letter Henry finds in her handwriting, addressed ‘dear sweetheart’, invites a man to spend the day in the woods 
with her, the tone indicating a ‘sexual relationship’ and capturing sentiments of ‘longing’ (p.249b). Upon being 
questioned, Ann initially laughs and refuses to account, but later counters that the letter was a ‘decoy’ intended 
to induce a response in him. If the letter is authentic then Henry’s jealousy is a response to her behaviour. If it 
is a ‘decoy’, then we still find evidence of behaviour that is meant to incite jealousy. In either case, there is 
something about Ann’s nature that induces jealousy.  
8 We do find content which challenges Henry’s standard characterization of Ann. For instance, contrary to his 
accusations of frigidity, Henry says that following the first week of his marriage they had relations “twice and 
sometimes six times a night” (p.153a). Concerning her frightened nature, it is not surprising, and quite 
understandable that she feared pregnancy given her experience of it. As Henry mentions, “his wife was very 
sick following her first pregnancy…” (p.149a), and also that “in nearly seven years – she was pregnant seven 
times – three miscarriages, and four births” (p.153a). He adds at one point that he used to think that “if wife 
where pregnant and should die, I’d be better off” (p.254b). Henry here concedes knowledge of the fact that 
pregnancy equates to vulnerability; the state providing the most fertile available context for his wish that she 
die/disappear. Ann also fears that Henry would tell his mother ‘everything’, and this also seems reasonable. 
As we’ve seen, Henry is extremely attached to his mother and mentions being unable to stay out of town for 
too long at a time, as he, “had to go back to mother. Sometimes I would leave my work in the middle of the 
day to see mother. She was always glad to see me, would throw her arms around me and kiss me” (p.257b).  
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may be blamed (hated) for standing in the way of Henry’s grasp of the idealized object. 
Considering the examples provided in the case study, what is seen most clearly are however 
attempts to protect a view of the self as good.  
As previously noted, while claiming that Ann was guilty of neglect, unfaithfulness and 
abandonment, there is at the same time undeniable evidence of Henry having committed these 
very ‘crimes’. Illustrating this point, after accusing Ann of abandoning the children and him, 
Henry admits that it was him finally who “made her leave the house, [and him who] put the 
children in an asylum and didn’t bother seeing them” (p.146a). Here, projective mechanisms 
are surely in operation, having to do with attempts by Henry to disavow shameful behaviour 
and therefore to safeguard a view of the self as good. As Henry confirms, “my suspicion of 
jealousy was all in my head” (p.249b). 
There is also evidence of projective identification being employed to incite neglectful 
and abandoning behaviour by Ann. Henry blames Ann for staying out and yet states that he 
“used to stay away from home quite often, even for as long as two or three months” (p.146a). 
Presumably this occurred before Ann began to ‘wander’, Henry suggesting that they swapped 
behaviour from that point on: “shortly after I found the letter, it was I that stayed at home, she 
went out” (p.259b). What may be in evidence then is a reversal or fluidity of relational roles; a 
complementary shift by both, between the poles of victim and perpetrator. Such a role shift 
may denote the operation of projective identification, where Henry incites Ann’s abandoning 
behaviour through a gradual and subtle intersubjective process. Although there is insufficient 
data to determine the precise functioning of the procedure, following the conceptualization 
presented in the literature review, I assume that it is grounded in projection. We can say that 
Henry’s ‘wish’ that Ann be bad, is a basic ingredient for making her thus. Other ‘ingredients’ 
may have been a continual denial of badness by Henry, thus leaving it to be situated in the 
other; or his contribution to the establishment of an unhappy marriage, thus creating an 
144 
 
environment where care and faithfulness simply could not exist, leaving room only for their 
opposite; or it may be that Henry’s denigrating attacks caused Ann to respond in kind. We can 
only speculate about these however but can note that projective identification also serves to 
protect the good self. Taking this into account, we can phrase the matter differently and say 
that we are here speaking not only broadly of the protection of the idealized external object but 
also of an attempt to identify with it.   
The case study seems to indicate that what Henry is continually aiming at, trying to 
insure, is a fusion between good objects; a blissful and perfect (often sexual) union. He nowhere 
for instance assumes the role of bad object in relation to an idealized one; there is never a 
statement along the lines of, “I am bad/pathetic/laughable”, in relation to a love object that is 
“perfect/beloved/transcendent”. Yes, Henry may be rejected as ‘not good enough’, but he does 
not allow this characterization of self to ‘settle’; projection and projective identification provide 
Henry with a method of both determining Ann’s character and of ridding himself of the very 
qualities put into/onto her, and this, partly in the service of allowing for another relationship 
with someone else. It may be noted that the strategy employed by Henry is what Fairbairn 
refers to as the paranoid technique. Key features of the technique are an identification with the 
exciting object, and the projection into the external world of an internal rejecting object. The 
consequence being, that while the individual attains the status of good self, the world becomes 
hostile and frightening. This outcome was shown as applying to Henry where delusional 
ideation occurred. We can summarise and say that Henry makes Ann bad to protect the good 
relationship, but that in making her thus, she becomes a site of badness, that is to be hated and 
feared.     
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The Unacknowledged Relationship  
The occurrence of splitting, along with Henry’s sustained attempt to identify with the idealized 
object, suggests the presence of an unconscious relationship. What Henry cannot acknowledge 
is disappointment or betrayal by the idealized object. It is true, apart from his mother and Ellen, 
that they do ‘fall’, are denigrated, but here, in ‘falling’ they cease to be what they once were - 
beloved and desired. What is not possible is an ambivalent stance, where the object can both 
disappoint and yet remain somewhat good. Additionally, there is the further deflection, of 
blame falling on the ever-present rival with the emphasis being on the rival’s relation to him; 
the occurrence of impending or experienced ‘theft’. The object-image that is repressed would 
seem to be of an object, that while loved, yet disappoints, abandons, frustrates and mistreats. 
Linked to this – the other half of a repressed object relations unit – we find in Henry’s ongoing 
efforts to identify with the idealized object, an attempt to escape a self-image in which the self 
is injured, overlooked, unloved and worthy of abandonment.       
To consolidate, we need to reconcile this statement, of repressed self and object-images, 
with what was said previously about the activation of a split-off ego fragment. In short, are we 
referring to the same or to different entities with the designates self-image and ego fragment? 
A starting point will be to state that for Henry in reality both parents were responsible for the 
ruin of his mother’s love. In this sense, both the rival, and the inevitable fall of the idealized 
object, betoken the same experience. What is different is that Henry seems more able to hold 
the rival to account. He responds with blame, often of a hostile or violent nature, which speaks 
to the agentive nature and operation of an ego fragment. Conversely, the self-image that is 
protected against would seem to suggest more an experience of self. We can say that this state 
of affairs is grounded in the historical moment of splitting where Henry blamed the father. We 
could extrapolate further and suggest that in Henry there simply does not seem to be a capacity 
to accuse the mother. I.e. there is no indication of a split-off ego state that is primed towards, 
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or even capable of this. We therefore reach the surprising conclusion that the split-off ego 
fragment is seemingly itself, at least partially, defensive in nature; it functions to protect against 
the apprehension of a self and object-image.                       
 
 
Consolidation and the Derived Hypothesis Following Analysis   
Overwhelming envy and jealousy along with a seemingly unavoidable loss of attachment 
resulting in isolation, disintegration and suffering where shown to occur repetitively across all 
of Henry’s romantic relationships, applying also to his relationship with his mother. Although 
these factors were constant, two different types of relationship could be distinguished in respect 
of the affective disposition directed at the object, indicating split object relating. On the one 
hand, Henry’s mother along with his objects of desire and sexual partners, define the region of 
the all good object. Adoration, idealization, contentment, and love are characteristic. On the 
other, Henry’s father, his wife Ann, along with sexual objects which ‘fall from grace’, are 
designated as all bad.  
It was observed that Ann’s status as the hated object is established in large part by 
transference, projection and further confirmed through projective identification. While 
claiming that Ann was guilty of neglect, unfaithfulness and abandonment, there was clear 
evidence of the operation of projective mechanisms, having to do with attempts by Henry to 
disavow shameful behaviour of the very kind Ann is accused of. In trying to safeguard a view 
of the self as good it was seen that Henry does not simply aim at protection of the idealized 
external object but also at a chance to identify with it. What Henry is continually aiming at, 
trying to insure, is a fusion between good objects; a blissful and perfect (often sexual) union. 
Projection and projective identification therefore provide Henry with a method of both 
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determining Ann’s character and of ridding himself of the very qualities put into/onto her, and 
this, partly in the service of allowing for another relationship.  
Concerning the repetitive loss of attachment, it was noted that extreme anxiety and 
hypervigilance centred on the appearance of a rival, results in denigrative attacks directed at 
the rival/supposed rival and importantly at Henry’s objects of desire, leading to their ‘fall from 
grace’. It was further seen that the constraint upon the object that it be fully pleasing, to a degree 
reminiscent of infantile fusion, leaves no place for the inevitability of frustration, and therefore 
no possibility of relational continuity. The desire for the idealized sexual object, a repetitive 
search for a union characterized by regressive infantile fusion, breaks down at this point. It is 
the bad object epitomized by the oedipal father and by Ann who are blamed, along with the 
now denigrated former object of desire. What is noteworthy is that Henry cannot ambivalently 
acknowledge that the object of desire itself may undermine the longed-for union (as seems to 
have been the case with his mother), idealization here protecting against such knowledge. The 
object must be denigrated and therefore lost before being held responsible.  
Henry’s experience of fearing and hating the rival, as well as turning against the 
idealized object was analysed in greater detail in relation to the notion of the activation of a 
repressed object relationship. The matter was understood as partly concerning the activation of 
a split-off ego fragment, Henry experiencing signs of the rival as though being faced with the 
father’s prescriptions. It was further argued that the threat of loss signified by the rival, overlays 
a greater and more powerfully denied experience of loss – fundamentally a loss of the mother’s 
own doing. This was described and understood in terms of self and object-images. We can note 
finally that with the destruction of the good object Henry loses the capacity to identify with it, 
and that the transference erects a frightening object, capable of further – in addition to the rival 
– reconfirming Henry’s status as the one who loses out (through abandonment for instance). 
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Fairbairn’s paranoid technique breaks down at this point, leaving Henry with an internal and 
external world populated by frightening and persecutory figures.       
As in the previous case (that of Ernst) it is again the adaptation to a primary site of 
loss and/or trauma which gives form to RC activity. Henry, (like Ernst) partially blames the 
‘wrong’ object, here the rival. In other words, much of the intra and interpersonal dynamics 
leading to pathological repetition originate out of experience where defensive splitting 
measures are operative and dominant. This supports the prior reformulation that, ‘a central 
aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable 
experience’.   
. With Ernst, the libidinal affective valence was split, with the sexual aspect occurring 
alongside aggression, directed at one and the same object. For Henry by comparison, each 
affective valence is seen to be distinctly untainted by the other – objects are idealized or 
ruthlessly denigrated. Both versions are accommodated by the most recent revision of the 
hypothesis.  
Differing forms of idealization were observed in each case. For Ernst object choice 
centred on the ideal object, an object that was protected from his aggression, but not elevated 
in his esteem. In distinction, for Henry objects of desire are elevated and imbued with 
compelling phantasy representations of a blissful union reminiscent of infantile satisfaction. 
The difference in presentation is captured by Kernberg’s (1975) distinction between ‘primitive 
idealization’ and ‘later idealization’, where the latter is a reaction formation motivated by the 
need to defend against aggression - a motivation highlighted in Ernst’s ongoing conflict 
between inhibition and aggression. With primitive idealization on the other hand, the object’s 
role is fundamentally to protect against a world of hostile objects. Here, “the good object 
representation is unable to withstand contact with the bad object representation, it must be 
free from all negative features and all aggressiveness… an unrealistic, all-powerful, all-good 
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object” (Summers, 1994: 202-3). The requirement that the object fulfil such a role was plainly 
observed in Henry’s case. The protective function of idealization allows us to add to our 
understanding of the variable which decides among the modes of externalization employed. 
We can recall that Ernst’s employment of object choice as a primary mode of externalization 
provides a method of repetition in which the object is not acknowledged or designated as bad, 
and that the object’s status is here determined by ‘later idealization’. For Henry on the other 
hand transference, projection and projective identification were observed as the primary modes 
of externalization and ‘primitive idealization’ was operative.  I would argue that primitive 
idealization requires such mechanisms in order to establish the inherently unrealistic 
experience of the all-powerful, all-good object. The hypothesis was previously amended to 
state that the variable under consideration acts in accordance with the aim of supporting 
repression of the total unconscious object relationship. We can now add that it does so through 
the mechanism of idealization and that object choice as a mode of externalization is preferred 
where later idealization is observed, and the other modes required where primitive idealization 
is necessitated. This amendment is included below. Outside of it, the RC definition and initial 
hypotheses remain unchanged as all conditions were confirmed. 
 
 
Bullet Point Presentation of Findings in Relation to the Initial Hypothesis: Hypothesis 
Development     
Below, standard text indicates the initial hypotheses. Bold text indicates changes made as a 
result of findings and carried forward. A line through the text indicates that a statement has 
been invalidated. Bold italics indicate that a change has occurred in the case under 
consideration.    
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The Repetition Compulsion Defined Following Case 2   
RC is defined by four descriptive criteria: 
 it is unconscious; characterized on an experiential level by a lack of conscious awareness or conscious 
rational deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its functioning are described, as being either 
broadly unconscious, or specifically, repressed, dissociated or ego dystonic. 
 it is a repetition of a past unpleasurable experience  
 it is unpleasurable because it is painful and damaging  
 RC should be thought of as the unconscious repetition of a ‘lived interpersonal situation’.     
In relation to the last point, RC concerns the repetition of an experience, rather than of cognition, and therefore 
does not include the kind of repetition viewed in obsessional neurosis. Cognitive repetition is furthermore 
excluded under the above RC definition, since it proceeds alongside an awareness of the fact of repetition. I.e. the 
patient suffering from obsessional thinking is keenly aware of the repetitive nature of his/her thought.  
 
Hypothesis Following Case 29  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached 
to internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely 
libidinal or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
 
9 The hypothesis development across cases is reproduced as appendix b 
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- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption 
is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is 
simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously 
chosen because of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
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 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization will be identifiable 
in relation to the broader symptomatic picture, and that this variable is one which will act to 
reinforce repression of an unconscious object relationship. 
 
Idealization, two forms of it, is recommended as the sought-after variable; object choice being central 
where ‘later idealization’ is observed, and the other modes (transference, projection, projective 
identification) required where ‘primitive idealization’ is seen.  
 
It is noted that object nature and/or the activation of a second object relationship may undermine or 
curtail episodes of primitive idealization.   
 
 A central aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable 
experience.     
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
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CASE STUDY THREE: STOLLER’S ‘A CASE OF 
FEMALE MASCULINITY’ 
 
RC Identification  
At the time of Stoller’s writing of the case study, the patient, Mrs. G, is in her mid-thirties and 
has been in individual treatment with Stoller for roughly seven years. Stoller meets her for the 
first time fourteen years prior to this while undertaking interviews at a county hospital. Their 
meeting results in Mrs. G’s transferral to UCLA where Stoller is Chief of the Inpatient 
Psychiatric Service. For the seven years following their first meeting, Mrs. G although 
nominally under Stoller’s care is treated by other psychiatrists both as an inpatient and 
outpatient.  
As an introduction to Mrs. G, Stoller describes her in the following terms: “Mrs. G was 
a teasing, manipulating, cute, gratifying, charming, loving, insightful, dangerous, suicidal 
psychotic. Those who do not know her and whom she does not wish to charm find her irritating, 
stubborn, and malicious. Those who know her find her sad, pliant, weird, sparkling, and 
yearning for closeness with others…My abiding response has been to a benignly teasing, sad 
and lonely madwoman with reversible pathology.” (250)   
It is difficult to be precise about the frequency and duration of ‘actual’ treatment. This 
is partly down to the unorthodox nature of the treatment relationship which is perhaps justified 
by the severity of pathology, but also made possible by Stoller’s unusual commitment to the 
patient. As Stoller tells it, during the first seven years of their acquaintance Mrs. G kept him 
“in the background of her mind” (p.304) and “would stop by [his] office from time to time to 
say hello and would also write a letter every month or so to keep [him] up to date…” (p.88). 
When Mrs. G eventually enters ‘official’ psychotherapy with Stoller, she only manages to keep 
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a few of her once weekly appointments during the first year (p. 97). Her letter writing however 
increases in frequency at times of psychological distress and the content becomes deeply 
personal. There is the suggestion that they do eventually begin to meet more regularly (p.107, 
109) while Mrs. G remains an outpatient, but from when and how often is difficult to determine. 
Finally, following a telephone call threating murder and suicide Stoller hospitalizes Mrs. G, 
saying that confinement enabled him to begin to treat her psychodynamically, which involved 
spending several hours each day with her (p.111-2), his undated notes recording, “I am still 
continuing to see the patient every day except Sundays” (115). Mrs. G is eventually released 
from this episode of hospitalization, and Stoller notes that in total she is hospitalized twelve 
times at UCLA (p.12). We do not learn how regularly they meet after this. It is noteworthy that 
throughout the period of ‘official’ treatment Mrs. G seems to have supplemented face-to-face 
meetings with telephone calls. There are periods when she calls “regularly, at least once a day, 
for a few weeks” (p.156).     
The case study consists primarily of verbatim extracts based on audio recordings of 
psychotherapy sessions, letters written by Mrs. G, some of Stroller’s clinical notes, and his 
theoretical and clinical assessments.             
When considering Mrs. G’s romantic relationships and sexual encounters an immediate 
complication has to do with her sexual orientation. Stoller ultimately classes her as 
homosexual, noting that throughout her life she nevertheless struggled to acknowledge her 
homosexuality, resulting in an extensive catalogue of heterosexual partners and behaviour. As 
he phrases it, she was “trapped by her heterosexual impulses” (p.278). In this respect, therapy 
may be viewed as a painstaking process of helping Mrs. G come to terms with her 
homosexuality; an aim which is eventually judged successful, for as Stoller sums up at later 
points in the treatment, “Mrs. G has finally come to accept her homosexuality, and can enjoy 
a lasting, loving, sexual relationship with a woman” (p.291). Mrs. G herself echoes these 
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sentiments, stating, “I am a homosexual…I always knew what I was; I always knew it. But I 
didn’t want to believe that I was a homosexual” (p.332-3). In relation to RC – specifically the 
definitional criteria of repetitive activity being both painful and damaging – Mrs. G’s sexual 
orientation has a bearing on how her heterosexual behaviour is understood because we might 
suppose that all such activity is for her inherently unsatisfying, perhaps even painful, and 
ultimately damaging in the sense that it reinforces repression of her homosexual tendencies. 
This is particularly relevant since a far greater proportion of the case study, a reflection of her 
life choices, centres on her relationships to men, and it is with her male object that I begin.  
 
 
Male Relationships  
Stoller divides Mrs. G’s relations with men into five categories (p.279). I will consider three 
of these as the remaining two are not of a romantic or sexual nature. The first group I consider 
are constituted by Mrs. G’s four husbands, the second by the men Mrs. G chose to father her 
children, and the third by sexual encounters often with strangers (p.279).  
 
 
Bill (4th Husband) 
 
Object Nature   
I begin my analysis with Mrs. G’s longest standing husband, Bill. Stoller describes the marriage 
as an ‘empty and angry relationship’ (p.110), with Mrs. G echoing that it was an ‘unhealthy 
marriage’ (p.104, 300) and that by staying with Bill, she allowed herself to be ‘destroyed’ 
(p.163, 360). She also speaks of him ‘hurting’ and ‘killing’ her (p.214), but it should be stressed 
that this does not refer to physical threat or injury. As Mrs. G clarifies he was a ‘threat to her 
156 
 
sanity’ (p.357). Mrs. G says that she spent twelve years with Bill, the marriage eventually 
ending in divorce (p.358). For most of that time she lives with Bill and two of her children by 
other men.      
Mrs. G reports that Bill and her spent their first night together, after meeting that same 
day, in lengthy conversation and open disclosure (p.49, 359). She notes that Bill was ‘strong’ 
and a ‘big man’ and that she chose him because he would take care of her and felt she needed 
to be cared for (p.359). She describes Bill as ‘serious’, ‘warm’ and as “someone who didn’t 
drink or smoke or screw around or any of those things” (p.360). In the marriage, she relies on 
him for stability, and as a provider for herself and the children (p. 100, 104, 163). The solidity 
he insures is not simply financial, but often involves him stepping in during her absence. He is 
for instance shown to look after the children while she is out ‘every night’ (p.100). He ‘pays 
the bills’ and ‘cleans the house’ when she is hospitalized (p.163). There are also examples of 
him providing comfort, Mrs. G saying that she used to ask him to just hold her and he would 
(p.360). As she hoped, he does therefore look after her, Mrs G confirming that “if I hadn’t had 
him, I would have died long ago. He kept me alive” (p.360).   
Along with the more positive aspects of the relationship, Mrs. G also relays the 
following. She states that Bill did not talk or listen well, and more broadly that he did not 
engage fully or provide sufficient emotional support (p.91, 163, 212, 300). As an illustration 
of what Bill was not able to engage with, we may consider the following statement by Mrs. G: 
“I want to run in the street and beg someone to please, please help me. I cannot understand 
why no one sees me hurting so much, crying so hard and running and running” (p.94). She 
also identifies a capacity for manipulation, saying that he ‘played with her head from the first’ 
(p.358) and a tendency towards punishment, noting that like her mother, he had “a quiet, 
nonverbal way of accusing me and punishing me…” (p.359). She expands on both tendencies, 
saying that, “he gave me permission to behave in a certain way and then when I did, he 
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punished me for it. A million things. He would bring some guy home for me to go out with, and 
then if I went out with him, he would…well, he wouldn’t talk to me for days at a time. Something 
like that, some petty shit. But whatever it was, it always freaked me out” (p.359).    
It is clear throughout the case study that Mrs. G wanted more from Bill. She for instance 
speaks of him ‘changing’ for the better and yet, is oddly unclear about what precisely this 
involves. She hints at a relinquishing of control and of granting her greater independence 
(p.100), but this feels fragmentary. Whatever its nature1, the change proves temporary, as Bill 
is eventually accused of not “[living] up to his part of the bargain” (p.184). There are instances 
where he is described as ‘nice’ and seen to be making an effort (p.127). Mrs. G describes one 
such occasion as follows, “Bill and I had dinner together. He did something very unusual. He 
talked to me and talked to me, and he cried and a little bit of everything” (p.187). We could 
guess that what Mrs. G is after, is captured in this episode of Bill talking and crying, that is 
greater communication and emotional involvement, but this supposition is complicated by a 
later clarification of what occurred during the event in question. In Mrs. G’s words, “he talked 
to me about the times when I get angry, and he said I’m vicious when I’m being hostile. He 
talked about going to bed with me, about whatever it is I do to him – I make him feel inadequate. 
He’s afraid to go to bed with me” (p.192). Bill then brings up the question of divorce, saying 
that it is perhaps time they spoke about it. This is followed by Mrs. G driving into oncoming 
traffic and causing an accident. She concedes that “maybe I really didn’t want to talk to Bill 
about it” (p.192).                
 
 
 
 
1 An interesting slip perhaps attests to the fact that Mrs G is somehow incapable of saying explicitly what she 
wants or needs from Bill where change is concerned. While with Stoller, in accusing Bill of misleading her 
she refers instead to Stoller, substituting ‘you’ for ‘him’. Confusion ensues, and by the time her substitution is 
noted and the matter rectified, the question of what things he was meant to do but failed at, is lost (p.185).        
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Affective State   
Mrs. G repeatedly speaks about wanting to kill Bill (p.74, 105), and there are three documented 
occasions when she does attempt his murder (p.176, 177, 217, 358). The desire to kill him is 
often in response to Bill not allowing her another child (p.74, 105, 358). As she experiences it, 
by denying her, he robs her of “all those feelings, all that warmth, good…all that…I don’t 
know what it is… I felt it once. The first time I had a baby” (p.74). She restates the same need 
at a different time, “I had this feeling inside of me about wanting something warm to hold…” 
(p.101). At another time, her reason for wanting to kill him has to do with him not living up to 
his promises (p.184). However, as previously noted we do not have a clear understanding of 
how and in what he failed.   
With the progression of psychotherapy Mrs. G does eventually recognise that her 
murderous impulses are related to feelings of rage and that she needs to find alternative ways 
of expressing her anger towards Bill (p.217). Although she does here acknowledge the presence 
of anger, she is still unclear about why she is angry and for the most part does not leave us with 
a proper sense of its specific character beyond the fact that it is murderous. One possibility 
which may go towards greater illumination is Mrs. G’s hint that it involves fear. As she says, 
Bill “threatens me; he’s a threat to my life; he’s a threat to my sanity. And he wouldn’t be a 
threat if he were dead…” (p.357). She expands, “I kill because I’m terrified for my life…the 
only thing you can do with someone like [Bill] is to kill him” (p.360). If there is fear and a 
feeling of threat, we do not learn why, although Mrs. G provides one statement worth 
considering, saying, “when I think of that first night I went to Bed with Bill my intent was to 
fuck his lights out…He wouldn’t let me” (p.360). It is after this statement that she concludes 
that the only solution is killing him and men like him. What did he do to her by his refusal? 
My sense is that it may have something to do with exposing her by stripping her of certain 
defences, and this is a possibility that is explored further below.     
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While it remains difficult to isolate Mrs. G’s affective states during destructive episodes 
involving Bill, we can nevertheless highlight that her behaviour speaks to an indifference or 
disregard. Such sentiments are again however not easily acknowledged by Mrs. G, and when 
they are admitted to, there is nevertheless an act of ‘distancing’ whereby they are for instance 
either attributed to Carrie (a dissociated identity discussed below), or Mrs. G enters a 
disordered state of mind. It is Carrie who is sexually “…not interested in Bill…[and who] thinks 
Bill is an ass” (p.150). Concerning her state of mind in relation to her attitude of marrying Bill, 
Mrs. G says that she did not know him ‘fifteen minutes’ before they married and finds it 
difficult to say why they went through with it, putting it down to ‘coincidence’ (p.359). She 
expands that it was somehow ‘arranged for them’ or down to a ‘bet or dare’ and that even while 
agreeing to the marriage she never pictured actually living with Bill (p.359). After further 
reflection, she struggles to clarify, ending with “I don’t remember…I don’t know. I don’t 
remember” (p.359).  
While noting such indifference, it is also true that Mrs. G does seem at times to value 
Bill and to regret her treatment of him. There is for instance the suggestion that Mrs. G had “a 
terrific feeling of responsibility [towards Bill]” (p.163). We also find that her attempt at 
poisoning him leaves her suicidal and that on reflection the act had ‘scared the living shit’ out 
of her (p.186). While considering divorce, she feels guilty (p.246), and again at the prospect of 
murdering him (p.357). I would suggest however that although these affective dispositions are 
seemingly present, that they are nevertheless difficult for Mrs. G to access; explosive, life-
altering experiences being required to arouse them.   
 
Effect of the Relationship  
I turn now to a consideration of the impact of the relationship on Mrs. G. We saw previously 
that in Mrs. G’s assessment, she was damaged by Bill, and that she sometimes spoke about the 
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impact of the relationship in terms of dying and death. She also reports feeling controlled, 
suffocated and unsupported emotionally. At the same time, we know that she relied on Bill for 
stability and security, admitting at one point that she owed her survival to him. The relationship 
between the two strands (the negative and positive outcomes) may be understood as one in 
which Mrs. G sacrifices her wellbeing and sanity in order to insure an ongoing degree of 
environmental stability and care both for herself and for her children (p.100, 104, 163, 360). 
She summarises the cost to her identity as follows, “when I was married to Bill I really wasn’t 
anything, and when I left Bill I had to find out who I was” (p.230). Although Mrs G ‘tries to 
be good’, Stoller notes that “it was too much for her to be a middle-class housewife” (p.167). 
We learn that with time her behaviour, in the guise of Carrie, turns ‘pretty bad’ (p.167), and 
Mrs. G describes what this may have involved with the following statement. “I can remember 
being so frustrated at times. I would leave the house and just go and drink until I was drunk 
and passed out or something, or use heroine or something, you know, just anything to get away 
from him” (p.358). There are also occasions where she leaves for longer periods, escaping to 
other cities without Bill knowing where she is (p.100, 162).   
  
 
The Psychiatrist (2nd Father)   
Stoller records that Mrs. G gave birth to five children, and suffered one abortion (p.59). Three 
of her children are given up for adoption, with Mrs. G keeping and raising her second and third 
(both boys and both by different fathers). It is noteworthy that while Mrs. G states again and 
again that she was happiest when pregnant (p.4, 16, 44, 69…), this seems to have had little to 
do with the relevant biological father who was often out of the picture by that point. Perhaps 
reflecting the transient role they played in her life, there is relatively little content concerning 
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the fathers. By far the greatest share concerns the father of H, her second child, and it is with 
him that I begin.           
 
Object Nature  
At sixteen a court action places Mrs. G into the custody of a psychiatrist, the condition of being 
under psychiatric care allowing her release from reform school. The psychiatrist is thirty at the 
time and soon to father H. Mrs. G describes him as a sweet and naive ‘little boy’ (p.83). She 
assures Stoller about his naivety, saying “he really was – if you can imagine anyone his age, 
thirty, and with his education being naive – but he was” (p.83). She elaborates, “he was kind 
of a Casper Milqutoast kind of person. He wasn’t a big masculine sort of thing. He was pretty” 
(76). Given her characterization of him, it is perhaps unsurprising that for the most part Mrs. 
G seems uninterested in the question of his accountability – the potential and on the face of it 
likely abuse of power and position – saying “Either I seduced him, or he seduced me…I don’t 
remember…” (p.77). She explains her position further, “I can rationalize, I can say ‘…I was 
sixteen years old; I was his patient; and he was supposed to be treating me and making me 
better, and instead he screwed me. That was a bad thing for him to do. He was a bad man.’ 
That doesn’t mean a goddamn thing. He was not a bad man. If it hadn’t been pushed in his 
face and made available to him, I’m sure that he wouldn’t have taken advantage. He was just 
a kid…He wasn’t even a man…” (p.76).   
 
Affective State   
In the case study, there are two presentations of Mrs. G’s encounter with the psychiatrist. The 
second occurs roughly two years after the first, and it is likely that the lucidity and apparent 
honesty observed in it, are a response to ongoing psychotherapeutic engagement.    
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At the first account, Mrs. G presents the events as though she used him from the start 
(p.74). Under this account her actions are premeditated and her aim is to use his sperm for a 
child, his authority for her release, and his expert backing to ensure that she be able to keep her 
child in the face of her mother’s rebuttals (p.74). He is therefore simply a means to an end, 
which Mrs G confirms with the following: “I wasn’t particularly interested in him or what he 
did one way or the other. My only concern was getting out of reform school; and he was the 
only way I could get out, so what he did was immaterial to me” (p.75). At this time Mrs. G 
summarises the quality of their interpersonal interactions as follows: “I used to lie to him a lot. 
I used to tell him fantastic stories (p.75). She adds dismissively, “He just talked to me. I can’t 
even recall what he looks like” (p.75).  
At the second reporting there is a marked change of tone. Mrs. G now states that she 
was sorry for him because of his naivety and that she felt the same affection for him that she 
had for her little brother (p.83). She characterises their conversation very differently; as 
engaging and meaningful: “we just talked about all kinds of things – you know, just like you 
[Stoller] and I do, only different…” (p.84). She also retracts the above claim of premeditation 
where pregnancy is concerned: “I don’t think I decided him as the father of my baby until after 
several times I’d been to bed with him” (p.84). Mrs. G also briefly reports in the latter stages 
of treatment that it was not easy for her to tell him that she was pregnant. In her words she 
should, “Just tell him – don’t be so chicken-shit – just tell him that [you’re] pregnant” (p.341).  
This is a far cry from the cold calculation she claims at the first discussion. Likewise, there is 
strong emotion, desperation, driving her call for him to defend her right to have a child, as she 
implores him to say “that I should go home and have my baby….call my mother and tell her 
that I have to have this baby. Tell her that she can’t take this one away from me” (p.341). 
Taken as a whole she characterises their relationship as follows. “It was just a good 
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relationship. We had something to talk about, and we felt warm together, and it was a good 
thing (p.84). She adds that “it wasn’t just a tumble in the hay for him” (p.84).       
 
Effect of the Relationship  
Mrs. G says that the relationship changed when she became pregnant, that he got ‘nasty’ (p.84). 
She elaborates, taking responsibility, “I made it nasty because then I started to make demands. 
I wanted him to see to it that I got off probation and got out of psychiatric care and go home 
to Los Angeles, where I wanted to be, and got to keep my baby…” (p.84). Stoller asks if she in 
fact ‘double-crossed’ him by unexpectantly ruining a ‘genuinely affectionate’ relationship. 
Mrs. G answers “yes. I took something that was partially his and used it against him. The baby 
was just as much his as it was mine” (p.85). She adds, “I feel the guilt now where I didn’t then” 
(p.85). Mrs. G says that she saw him less regularly after she got pregnant, and although we do 
not learn when they last meet, there is no indication that they see one another again after two 
and half months into her pregnancy. Mrs. G reflects, “He’s afraid of me. I can see it now…I 
don’t hurt people that don’t hurt me. I did hurt him though, and he never hurt me…And I never 
saw him. Now I see him every day [in her son]” (p.341).  
Although Mrs. G takes responsibility for both the fact of a sexual relationship and the 
destruction of the broader relationship, there is an intermediate position which is surly justified. 
Mrs. G sees this at one point saying “If he had been a man and a good psychiatrist, he wouldn’t 
have screwed me even if I had pushed it in his face” (p.76).    
 
 
Other Husbands  
There is less content pertaining to Mrs. G’s remaining three husbands. A further complication 
has to do with the fact that in certain instances, it is unclear what content refers to which 
164 
 
husband. Some of the confusion results from Mrs. G’s reticence over speaking about her first 
husband – it being in fact unclear whether the two were married Mrs. G. saying at one point 
that they were (p.58) and at others that they were not (pp. 57, 106) - and the rest from a general 
vagueness seemingly indicative of a lack of interest.      
 
Object Nature  
Mrs. G summaries that, “the men I married were all the same kind. They didn’t drink; they 
didn’t smoke; they didn’t swear; they were all stable…” (p.59). Husband number two, L, is 
however said to be an exception, Mrs. G reporting that the couple used lots of drugs together 
and that he was a ‘crook’ who had a history of incarceration (p.58). Mrs. G adds that in 
distinction to the others she never had a sexual relationship with him (p.59). She describes her 
third husband as wealthy, attractive and as having a nice personality, adding that she married 
him because he wanted her children who he had known and loved since they were born (p.56). 
Bill, the forth has been discussed above.    
 
Affective State    
Impulsivity in getting married, along with a voiced indifference over her choice of husband 
and over the fact of being married, is seen repeatedly (p.3, 4, 56). An illustration of her 
indifference is observed, at the time of Stoller and Mrs. G’s first meeting, when she reports on 
her third (presented as her second while omitting the fact of a first marriage) husband leaving 
without any warning. When Stoller asks why he left, Mrs. G replies “I don’t know; I haven’t 
seen him” (p.3). When he asks how it makes her feel, she replies “I don’t know; I don’t feel 
anything in particular” (p.3). To his question about whether they were close she responds with 
“not especially” (p.3). In relation to this husband Mrs. G admits to needing a father for her 
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children (p.3), but adds that they eventually separate because “it didn’t seem fair to me to be 
married to him…I wasn’t interested in him…I was crazy and I was in hospital” (p.56).  
 
Effect of the Relationship  
It is difficult to identify the effect these marriages had on Mrs. G, since so much of her 
behaviour goes towards insuring no impact at all. As Stoller notes she “drifted in, and…drifted 
out (p.56). Although there is little observable impact at the time of these relationships, regret 
and sadness do seem to be a long-term consequence of her marital choices. As Mrs. G says, in 
retrospect: “if I wanted to mourn for something, I could mourn for Marriages. First there was 
the guy I should have married, and I didn’t marry him. I just made him screw me, and he didn’t 
want to, but I wanted to get pregnant and made him; and then I kicked him out. And then there 
was the time I got married just for something to do to amuse myself for the weekend. And then 
there was the time I married a nice guy and I screwed him every way but the right way. Then 
there was another time I should have gotton married, but I just got pregnant” (p.57).    
 
 
Other Fathers  
Stoller notes that Mrs. G never married any of the fathers (except for the first). We might 
presume that this was down to the characteristics of the object, that is, a case of object choice, 
but this is not borne out by the analysis. What is indicated instead is that Mrs G for some reason 
could not allow the relationship to continue once a man had impregnated her. As Stoller 
confirms “once pregnant, she immediately ended the relationship” (p.70). This is not true for 
her first pregnancy, where it is her mother who is the obstacle, Mrs. G saying: “do you know I 
could have and begged to get married during my first pregnancy and she [mother] wouldn’t let 
me” (p.106).  
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Mrs. G’s first pregnancy, at fourteen or fifteen, by a neighbourhood boy is an anomaly 
because as she admits it was the only time she wanted to get married (p.58). Mrs. G struggles 
to speak about this relationship, saying that although they did get married it was annulled a few 
days later by her mother (p.58). 
Another man, V, is a further anomaly because as Stoller tells us, Mrs. G “has loved 
only two men: her father and V, with whom she lived in a loving, uncomplicated, unbrutal way 
for almost a year…” (p.279). They live together for around seven months and he father’s her 
twins, her final pregnancy (p.70). Mrs. G does not say much about him or his character, 
focussing instead on what it was like to be in the relationship. About this she says “do you 
know that was the only time in my life that sex was real to me? Do you know that I was so wild 
and so full of it, it was just like my whole body exploded…And I laughed and I really laughed 
because I was happy, and I cried and I loved my kids…” (p.219). Mrs G ends, “…and then a 
bad thing happened” (p.219). The bad thing which ended the relationship was an attempted 
murder-suicide, of her babies and herself (p.220-21). This occurs a day after she went to bed 
with a woman while V is away on a trip, and she tells us that she acted out of loneliness (p.221).       
 
RC Identification  
In identifying repetitive relational patterns which meet the definitional criteria of RC, I will 
start with the question of damage and pain. Mrs. G’s objects (husbands and fathers) are 
generally well adapted, stable and reliable. She often describes them as nice and trustworthy. 
They are individuals who are capable of caring for her, at least financially, and who seem to 
treat her well enough. By nature, they do not therefore signify obvious damage or pain. What 
is apparent however, is the presence of a power imbalance and some indication of this being 
exploited by her objects. The element of control may well be due to subtle personality features 
of the object, but all we have evidence for is that they held a higher socio-economic position 
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and sometimes wielded this power. It was observed most clearly with the psychiatrist who 
while characterised as nice and naïve had the power, in this instance benevolent, to insure her 
release from reform school and to grant her the chance of motherhood. Mrs. G herself 
comments on the existence of a power imbalance in connection to the father of F (the younger 
son who lives with her, Bill and H, the psychiatrist’s son), saying “I’ve always been 
scared…His father’s a big lawyer, and his mother’s very rich, and they go here and they go 
there. Maybe someday I’m in the hospital and he decides maybe I’m not the mother for F after 
all, so he’s going to take him away from me…” (p.85). The imbalance was also apparent in 
Bill’s behaviour, with Mrs. G describing one period of their relationship as follows: “I had no 
friends, radio, T.V. or phone and wasn’t allowed to have money” (p.100). Two primary, 
negative outcomes, of this power imbalance are highlighted in the case study; the first being a 
loss of identity and the second a need to escape.  
The qualities of distance and detachment are defining features of Mrs. G’s relationships. 
We can summarise and state that on a more conscious level relationships do not matter to Mrs. 
G; they have little value or meaning; she does not care whether they start, continue or end. If 
this were the whole story then Mrs. G could not easily be said to suffer from the harsh 
indifference which plagues her relationships. It is however clear that on a level removed from 
easy awareness, Mrs. G did want more and that she laments, especially at later points in the 
treatment, her inability to have got it. Of several of her relationships she explicitly and fondly 
recalls periods, usually at the beginning, when there is conversation, engagement and contact, 
which inevitably ends. She values these experiences and tells us that her one regret, the one 
thing she could mourn, is that she never found the relationship she wanted. 
A final feature is the fact that her relationships all end, often prematurely and badly. 
This is especially visible in her inability to continue relations with the soon-to-be fathers.    
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Concerning the unconscious nature of her behaviour, Mrs. G does not know why she chooses 
her partners outside of their ability to provide, what she likes in them if anything at all, what 
she needs or wants from them, why they inevitably exit her life; whether she feels one way or 
another about most aspects of the relationship.  
 
 
Sexual Encounters  
When considering Mrs. G’s sexual behaviour and her experience of sex and sexuality broadly, 
it is difficult to separate out what is and is not traumatic. This problem is not unique to Mrs. G, 
as it arises both from the subjective nature of trauma and due to the fact that it may be repeated 
in a manner where pleasurable aspects of experience are fused with or incorporated into what 
would otherwise be intolerable. With Mrs. G there is however an unusually marked blurring in 
these areas. Given this difficulty, I nevertheless think it makes practical sense to separate out 
those experiences which do seem more ‘obviously’ traumatic from others which may lean, at 
least on the face of it, more towards some form of pleasurable or satisfying sexual engagement. 
I begin with the latter, and it should be kept in mind that the separation into categories is aimed 
foremost at facilitating data management and presentation, rather than at making objective 
claims about the nature of a given experience.              
 
Object Nature  
We do not learn about specific men Mrs. G had consensual casual intercourse with. We know 
that she started extremely young, having as she puts it “screwed all those boys” (p.216) at 
thirteen. We hear that she had ‘a lot’ of sex (p.20), that she slept with ‘hundreds of men’ 
(p.281), and that she had “innumerable sexual relations with men…” (p.54). Stoller gives us a 
sense of the circles she ran in, saying that she had “association with motorcycle gangs, 
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criminals, drug pushers, thieves, and corrupt policemen” (p.54). Speaking of a period of 
homelessness and ongoing participation in criminal activity, Mrs G notes that she slept with 
many of the men in her orbit. In her words, “…some of those men still come around for sex 
with me. Some of those men that I knew then. I was out fucking each man…Then I’d kick his 
ass out of bed and get another one…those were the good old days” (p.68). Mrs. G seems to 
have become more particular in her sexual behaviours and choices over time, leading Stoller 
to summarise that as an adult “Mrs. G chose not to know the man’s name or where he lived; 
she would not attempt to explore his personality beyond checking that he was intelligent, 
physically clean, white, and middle class” (p.281). These features of interchangeability and 
transience are mentioned at other points (p. 215, 280, 281, 338).        
 
Nature of the Traumatising Object  
Mrs. G asks rhetorically, “do you know how many men have screwed me since I was six years 
old?” (p.20). Stoller later qualifies that she suffered ‘numerous traumatic seductions’ in 
childhood (p.123), with Mrs G reporting being repeatedly fondled at six or seven (p.20, 268). 
She gives a detailed account of anal rape by a stranger at around the age of ten (p.129). 
Speaking about this, she discloses prior experience of vaginal penetration, although not the 
particulars (p.133). Stoller summarises that for three years before the occasion of anal rape 
“…she had been having sexual experiences, ranging from being fondled to intercourse, with 
older boys and adult men” (p.135). He reiterates that “a grandfather, two uncles, and several 
strangers had already had intercourse with her by the time she was eight…” (p.278). Of the 
uncles, outside of this statement by Stoller, there is no supporting mention of childhood 
molestation. What is recorded is that one ‘slept with her’ when she was around thirteen (p.241, 
243), and that the other later ‘screwed her’ at eighteen to as Mrs. G says “prove to me that I 
wasn’t homosexual” (p.243). Mrs. G also participated in two pornographic films (p.54), Stoller 
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describing how at age eleven or twelve she was groomed for her role with pornographic 
material (p.278). 
 
Affective State    
Mrs. G equates men, and specifically the fact of possessing a penis with strength, 
invulnerability, independence and competence (p.13, 19, 26, 38, 46, 47, 64, 280). She speaks 
about the penis in glowing terms, saying that when she sees a particularly beautiful erect 
example, she wishes it could be hers (p.24). As she puts it, “a penis means strength…what’s a 
bigger word than strength? What’s the biggest word you can think of that means strength? 
That’s what an erect penis means to me” (p.24).   
While often idealizing and coveting the penis, at other times Mrs. G swings towards 
denigration (p.19, 24). She notes in passing for instance that “a penis is nothing” [and has no 
value beyond] shooting sperm into somebody to make them have a baby” (p.19). On a more 
personal note she says that she hates it for what it does to her and that actually it is repulsive 
(p.24). She saves her most dismissive diatribe for the non-erect penis, saying “…what does it 
look like? Nothing – just a piece of flesh – nothing. How can a man look masculine with a 
nonerect penis? It’s funny-looking. It doesn’t do a thing for me. A piece of wet spaghetti. A 
wilted flower. A penis is wrinkled. Have you ever seen a tomato worm…” (p.24). The 
denigration of the penis also extends to men more broadly often taking the form of treating 
them as interchangeable (215, 280, 281, 338).     
When considering the nature of Mrs. G’s affective engagement with sex and the male 
sexual object an immediate complication arises from Mrs. G’s long-standing delusional belief, 
that she herself has an internal ever-erect penis (p.16, 18, 26, 38, 46, 47). The possession of a 
penis is relevant under this heading because it impacts Mrs. G’s affective experience of having 
sex with a man where this involves penetration. Mrs. G knows rationally, while conversing 
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with Stoller, that at times of being penetrated that is what occurs. In these exchanges with 
Stoller her first obstacle with respect to reality testing is therefore getting her penis out of the 
way. Mrs. G solves this dilemma by noting that her penis travels between her stomach, pelvis 
and vagina, and that during penetration it probably moves into her pelvic region (p.16, 18). 
Mrs. G’s recognition of the standard mechanics involved in penetration oscillates, and perhaps 
reflects the fact that it is incompatible with her experience where reality-based physical 
sensations during penetration are detached from awareness. In her own words, “The only time 
I ever remember feeling my vagina is when I give birth to a baby. When I’m sitting here thinking 
about having intercourse, I think about the penis. I don’t think about a man putting his prick 
in my vagina. I think about having a penis, and I try to…I’m sitting here thinking about [it]… 
I do not feel my vagina. I don’t think about that” (p.18). Given this, it is initially surprising that 
Mrs. G nevertheless reports climaxing easily and seemingly enjoys the moment of orgasm 
(p.18, 278). As we will see however it is probable that it is precisely because she possesses a 
penis that she is able to find some satisfaction in sex, rather than in spite of it.           
At a late point in treatment, Mrs. G questions her motives, and specifically the place of 
pleasure, in relation to sex with men. In her words, “I was thinking about all the men I screwed, 
and you know it wasn’t something I wanted to do – it was something I had to do. I don’t 
understand that, why I had to do that” (p.57-8). At an earlier point in the treatment, Mrs. G 
gives us insight into what sex would feel like, with an awareness of being penetrated and 
without her penis. Here, following Stoller’s scepticism, she puts the existence of her penis to 
the test by having intercourse with a man who was “just somebody…hanging around” (p.18). 
Before intercourse she feels inside herself, testing for her penis, and finds nothing, “no penis” 
(p.18). The outcome during sex, in Mrs. G’s words, is that “I got scared…I thought he was 
killing me, because I felt his penis in me, and I felt like I was going to choke to death or he was 
stabbing me or something…” (p.18). Mrs. G continues, “I wanted him to get up. To get out of 
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me. It hurt. It was terrible…” (p.19). This is the experience that Mrs. G’s penis protects her 
from, but there are ‘side-effects’. Stoller describes her usual experience of sex as akin to a duel 
(p.16) with Mrs. G in agreement, and elaborating at another point that each time she had sex 
with a man she proved the ‘better man’, and would then discard the loser, replacing him with 
another candidate (p.16). In Stollers words, Mrs. G’s “purpose has been to outscrew the 
strangers, and she has invariably succeeded” (p.279). At one point Mrs. G identifies rage as 
an underlying motivator in her sexual exploits. I her words, “men that I’ve screwed – I can’t 
even think of their names. I was killing them…I was killing them…Jesus Christ, that’s so awful, 
just so awful” (p.215).  
The delusion of a penis is seemingly a defensive move that shifts the experience of sex 
from one of terror and vulnerability, to that of mastery and victory. With the shift Mrs. G 
maintains the ability to climax, although not the feelings of potential intimacy which could 
proceed it.     
At a late point in treatment, Mrs. G sums up what used to motivate her sexual exploits 
“…it wasn’t necessarily something that I wanted to do or needed…yeah, I needed to do it…go 
out and pick up a man in a bar and go to bed with him, not because I was feeling excited or 
anything else, but it was kind of a compulsive thing…and I don’t know what stopped it, but I 
don’t do it any more” (p.265).   
 
Affective State Directed at the Traumatising Object  
One of the barriers to understanding Mrs. G’s affective response to the traumatising object is a 
marked absence of statements about her emotions in relation to abuse and to the abuser. For 
the most part Mrs. G struggles to even know that what happened was bad or wrong. This does 
however change in the latter parts of treatment, where Mrs. G says the following. “Those 
men…They always say, ‘We’re not going to hurt you.’…What did they do? …they hurt me 
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because I was a girl…remember that man…he took me in that room and he hurt me…Liars! 
Pricks! There isn’t one man in the whole world who wouldn’t hurt you if he had the 
opportunity…I needed…the pain, but I didn’t need the lies” (p.338).         
 
Effect of the Sexual Encounter   
As is the case with sexual abuse, Mrs. G struggles to know when a sexual encounter is harmful 
or bad for her. As she says about her sexual exploits at thirteen, “…nobody ever told me it was 
a bad thing to do to screw boys…” (p.216). She repeats this again “nobody ever told me about 
that. About screwing boys…I never knew you’re not supposed to do that…” (p.257). In the late 
stages of treatment, she can see that she “…was exposing [herself] to all sorts of dangerous 
situations” (p.325).  
One likely outcome of Mrs. G’s sexual exploits, given her pattern of treating men as 
interchangeable (p.215, 280, 281, 338), is that she cannot know men as individuals; she cannot 
sustain a position where negative and positive characteristics live side-by-side and go towards 
making up the whole of a specific individual. As she says, “I really don’t even know what a 
man is; I just really never knew a man. I had all these ideas about what a man was…” (p.280).  
      
Effect of the Traumatising Encounter  
As stated, Mrs. G was anally raped by a stranger at around the age of ten. The case study goes 
into detail about the life-long impact it had on her, with one outcome being “a chronic delusion 
with which she lived so continuously that it came to be felt as simply a part of herself” (p.126). 
The recollection of the rape – Mrs. G having repressed it – is prompted by a rectal examination 
due to symptoms of spontaneous rectal bleeding, during a period of hospitalization as an 
inpatient. The initial threat of the examination pushes Mrs. G into psychosis with the actual 
examination leaving her in a state of extreme emotional distress. At first, she struggles to know 
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why she is affected so strongly, feeling only that what happened (the examination) was bad 
(p.128). She then describes what is in fact a reoccurring experience more fully, saying 
“sometimes I think things are bad. I don’t know why I think they’re bad, but when I think 
something’s bad, I vomit and I get scared and I feel shaky inside…I don’t know why…I don’t 
want anyone to touch my rectum” (p.128). In dialogue with Stoller, Mrs. G eventually 
associates to the rape where in her words “a man at the park…did something to my rectum…he 
made it bleed” (p.129). In terms of the identifiable impact upon Mrs. G, we find that one 
ongoing consequence has been that often before intercourse with men, there is a moment where 
she expects a repeat experience of anal rape (p.131). She also speaks of always ‘feeling dirty’ 
and finally of what proves to be a long-standing delusional belief about brain injury and 
impairment (p.132). Concerning the latter, Mrs. G believes that she was contaminated by her 
rapist’s sperm, which travelled up into her brain and caused it to rot. In her words, “Sperm. 
Little tiny bugs that can get up into your brain. Like worms. It’s rotting in there…worms in my 
head…flies eating my brain” (p.132). Mrs G describes the state of her brain, “I know it’s rotted. 
I don’t have a picture of it – I know it’s rotted! I just know that…It smells, and it’s rotten…” 
(p.132). She reports the impact, “I can’t read right, you know; I can’t retain what I read very 
well, and I try…Maybe it [brain] is getting smaller in size” (p.132).        
Furthermore, Stoller highlights a predisposition towards sexual compliancy in Mrs. G, 
summarizing that she put men’s needs before her own, cooperating and encouraging in what 
often amounted to her own abuse (p.130, 135, 243, 278, 279). Mrs. G confirms this inclination 
and her confusion over it, saying, “I’m thinking about a time when I was six or seven years old 
and there was this guy. He didn’t screw me though; he just fondled me, but I went back. See, if 
it hadn’t been me, I wouldn’t have gone near him again; but I went back. Why would I do that” 
(p.20). The closest Mrs. G herself comes to an answer for why she repeatedly ‘goes back’ is 
perhaps found in the epilogue. Here she writes, “Someday I’ll tell…about the pain that makes 
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me hurt myself; it makes me go out and fuck dirty old men and…It’s just a strange pain; it’s 
like a migraine headache…And sometimes I scream and scream, but it doesn’t help…But if I 
hurt myself or if I let somebody hurt me or if somebody is good to me, or, you know, if somebody 
shows me that they love me, then the pain goes away for a little while; but it always comes 
back” (p.343). 
 
RC Identification  
In beginning with Mrs. G’s consensual encounters, we can note that she is aware of the 
unconscious and compulsive nature of her sexual exploits. She states that it was not desire or 
pleasure which motivated her but some urge which she cannot properly define. The urge 
compels Mrs. G towards sex, but once in the act, a distortion of reality is required to negate 
feelings of vulnerability and terror. The outcome is the maintenance of a hallucinatory delusion, 
that of possessing a penis, and an inability to experience penetration along with the intimacy 
contingent upon it. Sex is seemingly defined as competition, with Mrs. G being uninterested in 
the individuality of her faceless ‘opponents’. One consequence which she acknowledges, is an 
inability to understand or know men. Another, is her admission that she repeatedly exposed 
herself to danger and that her promiscuity, especially when young, was likely damaging.                     
Some of the recorded consequences of sexual abuse are an ongoing reliance on repression as a 
defensive measure, periodic psychological reliving of traumatic experience cued by associative 
sensory stimulation, longstanding integrated delusional beliefs, and poor self-image. Of 
particular relevance to RC, is the observation that Mrs. G facilitated her own abuse both 
through a marked compliancy and due to her tendency to ‘go back’. As with her less obviously 
traumatic sexual encounters, Mrs. G struggles to identify why she did this – i.e., she was driven 
by an unconscious impulse.            
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Female Relationships   
 
Object Nature   
Stoller tells us that Mrs. G’s first genital homosexual experiences occurred around age eleven 
or twelve (p.275). Continuing with her history, we learn that at fifteen while in juvenile hall, 
Mrs. G was part of a microculture defined by paring off and mock marriage ceremonies 
between girls. At this point in her life she could not tolerate her body being touched by a female 
and although she had sex it was not felt to be as important as the relationship (p.275-6). Stoller 
says that by her early twenties Mrs. G had had over twenty homosexual affairs (p.54) and that 
a regular, although simultaneously denied, homosexual life began in earnest from this point 
(p.276). Stoller summarises her object preferences; “she wished her partner to be a feminine 
woman younger than herself. The girl had to be ripe, that is, transmitting a sense – even if 
unaware of it – of wanting sexual relations, of wanting to be loved, and to have children. She 
would have long hair, feminine dress and demeaner, softness and delicacy, and apparently 
exclusively heterosexual interests; it was essential…that not the slightest hint of homosexuality 
appear in the girl’s behaviour…” (p.276). The requirement of an absence of homosexual 
indicators and of motherhood are confirmed at other points (p.250, 290). Stoller notes that some 
of her preferences changed in response to therapeutic progression, allowing Mrs. G to 
eventually for instance have sexual encounters with women who were mothers (p.297).  
The nature of the sexual act – what Mrs. G was capable of, and found pleasurable – is another 
area that changed with the progression of therapy. Mrs. G seems to have had an ongoing 
intolerance for being touched sexually (p.140, 249, 276-8, 285, 299, 332). Initially her focus is 
on the other; taking pleasure in the other’s body and beauty and insuring their gratification 
(p.250,276-7, 291, 294, 298). In line with this she would characteristically delay the moment 
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of her own orgasm until the other was satisfied, while placing the most importance on the non-
erotic embraces that followed sex (p.250, 277-8, 298, 299). Speaking of Mrs. G’s sexual 
development, Stoller tells us that “only late in the treatment did she recognise how exciting it 
was for a woman to caress her, especially her breasts and genitals” (p.277). Mrs. G reports on 
a sexual encounter late in the treatment which was uncomplicated and enjoyable, saying that 
perhaps it was possible because she “felt stronger and more capable of being more receptive” 
(p.301).    
 
Affective State  
In distinction to her idealized assessment of men, Mrs. G maintains an ongoing perception of 
women as disgusting, vulnerable, weak and innately dishonest (p.45, 64, 229). While 
experiencing such aversion, she at the same time admits to wanting to get close to women. In 
her words, “I like to go to bed with girls. Because I like to touch them and I like to hold them 
and things like that” (p.285). Mrs. G likens her need to an addiction: “I had to do it. I couldn’t 
help doing it…I have to do that thing because it gives me strength to go on for more days…It’s 
like being addicted, like when you use heroin and you take a fix and you go along and you’re 
O.K.; and sometimes you’re better than O.K.: you feel real good…” (p.254). It is however 
unclear what specifically it is about the encounter that is desired; that has the power to replenish 
and strengthen. She admits to a degree of sexual excitement in phantasy (p.39) but with the 
qualification that what is foremost in her mind during sex is always giving pleasure (p.295), 
and that it is only after this that she receives her reward – cuddling, holding, embracing. She 
describes sexual encounters with women thus, “I get kind of frantic. It’s not sexual stimulation; 
it’s kind of a…like I want to hurry up and have it over with, and yet I want her to enjoy it so 
much that when she’s through she’s going to give herself to me – she’s not going to give herself 
to me when we’re having sexual relations, she’s receiving…and when that’s done, then I get to 
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have her for myself…I think about being…warm and being tight…no…being closer…” (p.298). 
Mrs. G confirms, “The best part comes after she has had the orgasm and wants to hold me 
close…” (p.299).  
Strong emotional reactions which generate violence or vomiting are another feature of 
Mrs. G’s sexual encounter with women (p.250, 288, 297, 298-9, 301). Mrs. G gives a detailed 
example of one occasion in which she allowed herself to be touched; another experiment 
precipitated by treatment. She says, “I did let her touch me…and then I got so angry I almost 
killed her. I wanted to kill her. I just wanted to smash her. So I beat the shit out of her and left 
her there. I don’t even know if she got home” (p.288). Mrs. G explains that the experience of 
being touched made her furious and sick to her stomach, and that what added to her anger was 
knowing that she liked it (p.288-9). Of vomiting, Mrs. G describes throwing up on women, and 
in private on her way home following sex (p.297-8, 301). Mrs. G notes a further aspect of her 
treatment of women, saying “I like to hurt them – not physically” (p.285). She gives the 
example of T, who was overly conscious of her weight and who Mrs. G would put-down by 
telling her that she would look better if she “weren’t so goddamned fat” (p.286).     
Mrs. G admits to being frightened by women; both in day-to-day interpersonal 
encounters and in sexual ones (p.25, 26, 47, 292, 298, 301). Concerning the latter, her fear 
seems to centre on the feelings they evoke, and on the fact that having such feelings defines 
her as homosexual. As she says, “what I was doing and what I was feeling was so frightening 
to me… I think one of the biggest things that kept me from being a homosexual was my children. 
I never wanted my children to know that I had homosexual feelings” (p.292). It is here that 
Mrs. G’s penis again comes to the rescue; its possession defining her desire as heterosexual 
(p.277, 285-7). As an example, she speaks about needing her penis to protect against feelings 
while with a nurse who she was fond of, imagining that if her penis were not there to create the 
illusion of a heterosexual encounter the nurse would be “very appalled and very disgusted” 
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(p.25). In daily interpersonal interaction with women Mrs. G again needs her penis, here to 
fend off feelings of uncertainty and inferiority (p.26, 47, 277).  
 
Effect of Sexual Encounters and Short-lived Relationships   
We saw above that sex with women fulfilled a need in Mrs. G, leaving her revitalized, 
sometimes happier, and generally more able to cope. It was also shown that violence and 
vomiting were an outcome. These negative components occur at the point of termination of her 
sexual engagements and relationships, and if there is one constant it is that Mrs. G invariably 
leaves (p.267, 277, 288, 293-4, 299, 300). She describes what it could be like for her following 
sex; the urge to escape, “I didn’t want to be in that room, and I didn’t want to have anything 
to do with the whole situation. And I was sick and I wanted to get out of there. I told her to get 
away from me. She just wanted more. So I shoved her…and then I hit her. In the face…” 
(p.288). Commenting on the reoccurring flight from intimate relations with women, Stoller 
tells Mrs. G, “Every time you had a homosexual relation with a woman, you moved out the 
next day. You ran away, moved to another town” (p.293). Mrs. G embroiders, saying, 
“…running away is kind of like holding up a gas station and not staying at the scene of the 
crime but removing yourself as fast and as far away as possible. Going to bed and leaving a 
woman is just about the same thing” (p.299). At a late point in treatment Mrs. G reflects on the 
damage she did to herself, saying, “being crazy after being with a woman spoiled all the good 
things…all the warmth and good feeling was spoiled. It really wasn’t necessary to do that. I 
wonder why I thought it was necessary” (p.300). Stoller tells us that the ‘craziness’ Mrs. G 
mentions sometimes took more extreme forms than those already addressed, resulting in 
murderous-suicidal psychological states and attempts (p.135-6, 271, 277).  
Stoller believes that Mrs. G used marriage as a flight from homosexuality (294). There 
is some support from Mrs. G for this conclusion, although it is confined to a single statement. 
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Mrs. G tells us that after she lived with a woman for eight months she had to leave because of 
feeling dependant. She then confirms “that’s why I married Bill…[and] I married my previous 
husband because my mother accused me of being homosexual” (p.294). 
 
RC Identification  
As with men, there are limits set on Mrs. G’s ability to engage fully in sexual intimacy with 
women. She biases the other’s sexual pleasure and satisfaction over her own, delaying her 
orgasm and denying her partner the means to reciprocate – touch. Mrs. G in a sense thereby 
bypasses the sexual act, at least in terms of its capacity to affect her as the recipient of pleasure, 
her objective being the non-erotic physical intimacy which follows. Mrs. G knows that by 
providing satisfaction to the other she is able to earn her objective in a sort of trade, but she 
does not question the fact of her own sexual gratification being omitted in the transaction; the 
issue is not consciously reflected on. She also struggles to define what she gets from these non-
erotic embraces, commenting only on a feeling of warmth and closeness. Along with the 
qualification that sexual desire is not a central impetus, she likens her need to an addiction and 
therefore as being beyond her control; compulsive in nature.          
Mrs. G’s sexual encounters result in nausea, vomiting and violence. Alongside this, 
there is a desperate need to escape and invariably the realised flight. Mrs. G does not understand 
why these responses repeatedly occur, but they are painful, and she knows destructive.         
 
 
Question of Mrs. G’s Sexuality  
Could it be, as Stoller seems very much to conclude, that much of Mrs. G’s behaviour is 
straightforwardly explainable by her inability to accept her homosexuality (p.225, 249-50, 271, 
278, 291, 294)? I have two objections to this argument. Firstly, where Mrs. G is concerned I 
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am not convinced by the aptness of the designate homosexual, in the absolutist sense, and 
secondly even if it is justified, this does not mean that all her behaviour is thereby explainable 
by recourse to her sexuality. Concerning the first objection, to my mind, there is nothing in the 
case study which justifies the term homosexual over for instance that of bisexual. As Mrs. G 
says “I’m somebody who sometimes likes women and sometimes doesn’t; who sometimes likes 
men and sometimes doesn’t…” (p.25). At other points it is true that Mrs. G does confirm her 
homosexuality (p.262, 332-3). My reticence over accepting these statements as conclusive, 
results from the suspicion that it is more Stoller’s voice that we hear at such moments than Mrs. 
G’s. Stoller expends a great amount of time and effort trying to convince Mrs. G that she is 
rightly described as homosexual, exclusively homosexual, and there is for me a strong 
suspicion that in the end he simply batters her into submission (39, 285-7, 289-91, 294). In the 
epilogue, where Mrs. G reflects on the treatment and therapeutic relationship she makes the 
following condemnation, “I think there were times that you pushed me into craziness that 
wasn’t necessary, and I suffered a lot because of that. God! When we were discussing 
homosexuality, for instance, and you would make me say things that you knew would upset 
me…but you insisted on my saying it…I think maybe I could have been spared that…It was 
never necessary to sit in that chair and say “I am a homosexual”” (p.332). Mrs. G now 
comments on my second objection saying that although Stoller may have been right about her 
being homosexual, he was mistaken to conclude that her pathology necessarily resulted from 
that fact. As an example, she says that perhaps instead of forcing her to state her sexuality, they 
could have proceeded differently, “I think we could have maybe started out by discussing my 
body. Since I’ve been a little girl…I always thought mine was different. Just like not being able 
to stand having my breasts touched. I thought my breasts were different, and I didn’t want 
anybody to touch them to find out” (p.332).    
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The Search for Necessary Conditions  
 
I begin with an analysis of Mrs. G’s relationship to both her parents, and then consider how the 
features identified there, manifest in her relationships.     
 
Father  
One of the defining features of Mrs. G and her father’s relationship is his absence (p.9, 10, 25, 
145, 147, 195, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 345). Being a career soldier, he was often 
away for extended periods, sometimes for years at a time (p.9, 234). Mrs. G admits however, 
that even when work permitted greater contact with the family, her father could not tolerate 
more than a few days at a time (p.195, 234). A tour in Korea leaves him with what we assume 
must be post-traumatic stress disorder, propelling him into alcoholism and periodic psychiatric 
hospitalizations (p.233, 236, 237). Mrs. G’s parents eventually divorce when she is fifteen, and 
her father later remarries, having a child with his new wife (p.10, 236). Mrs. G sums up the 
aforementioned, “I went to bed and when I got up he was gone and I didn’t see him again for 
almost five years. He had gone to Korea, been wounded, taken prisoner, returned, divorced 
and remarried and I was never told…The next time I saw him he had a new wife and a baby 
girl, was drunk ¾ of the time…” (p.236). It is possible to picture his eventual suicide, at least 
from a certain perspective as his greatest and final abandonment of her. As Stoller says to Mrs. 
G “From your point of view as a little girl and as his daughter and as somebody who was just 
aching for him all your life, what he did was: he abandoned you…” (p.239). She replies, 
“permanently…I always asked him to take me with him, and he never could” (p.239). Another 
important feature of their relationship, the other side of the coin so to speak, is that when Mrs. 
G’s father was present he could be warm, attentive, engaging, entertaining and loving (p.25, 
67,186, 195, 234, 236, 241, 244). Stoller adds the qualification that “perhaps his lovingness 
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would not have been so complete if it had not been intermittent…” (p.195). He is probably 
right, but for Mrs. G it was nevertheless sadly the fullest experience of love she had. In her 
words, “I really don’t have as much of my mother as I had of my father. Although my father 
was never there…when I had him there, I had all of him” (p.246).  
In identifying the intrapsychic dynamics, and ultimately the object relational 
components, which operate in Mrs. G’s romantic relationships, we start with an assessment of 
how she dealt with the contradiction and confusion of her father’s intermittent love. When 
Stoller first meets Mrs. G she tells him that she had only seen her father twice in the last four 
years. He asks if she misses him and she replies, “no, I don’t miss anybody” (p.10). This is an 
aspect of Mrs. G’s adaptive response to the aforementioned contradiction; denial and repression 
are employed to maintain the belief that her father’s absences did not and do not affect her 
(p.244). It is most clearly illustrated in relation to his death, with Stoller confirming that Mrs. 
G had not fully acknowledged her father’s death and the finality of his absence; she had not 
grieved (p.97, 212, 215, 237, 239, 240). In Mrs. G’s words, “I think he is dead. I went to the 
funeral. Yet I find myself waiting for him…” (p.97). And, at another point when Stoller pushes 
her she replies, “why should I grieve for him? …I don’t feel a thing” (p.239). An additional, 
and perhaps more prominent defence mechanism is idealization (p.67, 233, 236, 237, 238, 240, 
241, 242, 258), with some of the more noticeable ‘fabrications’ being Mrs. G’s description of 
her father as entrepreneurial, a hero, protective, dependable, honest and as wanting to be with 
his children. We also find that Mrs. G repeatedly defends him, saying that he was nice and not 
a bad man (p.9, 10, 67, 235, 258).     
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The Denied Relationship  
I turn now to a delineation of the portions of experience which are negated by these defences. 
I.e., what is it that is made unconscious; what parts of herself and of her experience of the other 
are repressed and potentially split-off? Concerning her experience of self, we see as therapy 
progresses that what Mrs. G denies and represses is her suffering (p.147, 238, 239, 345), 
neediness (p.237, 238, 239, 240) and yearning (p.235, 237, 238, 239, 344), along with her 
confusion (p.97, 195, 234, 242), sense of betrayal (p.25, 195, 234, 236, 237, 242, 244, 344, 
351) and anger (p.25, 145, 147, 215, 238, 239, 344). These are expressed in one lament to 
Stoller where she says that her father promised “he would come and get me…But he never 
did…All the times he promised to get me – over an over again he did that to me – and over and 
over again I believed him…he was a liar. He lied all the time (p.238-9). We could say that 
broadly it is the experience of being helpless or powerless that is removed from memory and 
awareness (p.145, 238, 345). Where idealization and the obstruction of her father’s ‘true’ nature 
is concerned, we see that what is denied along with certain of his characteristics (p.195, 233, 
238, 240, 244) is most importantly his unreliability (p.109, 238, 239) and his lack of care 
(p.145, 344, 345, 238, 240, 244). As Mrs. G sums up, again an acknowledgement that occurs 
with the progression of treatment, “I did love my father. But he was a bastard…with his trips 
and wandering away. He didn’t care…He didn’t care” (p.25).  She later adds, “He wasn’t 
dependable. He was a stupid ass…and he never cared anything about his kids…He didn’t give 
a shit for any of us” (p.238). Mrs. G at one point confirms her ongoing reliance on idealization, 
commenting on the reason why she needed it and expressing resistance over relinquishing it. 
After being pressed by Stoller to reflect honestly about her father she exclaims, “why do you 
want me to say these things? I don’t want to say them. I need my father to be what he was. I 
always needed him. I didn’t have anybody else…And now you’re trying to take that away from 
me…It doesn’t make any difference what my father was. No, it doesn’t. He could have been the 
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biggest son-of-a-bitch in the world, and it doesn’t make any difference” (p.240). As an outcome 
of treatment Mrs. G eventually seems to arrive at a position of integration; she is able to see 
her father in a realistic manner while nevertheless retaining her love for him. She now describes 
him thus, “A simpleminded, silly, drunken son-of-a-bitch, that’s what my father was. Whom I 
loved very much” (p.244).  
 
Identification  
Before considering how these dynamics might operate in Mrs. G’s romantic relationships a 
final area to note is her probable identification with her father (p.9-10, 66-7, 206, 235, 239). 
Mrs. G’s mother repeatedly accuses her of being like him. As Mrs. G reports, “my mother says 
he’s crazy…and I am just like him…it used to bother me a whole lot because my mother would 
go around…saying he was a skunk, and he did this and he did that, and you are exactly like 
him…” (p.235). Mrs. G admits that they were similar in their appearance and behaviour, 
highlighting drinking and lying (p.10, 239). It is also clear that Mrs. G both approved of her 
father’s criminal activity and mirrored him in committing similar acts (p.66-7). Although we 
have no way of determining whether these similarities are down to identification rather than 
for instance inheritance, it is likely, given Mrs. G’s idealization of her father, that identification 
did contribute. It is certainly a conclusion which Stoller supports (235). As we will see, it also 
allows us to make sense of the differing intra and intersubjective dynamics which occur 
between Mrs. G and her father and between her and her partners.        
 
Manifestations in Relationships  
I now consider how the above relates to Mrs. G’s romantic relationships. In summary, we saw 
that the experience, and by implication the object relationship, which is repressed involves an 
ego fragment or self-image that suffers over, needs, yearns for, is angry at, feels confused and 
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betrayed by an unreliable and uncaring object. In general terms it is a relationship between a 
needy self and a rejecting object. This relational dynamic is observed in Mrs. G’s romantic 
relationships, but more often the converse is true, which is anticipated given the defence 
mechanisms she was shown to employ – the fact of repression, denial, idealization and 
identification. I will discuss the first dynamic below, but for now note that the second has 
previously been established in relation to Mrs. G’s male objects. In these relationships and 
encounters what Mrs. G repeatedly experiences and expresses is indifference. We may 
conclude that she therefore adopts the father’s position, that of the rejecting object, perhaps 
partly as a direct result of identifying with him.       
In her casual sexual encounters, idealization is however observed – echoing her feelings 
towards her father – but it is restricted to part-object relating or to an abstract sense of the 
object. Its focal point is the penis and what it represents – strength, vitality, etc. Mrs. G is here 
able to want, need, yearn and desire. She idealizes men from a ‘distance’, but this quickly shifts 
to denigration during interpersonal contact. It seems to break down when she gets close, 
especially when they show ‘weakness’, for instance that signified by a non-erect penis. Then 
too, Mrs. G ‘wins’, is ‘victorious’ during sex. Idealization initially places Mrs. G in a position 
akin to that of the repressed object relationship, where there is the threat of being 
pathetic/weak/helpless in relation to what she desires. Her response is identification, as she did 
with her father. The delusional possession of a penis is a defensive move that shifts the 
experience of sex from one of vulnerability, to that of mastery and victory. This reading allows 
us to better understand Mrs. G’s murderous response to Bill not allowing her to ‘fuck his lights 
out’ on their first night together (p.360).    
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Mother  
The central dynamics of the maternal relationship are less easily identified and isolated than 
those of the paternal, there being greater ambivalence, contradiction and complexity in the 
former. As a starting point, Mrs. G summarises that the relationship between her mother and 
her was not good (p.5, 333), and that the two of them could never ‘connect’ (p.53). As she puts 
it, they “weren’t on the same wave length” (p.333). She adds that her mother could not really 
‘get her’ nor did she understand or empathise with much of her behaviour and psychological 
turmoil (p.4, 229, 252). Elaborating, she says her mother was distant (p.266); that she never 
spoke to her or had time for her (p.248, 267, 351). In her words, “my mother was cold, only 
not cold like I am, but unresponding” (263). And, “If I was upset or hurt or confused or any 
of those things, I couldn’t go to my mother because my mother was too distant…” (p.266). Mrs. 
G concedes that some of her mother’s reserve may have been because she was frightened and 
overwhelmed by her (p.21, 253, 255, 256, 257, 264, 334). She also however believes that her 
mother simply did not like her (p.10, 221, 251, 257, 339), noting that from the first she wanted 
a boy (p.81, 196, 227, 229, 253, 260, 265). She reports too that her mother was often punishing, 
and both verbally and physically violent (p.38, 173, 221, 255, 335, 339, 351, 355). One of Mrs. 
G’s statements does however cast doubt on the charge of physical violence. She is musing 
about the possibility that she needed discipline in order to learn right from wrong, and says of 
her mother, “you know, she never hit me, never once did she ever hit me; and maybe I would 
have understood better. But she always said, ‘What have I done to deserve this?’ or ‘What did 
I do wrong to make you like this?’ And I didn’t know” (p.257). Additionally, Mrs. G blames 
her mother for abandoning her to relatives and multiple institutional settings. These include – 
either as a direct result of her mother’s actions or through neglect – reform school (p123, 253, 
256, 337, 340), jail (251, 340), a psychiatric hospital (p.5, 253, 256, 260, 340), and periodic 
stays with her grandmother during childhood (p.256). Commenting on the last, Mrs. G says, 
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“she did it over and over and over again. God! Sending me there. If I was bad, I got sent there. 
If I was good, I got sent home. It was like…your badness will last for three months and then 
you may go home. Or your badness may last for six months, and then you may go home…I 
never knew what I did that was so bad…” (p.336). Finally, the allegation which troubles Mrs. 
G most, is the belief that her mother got in the way of her own attempts to be a mother. Mrs. G 
claims that she coveted and tried to steal her children (74, 88, 91, 106, 221, 336, 337), made 
her give up children to adoption (p.74, 78, 337, 342), gave permission for her eventual 
sterilization (p.71, 258) and attempted to feminize her infant son (p.79, 80, 342).             
 
Object Choice  
Certain dynamics of the mother-daughter relationship are echoed more prominently in the 
phenomenology of Mrs. G’s romantic encounters with men than they are in those with women, 
while of other dynamics, the converse is true. I will begin with the male relationships and 
sexual encounters, where it is immediately apparent that there is a great deal of shared 
phenomenology between spousal and maternal relationships.  
We could lift many of Mrs. G’s grievances about her mother, near word for word and 
they would fit those outlined in the section on her husbands. The key ones are that the respective 
relationships were bad, and that her mother and husbands, especially Bill, were cold, 
unempathetic, distant and unapproachable. Additionally, there is a ‘poorness of fit’ and an 
inability to understand or get each other. Along with these features, Bill, like the mother is 
described as punishing. Mrs. G summarises that her mother did not love her as well as she 
should have. In her words to Stoller, “she always gave me just enough, just enough to make 
me hungry and to want more…have you ever been to the dog races and seen the electric rabbit? 
I always felt like that dog chasing the rabbit…I never could quite catch up to it” (p.333).  
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There is also the further matter of an intrenched power imbalance. Mrs. G’s mother, 
along with the husbands and fathers are figures who to varying degrees provide stability and 
security. This role was documented for the husbands and fathers, and Mrs. G informs us, shared 
by her mother (p.21, 127, 251, 252, 255, 265, 266). It is captured in the following report on a 
conversation between Mrs. G and her mother; “my mother was talking about all the times my 
father left her with five kids, and she had to go out and earn a living and buy clothes and 
provide food and be strong…” (p.21). Mrs. G gives specific examples, “…when I got arrested 
for checks she bailed me out of jail. And when I had illegitimate babies, she paid for my 
prenatal care and took care of the babies. And my car caught fire the other day…and she’s 
paying to have it fixed. There isn’t anything she wouldn’t do for me…”  (p.255). Mrs. G 
immediately however amends, “She drives me out of my mind. She makes me pay for it” 
(p.255). This outcome was another shown to be characteristic of her marriages, and we may 
picture the wider context as one of a power imbalance, resulting in a loss of identity. As Mrs. 
G reflects, “I wonder if my mother ever thought of me as a person…I’ve gotton the impression 
that at different times in my life she thought of me as different things…I just wonder if she ever 
wanted any part of me…or if she just did her duty” (p.229). The same accusation is levelled at 
Bill, with Mrs. G reflecting, “when I was married to Bill I really wasn’t anything…I had to 
find out who I was” (p.230). The loss of identity suffered by Mrs. G is related both to the 
presence of a power imbalance and to the ‘poorness of fit’ described above. Mrs. G chooses 
husbands and fathers who do not allow her to be ‘herself’ and do not understand her well 
enough due to differences in respective life experiences. As Stoller puts it, although Mrs. G 
tried to be ‘good’, “it was too much for her to be a middle-class housewife…” (p.167). Mrs. G 
highlights an inability to disagree with, or defend herself against her mother which speaks to 
both the loss of identity and the power imbalance (p.51, 58, 254, 255, 263, 266, 340, 356). In 
her words, “I have got to do what my mother tells me to do, and it just tears me up. That’s not 
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sad, it’s scary” (p.58). When she does eventually develop the capacity and courage to go 
against her mother, she says of one encounter where she openly disagreed, “I was so relieved; 
but I was so scared. And that happens to me every day, every single day. I can’t get away from 
her…I can’t do anything without her…” (p.255). We saw previously that Mrs. G suffered the 
same loss of autonomy in relation to Bill.  
Mrs. G here chooses a certain type of object – object choice is the mode of repetition 
and of externalization. The experience which is repeated in these relationships is one of never 
being able to be ‘with’ the object; she cannot get what she needs from the other, be seen for 
who she is, and furthermore loses the self to the other.    
 
Projective Identification  
The nature of Mrs. G’s objects does not however account for or explain these relational 
dynamics in full. There is the further matter of Mrs. G’s culpability, both where distance is 
concerned, but especially in some of the more actively hurtful or punishing behaviours 
observed. We saw for instance with Bill that his distance was in part a reaction to Mrs. G’s 
behaviour and treatment of him. The same was shown to be true of her mother. Mrs. G 
summarises a conversation between her and her mother which takes place twelve years after 
Stoller and she first meet, confirming the former point; “[my mother] was telling me that six 
months ago she couldn’t talk to me…she was afraid to talk to me…she’s not afraid of me any 
more” (p.21). Mrs. G admits that the change in their relationship was down to her ‘handling 
things differently’, ‘being more mature’, and ‘doing her best’ (p.263). She therefore concedes 
that her behaviour contributed to her mother’s inaccessibility. Concerning accusations of 
aggression and mistreatment, in both the case of Bill and her mother, Mrs. G admits that she 
provoked hostility. In her words, regarding Bill, “maybe he hurts me because I hurt him; in 
fact, I know that’s true…” (p.218). Of her mother: “maybe that’s why she put me in hospital 
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and put me in reform school and sent me to my grandmother and things like that, so I wouldn’t 
hurt her” (p.256). There is an anecdote that seems to capture what Mrs G is conceding. While 
summarizing a history of numerous road accidents, she reports the following: “Bill had just 
really fixed the bike up, painted the tank, put a new headlight on it and a new front fender and 
had it just beautiful. And he said, ‘O.K. Now you can’t ride it. Every time you get on it, 
something happens.’ And I said, ‘Bill, just let me ride it around the block once’; and he said, 
‘No, it’s beautiful now. You can’t ride it.’ And I said, ‘Just let me ride it around the block. 
Nothing will happen.’ So I went around the street, and it ran in front of a car, and the bike was 
demolished” (p.61). In summary, Mrs. G provokes both distance and hostility. The same active 
provocation applies to her relationships with the fathers. As Stoller tells us, “…once pregnant, 
she ended the relationship with the man, nastily so that he would be hurt and degraded” 
(p.281). In turning to the psychiatrist for instance, if the two different accounts are considered, 
Mrs. G’s first account can be seen as an act of ‘undoing’, going hand in hand with the active 
destruction of the relationship. In this version she treats him with what she believes is deserved 
indifference and disdain. Although some of this may be justified given the power imbalance, 
Mrs. G nevertheless, as with Bill and the motorcycle, betrays his trust and dismantles 
everything good outlined in the second account. The outcome is that he turns nasty and 
disappears from her life.         
We conclude therefore that in addition to object choice as a mode of externalization, 
Mrs. G also employs projective identification. given the understanding of projective 
identification outlined in the literature review and included in the hypothesis the two modes 
may be said to entail each other. Mrs. G rouses ‘existing identity fragments’ or ‘pre-existing 
introjective configurations’ in her objects.      
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Transference 
We may question the reality of Mrs. G’s claims of a loss of ‘voice’ and autonomy in relation 
to the husbands and fathers. There are for instance multiple illustrations of Bill’s knowledge, 
of Mrs. G and of what occurs between them, being negated; disregarded by her and supressed 
by him (p.100, 101, 145, 162). As Mrs G confirms, “…I just ignored what Bill knew” (p.101). 
And again, “I just ignored him, per usual…” (p.100) In respect of self-imposed censorship, 
she states, “…that was just the kind of person he was…he knew…but he didn’t say anything” 
(p.162). As a further example, “to this day Bill has never once asked me what I do when I’m 
out all night” (p.100). I would suspect therefore that a degree of Mrs. G’s experience of being 
silenced and controlled is down to transference.  
Another point of overlap between Bill and Mrs. G’s mother is that both are targets for 
her murderous impulses (Bill: p.74, 105, 176, 177, 184, 217, 357, 358, 360; Mrs. G’s mother: 
p.215, 340, 352, 355, 356). Through therapy Mrs G arrives at the admission, that while she 
often wished Bill dead, he did not deserve that outcome (p.218). Of Bill she says, “he’s never 
done anything to me that’s been that bad…” (p.218). A similar statement is made about her 
mother, “My mother never did anything bad to me…I think the worst thing my mother did was 
she wouldn’t let me have my father” (p.242). The last point about her father is important, 
because I believe that much of Mrs. G’s treatment of her mother and of her husbands involves 
displacement. What I am suggesting is that Mrs. G displaced much of the hurt, resentment, 
anger and ultimately aggression which she should have directed at her father onto her mother 
and later onto Bill. She chose the parent/partner who remained, who would not leave; the 
parent/partner who she could afford to mistreat. It may be that Mrs. G’s mother was aware of 
this tactic, if not of all its components than certainly of her daughter’s manifest inability to 
chastise her father, for she repeatedly implores her to both turn on her father and to hold him 
accountable (p.21, 196, 244, 258). Mrs. G steadfastly refused, explaining, “The only thing that 
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I can think of that she ever told me to do that I couldn’t do…there’s only one thing that she 
ever told me to do that I couldn’t do, and that was to dislike my father. I wasn’t able to do that, 
and I think she knows that I feel bad about that” (p.258).  
 
Expressions of the Denied Relationship    
I return now to the dynamic mentioned above; the identification of a relational dynamic 
between a needy self and a rejecting object. We have just seen that a portion of Mrs. G’s 
experience – where her mother, her husbands and the fathers of her children are concerned – 
can be attributed to object nature, but that much of that experience is also of her own making; 
a consequence of projective identification and transference. As argued, I would suggest that 
the source of some of these vicissitudes originates with the father. Perhaps for instance the 
feelings of abandonment, the perception that the other has no time for her and especially a 
quota of aggression and anger. In this sense we observe a self-perpetuated reexperiencing of 
elements of the denied object relationship. It is however far from a comprehensive reliving, 
and for that we must turn to her relationships with women.   
   
 
Women  
I turn now to Mrs. G’s sexual encounters with women, and note that a defining feature, which 
is central also with her mother, is an oscillation and conflict between disgust and desirability, 
or relatedly between violent rejection and intimacy. We saw previously, that Mrs. G maintains 
an intrenched perception of women as disgusting, vulnerable, weak and innately dishonest. 
This aversion was echoed in acts of uncontrollable vomiting and violence, which terminated in 
flights of escape. At the same time Mrs. G admits to a deep-seated need to get close to women, 
which she likens to an addiction. One of the central forms this ‘closeness’ takes, is the non-
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erotic embraces following sex, which Mrs. G. describes with the words ‘warm and tight’. These 
perceptions, responses and desires are repeated in relation to her mother (p.95, 218, 259, 344). 
After Stoller challenges Mrs. G’s classification of women as weak and vulnerable, inviting her 
to be more feminine, her immediate association is to her own mother. She replies in horror, 
“do you want me to be like my mother” (p.17)? The association is again expressed in the 
following, “…women are so disgusting, they just…they cry and…You know, my mother is a 
good example of a disgusting woman…There’s no honesty in women” (p.45). We find too that 
Mrs. G’s vomiting started with her mother, during childhood. She reports “…every time my 
mother would come near me I’d vomit on her…that’s when it started, when I started puking on 
my mother” (p.38). She confirms that it happened again, during treatment with Stoller; “When 
I saw her Tuesday, I threw up all over her. I am sure it gave her fond memories” (p.95). There 
are few illustrations of Mrs. G being physically violent towards her mother, although there are 
as previously indicated homicidal urges, and in one case she cuts her mother with a razorblade 
(p.351-356). On the side of desirability and intimacy, Mrs. G’s need for women was described 
as compulsive and this is seemingly true of her need for her mother too. She described it with 
the analogy of dog racing, likening her unsatisfied need to that of dogs chasing an electric 
rabbit. She embroiders saying her mother gave [her] just enough, just enough to make [her] 
hungry and to want more” (p.333). We find too, as with women, that one of Mrs. G’s strongest 
yearnings is to sleep alongside and be held by her mother. We learn from Mrs. G that, at thirty-
four years old, the time of writing, she often spent the night at her mother’s apartment and 
shared her bed (p.265). She says that before this, she slept with her mother ‘off and on’ until 
she married Bill, and that what she most got from it was comfort (p.266). The words ‘warm 
and tight’, her description of the feeling she gets from post-coital embraces, are echoed in one 
early experience with her mother. Mrs. G presents a recollected experience, in the first-person 
present tense, of her yearning to be held by her mother. She reports the following, “mama, can 
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I sleep with you tonight? ...I’m excited…Hold me close, Mama…I’ll just put my face on her 
breast. If I could just…If I could just get inside of her…It’s wet and warm inside…so I’ll make 
it wet and warm” (p.351). She urinates in the bed and on her mother, inciting fury. As she says, 
“now she’s angry again. Oh, God, I always make her angry. Just when it’s going well, I make 
her angry” (p.351). We here too then see a repetition of an attack on, and a destruction of, the 
desired object. The following statement about how she spoiled her encounters with women can 
therefore equally be said to apply to her mother: “being crazy after being with a woman spoiled 
all the good things…all the warmth and good feeling was spoiled. It really wasn’t necessary to 
do that. I wonder why I thought it was necessary” (p.300).  
 
Return of the Denied Relationship  
Mrs. G’s conflict between desirability and disgust, or intimacy and violent rejection, seems to 
centre on the issue of association and identification. If she gets too close to her female objects, 
her mother included, she fears being ‘contaminated’, ‘consumed’ and ultimately identified with 
them. Women therefore signal a return to the repressed configuration, placing her in position 
of vulnerability and weakness, a state she finds both terrifying and disgusting. Hence the frantic 
need to flee, underpinned by overwhelming emotional responses generating nausea, vomiting 
and violence. We can add that her inability to receive physical affection and sexual stimulation 
act to safeguard against this experience. The shift from a position of neediness and vulnerability 
to one of aggression and rejection, amounts ultimately to a shift in identification – from mother 
to father.   
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A Note on Abuse and Repetition  
Elements of the experience Mrs. G represses include suffering, confusion, a sense of betrayal, 
the experience of being helpless and powerless, along with anger over this. I have noted that 
these occurred in relation to her father but would reason that the same responses would likely 
be experienced over instances of abuse, particularly the occasions of sexual abuse Mrs. G 
suffered. What I am arguing for is the notion presented in the literature review, that of internal 
objects existing as complex composite structures, where experience of newly encountered 
objects is superimposed and partly fused with that of previous encounters. In short, I would 
reason that aspects of the experiences of abuse are superimposed on those which relate to the 
father, and furthermore that Mrs. G’s defensive strategies are a response to both; likewise, an 
instance of defensive strategies being fused with each other.           
 
 
Negation of Affect  
Finally, I would highlight an additional factor that no doubt assists in the denial of the repressed 
object relationship, that of a blanket negation of affect. At the best of times it is difficult to get 
a sense of Mrs. G’s emotional states. In respect of the content provided, this is because Mrs. G 
generally offers accounts of her behaviour, rather than a sense of the feelings which may 
underlie them. As an illustration, she acknowledges that she can be “…a very capable, 
vindictive, thoroughly nasty bitch if [Bill] pushes [her] (p.105) but says little about the emotion 
which may precipitate such behaviour.  On a psychological level, such omissions can in the 
first instance be put down to a general deadening or negation of affect. Stoller speaks of the 
pervasive and persistent ‘denial or repression of feeling’ (p.29, 65), saying that for years he 
“…despaired of getting her to know that she did feel…” (p.65). He elaborates on her direct 
affective experience saying that she had “no word for the feeling she had to avoid; it was not 
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sensed as fear, anxiety, sadness, grief, rage, guilt, or any other painful affect for which we have 
labels. She has never been able to put it more clearly than to say that she was driven 
to…behaviour to end the ‘excited sensation inside’…” (p.66). The matter is further complicated 
by fugue states and dissociative trends which at times approach pathology indicative of 
dissociative identity disorder. It is startling however that even when Stoller and Mrs. G 
meticulously retrace the steps of an event, that purportedly occurred under the dominance of a 
split off personality named Carrie, little evidence of emotional states is found. The event in 
question is Mrs. G’s burning of the garage and the psychotherapeutic ‘retracing’ may be 
understood as an attempt by Stoller to retrospectively reincorporate Mrs. G into the event. He 
gets Mrs. G to tentatively acknowledge that the aim of the act, previously omitted in her 
account, was to destroy Bill’s “prized political material. All his books” (p144). Stoller next 
suggests that she acted out of anger, but we are left with a sense of words being put into her 
mouth, and Mrs. G continues by retracting both the suggested aim (hurting Bill) and the 
supposed affective motivation (anger). In her words, “I don’t really know. I don’t have a feeling 
for it” (p.144). Later in the treatment, during a period where Carrie ‘takes over’ we hear that 
‘she’ acted out of a desire to be rid of Bill and that his inability to listen necessitated a ‘powerful 
signal’, but even here there is little in the way of affective disclosure (p.162).    
 
 
Consolidation and the Derived Hypothesis Following Analysis  
In the case of Mrs. G a repressed object relationship was identified which has its roots in the 
paternal relationship. What is split off and denied of her experience of self, is her suffering, 
neediness, yearning, along with her confusion, sense of betrayal and anger; broadly, the 
experience of being helpless or powerless. Of her experience of her father, it is fundamentally 
his unreliability and his lack of care. To achieve this outcome, in addition to the defence 
198 
 
mechanisms of repression and denial, Mrs. G was also shown to employ idealization and 
identification. It was furthermore suggested that later experiences of abuse would have been 
fused with or superimposed upon the elements which make up the ego or self-image 
component.    
Four types of romantic/sexual relationship were analysed. These were her husbands, 
her relationships with the fathers of her children, her casual sexual encounters and her relations 
with women. The phenomenology observed in the first two types, her longer-term relationships 
with men, was the same outside of the fact that she did not stay with the fathers once pregnant. 
The central dynamic observed in these relationships was that although Mrs. G experienced 
these men as rejecting – a portion of this being grounded in reality (object choice) – much of 
this was yet of her creation (PI and transference), she additionally being shown to repeatedly 
reject them. In the rejection we see the manifestation of the above-mentioned identification 
with the father.      
In her casual sexual encounters with men, it was seen that while Mrs. G treated them 
as interchangeable (a form of denigration), part-object idealization was also a feature, centred 
on the penis and on what it signifies for her – the qualities of strength, invulnerability, 
independence and competence. It was argued that being faced by these traits, replicates the 
experience of the denied relationship, and that to counter this, identification is again employed, 
this time resulting in Mrs. G’s delusional belief that she has an ever-erect penis. Armed thus, 
Mrs. G sexually competes, bests and discards her ‘opponent’. By doing so, she moves from a 
position of victim to perpetrator. To illustrate the impact, she has on her male sexual partners, 
we can recall Bill’s statement as reported by Mrs. G, “…he talked to me about the times when 
I get angry, and he said I’m vicious when I’m being hostile. He talked about going to bed with 
me, about whatever it is I do to him – I make him feel inadequate. He’s afraid to go to bed with 
me” (p.192). As suggested above, it is again likely that experiences of sexual abuse would have 
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been fused with the elements which make up the ego or self-image component. For an 
illustration of this point we can turn to the experiment where Mrs. G gives up the delusion of 
a penis and experiences penetration without that protection. In her words, “I got scared…I 
thought he was killing me, because I felt his penis in me, and I felt like I was going to choke to 
death or he was stabbing me or something…” (p.18). 
Turning to Mrs. G’s relations with women we observed a conflict, between on the one 
hand a desire to get close, perhaps even assimilate, and on the other a dread of being consumed 
and identified with them. Identification, for Mrs. G here amounts to an unqualified 
classification as vulnerable, weak and disgusting; her perception of women. It is worth 
highlighting that, in her sexual exploits with both men and women, although Mrs. G begins 
from different positions, initially part-idealizing men and denigrating women, schematically 
the encounters mirror each other at the point of the shift in relational dynamics from victim to 
perpetrator. The vulnerable position, though not present with women initially, is eventually 
also evoked with them, and it is here that the same shift occurs with both, that of 
overturning/negating the experience. With men she does this through ‘winning’, or denigrating 
them, with women through vomiting, violence, rejection and flight. Both furthermore, seem to 
be underpinned by a swing in identification; from her mother and the feminine to her father 
and the masculine.        
One central finding of the above is a consideration of the place of denigration, which 
has a far more eclipsing presence than it did in either of the previous cases. Mrs. G does not 
idealize her partners (husbands and fathers). What is observed instead is indifference and 
denigration.  This finding challenges the hypothesis about two forms of idealization 
determining the mode of externalization. Her denigration of her partners (husbands and fathers) 
primarily takes the form of indifference but also ‘pictures’ them as distant and hostile. On a 
conscious level her relationships do not matter; they have little value or meaning; she does not 
200 
 
care whether they start, continue or end. Projective identification and transference are the 
modes of externalization chiefly employed to achieve these ends. Her denigration of women is 
down to transference and projection. For Mrs. G sexual enjoyment is tantamount to 
identification and therefore places her in the position of a needy, disgusting, vulnerable, weak 
and dishonest self. To avoid this, she repeatedly destroys (a second stage of denigration) and 
flees from the object. Taking both her relationships to men and women into account we can 
summarise and state that Mrs. G employs denigration, via the mechanisms of transference, 
projection and projective identification to rid herself of the experience she suffered with her 
father. Idealization does not play a part, but because it did in the other cases the reformulated 
hypothesis reads as follows: ‘Idealization and denigration are central in reinforcing repression 
of unconscious object relationships. We can say that the modes of externalization often aim at 
or are used to ‘manufacture’ one or the other. 
The inclusion, in the hypothesis, of repetition being a defensive adaptation was again 
confirmed. This was most clearly seen in relation to men where what was repeated was Mrs. 
G’s undermining or curtailment of primitive idealization by identifying with the idealized 
object (penis and men in the abstract) and competing with them. The second repetition 
happened with women and centres on the shift from neediness and vulnerability to aggression 
and rejection. The third occurs in her ongoing rejection of her partners which is underpinned 
by her paternal identification.    
Outside of the above amendments, the RC definition and initial hypotheses remain 
unchanged as all conditions were confirmed. 
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Bullet Point Presentation of Findings in Relation to the Initial Hypothesis: Hypothesis 
Development     
Below, standard text indicates the initial hypotheses. Bold text indicates changes made as a 
result of findings and carried forward. A line through the text indicates that a statement has 
been invalidated. Bold italics indicate that a change has occurred in the case under 
consideration.    
 
The Repetition Compulsion Defined Following Case 3   
RC is defined by four descriptive criteria: 
 it is unconscious; characterized on an experiential level by a lack of conscious awareness or conscious 
rational deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its functioning are described, as being either 
broadly unconscious, or specifically, repressed, dissociated or ego dystonic. 
 it is a repetition of a past unpleasurable experience  
 it is unpleasurable because it is painful and damaging  
 RC should be thought of as the unconscious repetition of a ‘lived interpersonal situation’.     
In relation to the last point, RC concerns the repetition of an experience, rather than of cognition, and therefore 
does not include the kind of repetition viewed in obsessional neurosis. Cognitive repetition is furthermore 
excluded under the above RC definition, since it proceeds alongside an awareness of the fact of repetition. I.e. the 
patient suffering from obsessional thinking is keenly aware of the repetitive nature of his/her thought.  
 
Hypothesis Following Case 32  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
 
2 The hypothesis development across cases is reproduced as appendix b 
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valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached 
to internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely 
libidinal or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
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better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption 
is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is 
simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously 
chosen because of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
 
 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization (transference, projection, 
projective identification, object choice) will be identifiable in relation to the broader symptomatic 
picture, and that this variable is one which will act to reinforce repression of an unconscious object 
relationship. Idealization and denigration are central in reinforcing repression of unconscious object 
relationships. We can say that the modes of externalization often aim at or are used to ‘manufacture’ 
one or the other. This finding is in line with another, which states that RC is a repetition of a defensive 
adaptation rather than of a primary experience.  
 
Idealization, two forms of it, is recommended as the sought-after variable; object choice being central 
where ‘later idealization’ is observed, and the other modes required where ‘primitive idealization’ is 
seen.  
 
In the case of idealization, we can note additionally that object choice allows for ‘later idealization’, 
and that the other modes are required for ‘primitive idealization’.   
 
It is noted that object nature and/or a defensive adaptation to trauma or loss and/or the activation 
of a second object relationship may undermine or curtail episodes of primitive idealization. It is 
suggested that primitive idealization is inherently unstable and therefore that only later idealization 
indefinitely protects from knowledge of negative aspects of object nature.   
 
 A central aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable 
experience.     
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
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 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Ruti (2010) writes that RC “shapes the subject's destiny independently of its wilful efforts either 
to develop a character or to arrive at particular existential outcomes....Repetition 
compulsions...unfailingly guide the subject to specific goals, hopes, and modes of meeting the 
world at the expense of others, thereby ushering it onto a trajectory of distinctive 'fate', 
'fortune', or 'destiny'” (p.1114). There are two relevant aspects to this description. The first 
concerns an absence of agency; the inability to wilfully steer life in a chosen direction. The 
second implies a ‘foreign’ agency; as Ruti puts it, an 'other' which is distinct from conscious 
experience – hidden from its apprehension, resistant to its dictates and often opposed to its 
aims. In broad terms, this research has attempted to explore this paradox and to identify an 
agency that is complex enough to bring about outcomes described as fate, fortune or destiny; 
an agency that is for instance more than simplistically purposive, habitual or reactive.  
Orlandini (2004) notes that one of the major controversies raised by the literature on 
RC is whether it describes “...a broad range of dysfunctional repetitive behaviours, or only the 
repetition of severe traumatic experiences” (p.525). To contextualize my research, I want to 
highlight the presence of a core RC account that exists in the literature, which can be termed 
the trauma model. Van der Kolk & van der Hart (1991) state that the failure to organize 
traumatic experience on a linguistic level “...leaves it to be organized on a somatosensory or 
iconic level: as somatic sensations, behavioural reenactments, nightmares and flashbacks” 
(p.443). The experiential elements under consideration could therefore be said to consist of 
images, sensations and motoric action. One observation on the nature of motoric reenactment 
that I would like to highlight is the absence of an intersubjective dimension. In outlining Janet's 
understanding of the distinction between traumatic memory and normal memory Van der Kolk 
& van der Hart (1991) observe that traumatic memory (here memory as behavioural re-
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enactment) “has no social component; it is not addressed to anybody, the patient does not 
respond to anybody: it is a solitary activity” (p.431). They continue with the statement that 
“traumatic memory is produced by the mechanism which Janet called restitutio ad integrum. 
When one element of a traumatic experience is evoked [by an internal or external stimulus], all 
other elements follow automatically” (p.431). In other words, the type of repetitive activity 
under consideration has little intersubjective dimension beyond an initial receptivity to the 
environment as cueing or triggering devise.       
 In considering the dynamics of the identified elements, Ogden (1983) points out that 
mental representations cannot themselves think, respond, perceive or feel; psychological 
activities which are required for the attribution of dynamism. I am highlighting the perhaps 
obvious idea that mental representations cannot directly generate repetitive behaviour. Such 
behaviour in this context is reliant on the individual's response to representations of traumatic 
experience. As Sandler (1962) puts it, “the representational world is never an active agent – it 
is rather a set of indications which guides the ego to appropriate adaptive or defensive activity” 
(p.136).  Although I cannot here offer insight into the form of subsymbolic 'memory' I suspect 
that it is characterized by an equivalent absence of agency. I think the same is fairly self-evident 
where sensations are concerned. Motoric enactment does however imply activity and therefore 
potentially agency, but here I would stress that the type of activity as noted lacks an 
intersubjective dimension. 
Within this framework, repetition amounts largely to ‘automated repetition’, with the 
account describing habitual affective and behavioural stances that lack an intersubjective 
dimension beyond treating the other as response inducing stimulus. Returning to Ruti’s 
description, above, automated repetition certainly concerns an absence of agency, and although 
it also includes behaviour which is felt to be beyond the conscious control of the individual, 
something which could be seen as a 'foreign agency', it is one which lacks the complexity to 
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bring about outcomes described as fate, fortune or destiny. Such outcomes necessitate an 
agency which is more than just habitual and reactive.  
I am in agreement with Inderbitzin & Levy (1998) who are willing to concede that in 
certain rare cases a biologically based stereotyped repetitiveness can occur, but believe that 
“...the vast majority of repetitions acquire meaning and are dynamically motivated” (p.50). 
My feeling therefore has been, that although a trauma account has validity and applicability, 
there is a danger if it is accepted as the ‘whole story’. It is noteworthy that in instances of severe 
trauma one can still generally identify content concerned with the relational. Mollon for 
instance writes that “broadly speaking [sources of psychological pain]...are concerned either 
with sufferings related to love attachments (and the wish for love) or with narcissism – the 
image, evaluation and experience of self” (2002:3). My belief is that underlying mechanisms 
in RC concern innate attachment processes and their frustration during experiences of loss and 
trauma. I feel that the reason why Freud had difficulty in accounting for RC, is because it 
indicated the shift that Fairbairn (1941) would make, that from drive theory to object relations. 
It showed that object relations function on a fundamental level as a motivator of behaviour.  
 
 
Findings  
I would suggest that a key finding of the research is the statement that a central aspect of that 
which is repeated in RC, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable experience. This 
was not predicted in the literature review and therefore not included in the initial hypotheses. 
In considering the vicissitudes undergone by lived experience, due to processes of 
internalization, many authors (for instance Klein, 1930; Fairbairn, 1955; Ogden, 1983; 
Mitchell, 1981; Kernberg, 1984) do note that the products of internalization – what exists 
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internally in the form of an object relationship – will not be identical to what was experienced 
in reality. Given this assertion, it does follow, that what is externalized as repetition, would 
differ from any supposed initial experience. At question then, is the manner in which it differs, 
and what my research indicates, is that one way it diverges is that externalization takes the form 
of a defensive adaptation.    
It is worth recalling, that in each of the three case studies, the adaptation centres on 
aggression directed at the ‘wrong’ object; a substitute object that is undeserving. On a more 
abstract level, these attacks seem to have some relation to idealization and denigration. In 
Ernst’s case, attacking a substitute protects against denigrating the ‘ideal object’, and in 
Henry’s, against tarnishing the highly elevated and idealized object – a distinction that is 
captured by Kernberg’s (1975) notion of ‘later idealization’ and ‘primitive idealization’. For 
Mrs. G, attacks seemed to centre on a need to escape potential self-denigration. In her casual 
sexual encounters with men, they functioned to undermine a form of part-object ‘primitive 
idealization’, and thereby, in relation, elevate her. With women she fled a mirror image of 
herself as pathetic. With her partners, she ensured that she was never on the ‘wrong’ side of 
rejection and abandonment.          
We can add further that the four defensive procedures (transference, projection, 
projective identification and object choice) are implicated in these acts of idealization and 
denigration. In short, they are the components which go to making up the defensive adaptation, 
and manufacture the outcome of idealization or denigration.  
Having identified the varies elements of a dynamic intra and interpersonal situation, we 
are now faced with a question about how the parts relate to each other. For instance, what 
comes first, the defence mechanism or the aim of idealization or denigration? Depending on 
our answer here, a further question would be, how are the mechanisms related to each other? 
Do they act in consort, to produce a joint but singular outcome, or are we faced with a certain 
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randomness of aim, where each act with an individual innate motivation? To my thinking, the 
research seems to indicate a middle ground – between the conceptualization of a singular 
directive, and multiple individual aims – in so far as, what gives form or direction, to the entities 
involved, is the intrenchment of a specific adaptation. It is the adaptation that is repeated, and 
that provides constancy of outcome.  
 To spell my thinking out, yes there may for instance have been a conscious need, at one 
point, to denigrate a given object in order to protect another, or a view of the self, but I would 
reason that defence mechanisms eventually develop ‘a life of their own’. For example, a 
reliance on projection would have cumulative and holistic impacts for the psyche as a whole. 
Projection may require a certain shackling of one’s ability for self-reflection, and a cumulative 
impoverishment in that area, would in turn strengthen one’s capacity for, and perhaps reliance 
on projection. In this sense, a specific adaptation configuration, can be said to self-perpetuate 
its functioning.       
It could be argued that a variable which may impact on intrenched configuration, 
changing up the defence mechanisms at play, is external reality, specifically in relation to 
object choice and PI where the nature of objects is relevant. A further element might be 
maturation in respect of for instance self-knowledge and self-development. This is territory 
that Russel (2006) covers, with the statement that “the repetition compulsion contains the 
history of our losses, and the quest for a new relationship” (p.620). For him, RC, by attaching 
itself to a real external object, introduces the possibility of change – of relating in a different 
and non-repetitive manner to an object that must differ in some respects from past ones. RC is 
here understood as partly a new and personal creation, that combines a past traumatic 
experience with whatever current capacities the person has for healing and change. Although I 
have no doubt, that ‘hopeful’ repetitions of this kind do occur, I would add a note of caution, 
perhaps about their frequency, or simply about the complications involved. What the case 
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studies seem to indicate, again is the entrenchment of a given adaptation, and I would reason 
further that the defence mechanisms by their nature, resist nullification, and change to the 
configuration as a whole. As an illustration, what transference for instance, precisely does, is 
negate the possibility of ‘seeing’ the object for what it is. Under its domination, the introduction 
of a new and different object is largely immaterial. Considering object choice, as I have defined 
it, it again by nature, seeks after repetition.              
 
 
Causality in the Existing Literature    
I now return to the claim made in the introduction, that an object relations conceptualization of 
RC, the one hypothesised in this work, will be able to account for multiple causal explanations 
in the existing literature on RC.  
 
Expressions of Aggression 
Inderbitzin & Levy (1998) believe that “...the vast majority of repetitions acquire meaning and 
are dynamically motivated” (p.50). They suggest further, that many considerations of the role 
of trauma and its effects on mental functioning have failed to highlight the role of anger and 
aggression directed at the self or other, and emphasise that PTSD patients repeatedly enact roles 
of victim or victimizer. 'Re-experiences' of trauma that take the form of repetitive behaviour 
provide an aggressive outlet for the frustration and pain generated by traumatic experience. 
“The trauma appears to take on an instinct-like role that really belongs to the aggression 
created by the trauma” (p.41). Hidden aggressive aims and gratifications are thus seen by the 
authors as the central motivation behind re-experiences of trauma. Two forms of repetition 
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which would closely resemble the form of the initial trauma are instances of self-directed 
aggression and those that are based on identification with the aggressor. The authors also 
however include repetitions which are more adapted to the context of the individual's ongoing 
inter and intra-personal relations. Some examples include “...punishment of perpetrators by 
inducing guilt, demand for reparation, expression of entitlement, exploitation of others..., 
[etc.]” (p.41).  
It is immediately apparent, that the object relations RC framework, will have little 
difficulty accommodating this conceptualization. The framework sits comfortably with the 
statement that repetitions acquire meaning and are dynamically motivated. This was an element 
of the initial hypotheses and recurrently confirmed in the case studies. Accounting for the role 
of anger and aggression, directed at the self or other, was likewise repeatedly encountered. On 
a theoretical level it is explainable for instance by recourse to the activation of a split-off 
antilibidinal ego fragment, defences against the apprehension of a disowned self-image, 
identification with a rejecting object, and/or could involve the workings of any of the four 
defence mechanisms.       
 
Biased Assessments of the Environment 
Morehead (2002) grounds his account of RC in biological theory by viewing repetition as an 
instance of evolutionary adaptation to comparatively stable ancestral social environments. He 
argues that children were/are configured to take their early environment as indicative of future 
circumstances. Stability of patterns of object relations across the life-span, maximises chances 
of survival and reproduction because it qualifies as an instance of adaptation, given social 
homogeneity. RC represents a “mismatch between ancestral and modern social environments” 
(p.248), in so far as repetition becomes maladaptive only when adult social environments differ 
markedly from childhood ones, specifically if they are more benign. Morehead argues that 
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relational templates developed during childhood are compromise arrangements which balance 
the needs and wishes of the child against the particularities of social reality. They do not reflect 
ideal relationships but attempts to adapt to surrounding environments. It follows that negative 
patterns of relating would remain adaptive if conditions which brought them about remain 
stable. Absenting such stability, the inherited predisposition for repetition becomes 
maladaptive. The mechanisms involved in RC here consist of a disparity between relational 
templates and the environment they are meant to represent/predict.  
Again, the object relations RC framework accommodates these insights, since 
Morehead is simply proposing that evolutionary adaptation may have contributed to the rigidity 
or fixed nature of internal object relations; that there may have been a payoff given social 
homogeneity across the lifespan. If we think for instance of Mrs. G, she needed to idealize her 
father in order to preserve the relationship and quota of care and love she did receive. This 
response to her surroundings, would have continued to be adaptable, if the relationship had 
remained a central one throughout her lifespan.        
 
Compromise Formation  
Kubie (1941) argues, essentially that RC results from frustration of a demand. Here, a lived 
experience, the response of the other particularly in early childhood, is fundamental in terms 
of disallowing gratification or expression of frustration. Punishments, displeasure or counter-
threats instil fear of retaliation, while an empathic gentle obstruction produces fear of losing 
the other's love. Both may produce guilt and anger/hate and secondary guilt over the violent 
feelings. Kubie asks about the fate of repetitive needs which are blocked in this way, and writes 
that “clearly a state of internal conflict has been created which can no longer be discharged 
adequately in any way” (p.31). The only option is a compromise formation where disguised 
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and often unconscious substitutive discharge is balanced against the prospect of overt 
displeasure. “The repetition of one act thus becomes to the child the only safe and permissible 
expression of several things at once: original yearning; anger at the frustration; guilt both for 
yearning and the rage; fear both of retaliation and of its own resentments. It becomes the only 
possible compromise expression of all that the child feels...” (p.31). The total conflict, drawing 
on multiple sources of energy, is thus expressed in the repetitive act which makes it irresistible 
as a reflection of self and therefore uncontrollable. Kubie expands, saying that “....every 
neurotic symptom expresses several antithetical and irreconcilable purposes” (p.32). If one of 
the paired aims – for instance considering the pair of submission and defiance – are curtailed 
then the other is expressed in isolation, which is unendurable since both are required as an 
expression of the underlying conflict. There is therefore seldom “...an adequate dynamic or 
'economic' cause for stopping” (p.32). RC as he describes it, proceeds in this same manner, 
drawing on multiple aspects of a conflict which thus perpetuate its repetition. So long as the 
underlying need remains, neurotic behaviour by its nature can never bring satiation. 
Kubie’s thesis on the frustration of demand, covers the same ground as Fairbairn on 
compensation and protection of existing relationships in early childhood. What is missing is 
the proposal of internalization and structure formation, but the outcome of compromise is 
equivalent, as is the statement that repetition involves the expression of all that the individual 
feels. The difference between the two formulations, is that Fairbairn has outlined the mode by 
which, all that the individual feels, is carried forward.    
 
Analgesia Attainment  
Orlandini (2004) conceives of RC as “...made of (1) a painful and impossible desire and (2) a 
familiar kind of relief – analgesia by re-victimization” (p.537). Emphasis is placed on the 
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particular situation and specific emotional state present prior to repetitious behaviour. At such 
times there is the possibility or desire for overcoming a frustrating relational pattern; a need 
which is simultaneously experienced as an impossibility due to past experience. There is a 
conflict between the conviction of rejection and the desire for acceptance. The conviction is so 
strong that the only possible course is to destroy the pain inducing desire by 'deadening' it and 
so producing a state of analgesia. In one sense the harmful behaviour inflicted through re-
victimization is directly related to a lowering of the ability to desire some more positive 
alternative. The reality of the event makes evident that in relationships this and not a better 
alternative just is what happens.  
  The vicissitudes described by Orlandini are the same as those presented by Fairbairn, 
but as with Kubie, what is missing is an account of internalization and of structure formation. 
To emphasise the point, it can be recalled that Fairbairn’s term for the antilibidinal ego is the 
‘internal saboteur’, and that one of its propensities, is the maintenance of repression, via 
aggressive attacks on the libidinal ego. The outcome is a smothering of desire, need, longing, 
hope.      
 
Affect as a prime motivator  
The role of affect in the mechanisms of RC is given a prominent position by many authors in 
the field. Orlandini (2004) focuses on analgesia attainment in response to a painful and 
seemingly impossible desire. Van der Kolk (2007) provides an account of arousal dysregulation 
– the loss of ability to differentiate, identify and regulate affect – as a customary response to 
trauma and a cause of RC. Zulueta (1993), Shabad (1993) and Interbitzin & Levy (1998) speak 
of anger and of exporting pain outwards during the role shift from victim to aggressor. Wilson 
& Malatesta (1989) highlight the role of affectivity in primal repetition. The authors are 
speaking about the dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, and attempts to smother 
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it or to pass it on to another. 
Of particular interest is Russel's (2006) account of RC concerning the inseparable 
nature of affect and motivation. For him affects are object-seeking, and because they aim at, or 
wish for some specific external thing, they provide inbuilt intentionality. Kernberg (2009) 
supports this view in a paper on the death drive, saying that “affects are primary motivational 
systems [inciting] movement toward other objects or away from them” (p.1009-10). In this 
sense it is enough that individuals simply feel something in relation to another, without 
necessarily supposing an alternative motivation in bringing about repetitive experiences. The 
types of affect present as motivational vectors encountered in the literature are sexual desire 
(Armstrong-Perlman, 1991), yearning (Orlandini, 2004), attachment needs (van der Kolk, 
2007), aversion (Kubie, 1941) and aggression (Kubie, 1941; Zulueta, 1993; Shabad, 1993; 
Interbitzin & Levy). Conceiving of affect as the primary motivator in RC activity removes the 
need of a supervenient motivational aim towards restitution (Lipin, 1963; Cohen 1980; Bibring, 
1943; Russel, 2006). One supposes instead that while in the grips of RC activity individuals 
are simply feeling something in the same way that they felt it in the past (at the sight of initial 
trauma).  
 
Although the literature suggests that affect plays a central role in precipitating RC activity, it is 
largely silent concerning an account of how affects are 'carried forward'; the fact that they are 
as Kernberg (2009) notes usually embedded in mental representations. Kernberg describes this 
as “a cognitive organization of the context in which affects emerge” (p.1010). This is important 
because it goes towards understanding why one affect and not another is present in a given 
repetitive situation. It explores the question posed by Wilson & Malatesta (1989), “Is the 
seeking-after-repetition one of affective contours? Cognitive or form similarities? Smell or 
pheromone recognition? Behaviour? Critical moments? Modes of need gratification? Feelings 
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for another, feelings induced by another, thought or fantasies about, wishes for, or physical 
sensations induced by another? To clarify what is meant by the phrase 'repeat a relationship'” 
(p.268).  
For Kernberg (2009) the embedded nature of affect points to the primacy of object 
relations, and this is precisely what I am proposing with the object relations RC framework. 
The pre-eminence given to the role of affect as motivation, tallies well with the view of 
activated split-off ego fragments, that are attached to their objects with a singular ferocity.      
 
 
Other accounts  
Some accounts resist assimilation to an object relations framework because the language and 
concepts they employ are simply not comparable. Examples are van der Kolk (2007) on 
traumatic repetition; Lipin (1963) and Cohen (1980), with a focus on the abnormal registration 
of traumatic memory; Bibring (1943) on ‘working-off’ mechanisms of the ego. Other accounts, 
echo specific aspects of the object relations RC framework. Zulueta (1993) and Shabad (1993) 
for instance work with the notion of a role shift from victim to perpetrator, and Lipin (1963) 
distinguishes between patterns of RC that involve mechanisms akin to transference and 
projective identification.          
 
 
Limitations of the Method and Findings  
Cressey (1950, in Robinson, 1951) notes that practical certainty of outcomes, may be attained 
after a small number of cases has been examined, but the discovery of a single negative case 
disproves the explanation and requires a re-formulation. Cressey seems to be suggesting that it 
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is possible to reach a point of practical certainty that would allow for something akin to a truth 
claim. An immediate question here would be how do we decide on, that is quantify or measure, 
that which counts as practical? For my part, having analysed three case studies, I have little 
doubt that the hypothesis would have continued to develop with further cases. If there is a point 
of saturation, of practical certainty, then I do not feel it was reached. This would be a problem, 
if I were aiming at a version of a final statement in the positivist sense. As outlined in the 
methodology section, I instead see the research findings as amounting to a ‘living theory’, 
which will change with further research. Relatedly, as stated in the methodology section, 
generalization is a matter of theoretical generalization, that is generalization to a theory.    
 I would say that the most serious limitation of the research has to do with the use of 
pre-existing self-reports as data. Self-reports, by their nature, cannot be independently verified 
and so attempting to account for potential bias or even deception is a notorious ask, if not a 
tenuous proposal at best. Given the nature of the area explored, it is however difficult to see 
how this issue could be surmounted. A factor that is more amendable to a change, is author bias 
in respect of the use of pre-existing data. Conducting my own interviews would have provided 
me with an opportunity to monitor and minimise interviewer bias. I felt however, that this 
would be at the cost of losing the context of therapeutic engagement, and therefore the 
intersubjective processes and vicissitudes, which seldom occur with as much clarity, outside of 
such engagement. Audio recordings of therapy sessions would have been the next best thing, 
but as addressed in the methodology section, practical issues prohibited this.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
I will begin with an observation about the RC object relations model. The model is a synthesis 
between a largely Fairbairnian object relations framework, and the construct of RC, defined 
along fairly general lines. RC, as noted previously, is sometimes represented in object relations 
writing, and object relations theory is used at times to explicate RC activity. Although often 
stimulating and helpful, neither application has, however, been applied in a systematic manner, 
hence my decision to develop and outline a synthesis between the two. Highlighting the role 
of defence mechanisms, as part of an explicit conceptualization of the vicissitudes involved, is 
a key element of the synthesis, and one I arrived at gradually while reflecting on the detail that 
‘somehow’ internal object relationships needed to get ‘outside’ if they were identified as the 
underlying cause of RC.   
In this research project, the model was verified, tested and altered in relation to 
empirical observation. In terms of the broader utility of the model, I would suggest that it stands 
as a viable alternative to the trauma paradigm, which I consider to be the dominant, because 
most thoroughly developed, conceptualization of RC in the literature. It is also able to 
assimilate many alternative, existing, theoretical causal explanations of RC. I feel that my 
findings, which broadly amount to a defence of the RC object relations model, and specifically 
to its presentation in the form of a causal hypothesis, follow logically and coherently from the 
analysis procedure. I have provided a visible trail concerning how the findings were derived, 
and I have also discussed why the method of analysis was chosen over other methods, how it 
was implemented, and indicated some of the shortcomings of employing it.       
 Reflecting on the suitability of the research method, in relation to the area of interest, I 
would suggest that the complexity of RC as a construct, introduces too many variables for the 
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application to be ideal. One outcome, of the need to account for a multiplicity of variables, was 
that the analysis of each case became extremely time consuming. Time constraints, and a word 
count restriction, meant that I could not include further cases, which I think would have 
benefited the research. A more serious concern had to do with the practicalities of accounting 
for, and presenting all variables of interest. In short, on reflection, I do not believe I gave every 
variable, let us say entity, line of reason or series of occurrences, the full attention deserved, 
nor do a feel that they were integrated, one with the other, to my satisfaction. I would suspect 
that the method could be applied to far more straightforward phenomena, with greater ease, 
producing surer research outcomes. As an example, focussing on one of the defence 
mechanisms, let us say projective identification, as the sole area of research, would have 
introduced fewer variables into the analysis and allowed for the analysis of more cases.  
 On a personal note, my aim in focussing on RC was partly about highlighting the fact 
of repetition, its immutability. Russel (2006), while noting this quality, nevertheless theorizes 
that RC is always a new and personal creation that combines a past traumatic experience with 
whatever current capacities the person has for healing and change. For him, “the repetition 
compulsion contains the history of our losses, and the quest for a new relationship” (p.620). 
Over recent years, while being enclosed in the topic, I developed a growing feeling of 
suffocation and monotony with it. I think the nature of the topic, lends itself to these feelings, 
in so far as it emphasises an absence of hope, a lack of agency, a quality of the unavoidable and 
catastrophic; in short, it speaks of repetition, endlessly. These feelings have culminated in a 
sense that although the concept may have legitimacy and utility, it is possibly reductionist 
nevertheless. I feel that it leaves out too much in the areas of change, development, dynamism 
and hope. I think that Russel’s inclusion of hopeful outcomes in RC, are worthy of further 
exploration and research.        
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Appendix a 
 
 
The Repetition Compulsion Defined   
RC is defined by four descriptive criteria: 
 it is unconscious; characterized on an experiential level by a lack of conscious awareness or conscious 
rational deliberate agency. It is described, or aspects of its functioning are described, as being either 
broadly unconscious, or specifically, repressed, dissociated or ego dystonic. 
 it is a repetition of a past unpleasurable experience  
 it is unpleasurable because it is painful and damaging  
 RC should be thought of as the unconscious repetition of a ‘lived interpersonal situation’.     
In relation to the last point, RC concerns the repetition of an experience, rather than of cognition, and therefore 
does not include the kind of repetition viewed in obsessional neurosis. Cognitive repetition is furthermore 
excluded under the above RC definition, since it proceeds alongside an awareness of the fact of repetition. I.e. the 
patient suffering from obsessional thinking is keenly aware of the repetitive nature of his/her thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
Appendix b 
 
Below, standard text indicates the initial hypotheses. Bold text indicates changes made as a 
result of findings and carried forward. A line through the text indicates that a statement has 
been invalidated. Bold italics indicate that a change has occurred in the case under 
consideration.    
 
Initial Hypothesis  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence (libidinous) and those 
by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. We therefore infer the presence of ego fragments attached to 
internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely libidinal or 
aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
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 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire is here centred on a specific object choice, often imbued with compelling 
fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or better. A basic 
assumption is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is desired 
is simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is 
unconsciously chosen because of certain harmful qualities or capacities.   
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
 
Hypothesis Following Case 1  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
223 
 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached to 
internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely libidinal 
or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
224 
 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption is 
that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is simultaneously 
and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously chosen because 
of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization will be identifiable in 
relation to the broader symptomatic picture, and that this variable is one which will act to reinforce 
repression of an unconscious object relationship. 
 RC is a repetition of the defensive adaptation to a past unpleasurable experience, rather than a 
repetition of the supposed primary experience itself.   
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
 
 
Hypothesis Following Case 2  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
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mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached 
to internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely 
libidinal or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
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reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption 
is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is 
simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously 
chosen because of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
 
 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization will be identifiable 
in relation to the broader symptomatic picture, and that this variable is one which will act to 
reinforce repression of an unconscious object relationship. 
 
Idealization, two forms of it, is recommended as the sought-after variable; object choice being central 
where ‘later idealization’ is observed, and the other modes (transference, projection, projective 
identification) required where ‘primitive idealization’ is seen.  
 
It is noted that object nature and/or the activation of a second object relationship may undermine or 
curtail episodes of primitive idealization.   
 
 RC is a repetition of the defensive adaptation to a past unpleasurable experience, rather than a 
repetition of the supposed primary experience itself.   
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual.  
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Hypothesis Following Case 3  
Dynamically, RC will occur as an outcome of the externalization of a repressed internal object relationship. In 
accordance with the literature review, this statement entails the following: 
 The dynamic causes of RC ultimately result from endopsychic make-up, where internalization is seen as 
a form of forgetting/repression and, splitting as a method of dealing with ambivalence. Splitting 
mechanisms here have a tendency to keep object relationships defined by a positive affective valence 
(libidinous) and those by a negative valence (aggressive) apart. However, contamination of affective 
valences may be observed and we do not necessarily in each instance find ego fragments attached 
to internal objects, with a singular ferocity or uncontaminated affective valence (either purely 
libidinal or aggressive). The following may be observed by implication:   
 
- The dynamics of overwhelming unmanageable affect, along with attempts to smother it or to 
pass it on to another. 
- ‘Crude emotion of an infantile character’, circumscribed by an inability to enter ambivalent 
formations. 
- ‘Chronic conflict’, often manifested as seemingly direct conflictual relations between love and 
hatred.  
 
 Externalization may be pictured either in terms of the activation of a split-off ego fragment or as centred 
on the defensive measures employed to impede apprehension of a repressed internal object relationship 
(an object-image/representation, a self-image/representation and a related affective component linking 
the two). 
 
 Externalization is achieved through various psychological defensive procedures, effecting perception and 
behaviour, including     
- Transference  
- Projection 
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- Projective Identification: PI is understood as both an intra and interpersonal event. In the first, it 
involves the projection of unacceptable or intolerable aspects of the self onto an object (an 
intrapsychic event properly involving the displacement of aspects of the self-representation onto an 
object-representation). A second step, beyond projection and beyond the intrapsychic, comprises of 
additional pressure, manipulation or influence designed to induce the object of the projection to feel 
or experience the projection. Finally, inducement or the degree of inducement will depend on the 
reactivation or reinforcement of “existing identity fragments” or “pre-existing introjective 
configurations” in the object, and belonging to the object.  
- Object Choice: desire, want or need is here centred on a specific object choice. The object may be 
imbued with compelling fantasy representations, such as a belief in something longed for, needed or 
better, but equally it may be chosen in line with an undefined want or need. A basic assumption 
is that an individual remains unaware of the fact of repetition, and that what is chosen is 
simultaneously and ultimately unwanted and unintended. In other words, the object is unconsciously 
chosen because of certain harmful qualities or capacities. 
 
 It is posited that a variable, which decides between the modes of externalization (transference, projection, 
projective identification, object choice) will be identifiable in relation to the broader symptomatic 
picture, and that this variable is one which will act to reinforce repression of an unconscious object 
relationship. Idealization and denigration are central in reinforcing repression of unconscious object 
relationships. We can say that the modes of externalization often aim at or are used to ‘manufacture’ 
one or the other. This finding is in line with another, which states that RC is a repetition of a defensive 
adaptation rather than of a primary experience.  
 
Idealization, two forms of it, is recommended as the sought-after variable; object choice being central 
where ‘later idealization’ is observed, and the other modes required where ‘primitive idealization’ is 
seen.  
 
In the case of idealization, we can note additionally that object choice allows for ‘later idealization’, 
and that the other modes are required for ‘primitive idealization’.   
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It is noted that object nature and/or a defensive adaptation to trauma or loss and/or the activation 
of a second object relationship may undermine or curtail episodes of primitive idealization. It is 
suggested that primitive idealization is inherently unstable and therefore that only later idealization 
indefinitely protects from knowledge of negative aspects of object nature.   
 
 A central aspect of that which is repeated, is the defensive adaptation, to a past unpleasurable 
experience.    
 
 We expect evidence of processes of internalization; incorporation, introjection and identification. 
 
 RC may be mediated by broad processes and modes of functioning, such as ego and superego 
participation. Repetitive activity is therefore a holistic affair including numerous aspects of the 
individual. 
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